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Introduction 
 
This thesis focusses on the ethical relationship between British amateur horse riders and 
their horses. More precisely, it argues that an important element of relating well, in this 
context, is knowing well, and it investigates the various sorts of epistemological 
responsibilities that the horse riders I studied negotiate and enact. The 'horse world' (as 
my participants call it) is a fragmented and heterogeneous domain (described in more 
detail in Chapters One and Two). Equestrian sport is no longer the pastime of an 
aristocratic and military elite, but encompasses multiple styles of riding, training and 
horse keeping, available to those with different tastes, ethical values, and economic 
resources. This diverse horse world is increasingly populated by one-horse owning leisure 
riders (as opposed to professional riders or aristocrats), three quarters of whom are female 
(BETA 2011, 2015), and these leisure rider/owners are the central focus of my study. 
Riding is a project of ambition and personal fulfilment for these riders, many of whom are 
serious in their endeavour to achieve competitive success in equestrian sport, but even 
more committed to the seductive goal of cultivating a state of profound partnership and 
'real connection' with their horses. For my participants, their 'world revolves around the 
horse' (in one rider’s words). They yearn to 'bond' with their horse so closely that horse 
and human are almost telepathically connected. They work towards creating embodied 
harmony so complete that the boundaries between bodies are felt to dissolve. They aim 
for a form of companionship and sensitive communication that empowers and enhances 
both partners, giving a soulful and liberating experience of both freedom and 
togetherness.   
 
A recent 'revolution in horsemanship' (Miller and Lamb 2005) involves a number of 
training methods advertised as overturning traditional systems. The revolutionaries 
propose new ways of thinking about horses, particularly as potential partners with a right 
to choose, and as natural beings replete with complex instinctive behaviours that, 
proponents argue, ought to be better recognised. This movement is far from internally 
consistent, and an environment of invention, critique, counter-critique and debunking 
emanates within a consumer market of educational services and products aimed at 
training horses and teaching owners. Amid this critical and lively ethical/epistemological 
environment, I set out initially to investigate the varied practices at play for making sense 
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of horse behaviour, by asking: “How do British amateur horse riders variably interpret 
their horses' behaviours?” I quickly began to recognise that a slightly different question 
was more pressing for my research participants: “How should horse riders know their 
horses?” It became clear that the act of knowing horses was treated as a critically 
important, deeply rewarding, but ethically risky practice, with associated responsibilities, 
values and virtues. Riders felt an imperative that one ought to know their horse better, as 
well as an aspiration to feel empowered by a profound sense of togetherness that may 
come from knowing their horse well. My research questions became: 
“How/when/where/by whom is the knowing of horses constituted as both a critical ethical 
risk and a captivating goal?” and “What requirements for 'knowing well' does this 
multispecies context demand?” 
 
Individualisation, choice, and the precariousness of 'real connection' 
 
The equestrian example outlined above is situated within a broader socio-political context 
analysed variably as reflexive modernity (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), late modern 
reflexivity (Giddens 1991) or liquid modernity (Bauman 2013), and described as 
operating under neoliberal governance (Harvey 2007), or advancing technologies of 
responsibilization (Rose 1999). Each terminology refers in different ways to the capacity 
of contemporary Western contexts to constitute people as reflexive, flexible, responsible, 
choice-making individuals. Anthropologists have debated the extent to which the concept 
of neoliberalism can provide a coherent 'macro-context' (Collier 2012:189) or describe 'an 
overarching, unified, coherent global trend' (Gershon 2011:539, see also Freeman 2007, 
Wacquant 2010). In line with this critique, this thesis aims to demonstrate a multifactoral 
context for equestrian activities, involving economic aspects, kinship relations, linguistic 
ideologies, gender dynamics and the affordances of equine bodies and responses, to name 
just a few. However, particularly pertinent at the introduction of this case is the 
observation made by scholars of late modernity that an emphasis on individual choice in 
contemporary Western society relates to a precariousness, and preciousness, to the idea of 
being properly connected. 
 
In this argument, an ever-expanding consumer market is described as encouraging 
individuals to make choices that are considered 'self-fulfilling' (Rose 1998:159). At the 
same time, the labour market demands and expects workers to  be flexible, self-
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improving, and mobile, to 'take charge of their own life' (Beck 2002:32). This means that 
people are no longer firmly rooted in their natal villages, nor in inherited classes, but are 
increasingly able (or expected, or forced) to 'construct their own biographies and self-
identities from the diverse options available' (Atkinson 2010:19, we will explore this 
point ethnographically in Chapter One).  Zygmunt Bauman's phrase 'liquid modernity', 
captures not only the flexibility required of workers and consumers, but the fluidity of the 
system they try to grapple with through their choices. Such fluidity abounds because 
individualist consumerism functions best when it demands that people keep changing 
their tastes, habits, affiliations and identities. 
 
This brief overview of scholarship helps to depict a British climate in which a 
proliferation of choice is felt as both opportunity and burden, and in which people yearn 
for better connectivity, a desire which plays out in different ways. Rheana Parrenas, for 
example, demonstrates the immense, affective, and financial 'encounter value' (Donna 
Haraway's term 2008:46) that Western office workers get as tourists helping to care for 
rescued Orangutans in Sumatra (2012). In a very different example, Debora Cameron 
critically analyses the uneven gains afforded those at the top of what she calls the 
capitalist 'communication culture,' which tells its consumers they need to buy in to the 
idea of better connectivity (2000). It is clear that the very idea of connectivity (in various 
forms) is valuable in contemporary Britain, as something else that can (must) be chosen. 
In line with this, in Animals in Modern Cultures, sociologist Adrian Franklin suggests that 
a state of 'ontological insecurity' in Britain (1999:54) (typified by the flexibility and 
choice described above) leads to feelings of isolation and impermanence (1999:55) which 
are alleviated by the recent increased uptake in pet-keeping. However, my ethnography 
connects human/animal relationships to this scholarship on 'liquid modernity' differently. 
I will argue that human/horse relationships are not the solution to the late modern 
experience of ontological insecurity, but a particular example of it. I will demonstrate that 
this climate figures epistemological practice as a relational technique and ethical problem 
for individual horse owners to manage responsibly. 
 
I will explore the various ways equestrians not only value the idea of profound 
connection, but also valorise the conditional adjective 'real', such that each rider considers 
only some of available epistemological options capable of representing the real horse 
well, and only some of the observable relationships between horse and rider qualified as 
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real connections.  This shows that dynamics between the concepts of choice, nature and 
connectivity have not reached a complete state of 'postplurality' (Marilyn Strathern's term 
1992:39, 135-6, 186). This is a condition Strathern describes associated with an influx of 
plurality and optionality, where everything would be rendered choosable, and 'nature' and 
'connection' entirely subsumed under that logic as merely another type of thing an 
individual can choose how to engage with, as though all options for connecting (or not) 
were equally (in)valid. However, Strathern depicts English society as feeling 'nostalgic' 
for the loss of naturalised connectivity as it heads towards, rather than is lost for good 
over, the precipice in which choice reigns supreme. In line with this, I find the imperative 
that one ought to know certain things about one’s real relatedness constitutes an 
interesting juxtaposition between the idea of a choosing, responsible individual and their 
natural (real) connectivity. While neither connectivity, nor nature, can be taken for 
granted in such a plural landscape, the concept of really real maintains ethical import and 
gives substance on which choices can be anchored and connections felt more binding. I 
can gently point towards other instances of the contemporary revival of this longstanding 
British trend to cherish and defend the concept (s) of 'real'; the increased popularity in 
tracing one’s ancestry to uncover one’s true roots (Edwards 1998, 2012), and the 
scandalous outrage that the media may have reached a state of 'post-truth' reporting (Mair 
2017, 2018). Each gains ethical traction through naturalisation; the idea of a really real 
that (ought to) root, connect and bind people. This thesis traces amateur British horse 
riders' techniques of grasping towards the 'real' as well as their endeavours to achieve 
good connection, and, more precisely, it explores the relationship between these two 
projects. The next two sections consider how this project is situated in relation to two 
bodies of anthropological literature, the 'animal turn' and the anthropology of ethics 
 
'Knowing well' as an ethnographic object in 'the animal turn' 
 
My interest in how people think and speak about horses pushes against the current 
momentum within 'multispecies' literature (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010). The latter is 
predominantly characterised by an emphasis on embodied, ontological relationships with 
animals rather than symbolic, detached ways of thinking about them. Until the 1980's, 
anthropological interest in animals was principally concerned with ascertaining how the 
idea and image of certain animals worked as symbols that could be utilised for human 
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thinking, or to aid human social relationships1 (Leach 1964, Tanner 1979, Levi-Strauss 
1962, Turner 1985). However, the reflexive turn in anthropology, the development of new 
disciplines such as science and technology studies, animal studies and 'environmental 
humanities' (Rose et al, 2012),  as well as the broader Western context of growing 
environmental concerns and interest in animals lives, have all contributed to a 
reconsideration of the anthropological approach to non-human animals (Ogden, Hall and 
Tanita 2013). This has included an active effort to 'bring the animal in' through 
'multispecies ethnography' – a methodological shift towards making observations beyond 
the human (Noske 1989, 1997, Kirksey and Helmriech 2010). The 'animal turn’ is a 
burgeoning and varied field, which includes an interest in the embodied experience of 
multispecies relatedness (Faier and Rofel 2014, Game 2001, Hayward 2010, Ingold e.g. 
2000, 2013, Parrenas 2012), the sort of partnerships and cooperation possible between 
humans and animals (Hart 2006,  Locke 2013, Nadasdy 2007, Vivieros de Castro 1998, 
Wipper 2000) and communicative relatedness with non-human animals (Brandt 2004, 
2006, Knight 2005, Kohn 2007, 2013, Kuhl 2011, Smith 2003, Wipper 2000). 
 
In this 'turn', ethnographies of radically different ways of knowing the world are often 
described in comparison to Western epistemology (e.g. Vivieros de Castro 1998, Nadasdy 
2007). The Western way of knowing is often described as 'modern' and exemplified by 
Descartes' philosophy, which not only holds human as distinct from animal, but also 
regards mind as distinct from material body, and interior self, distinct from exterior other 
(e.g. Ingold, 2000, 2006, 2013, Palsson 1996:65-66, 76, Willerslev 2007:13-15). Tim 
Ingold has been forefront in the rejection of this ‘sterile’ Cartesian system of knowing 
(2000:167), both in order to better understand non-Euro-American human others, and in 
order to better connect with the phenomenology of being-in-the-world (2000:40-50, also 
Descola and Palsson 1996:8, Mullin 2002:389). A central problem identified with the 
Cartesian model is its lack of ability to account for non-human personhood, as Rane 
Willerslev describes, ‘For us in the West... Animals are understood to be wholly natural 
beings, and their behaviour is typically explained as automatic and instinctive’ 
                                                 
1Other early considerations of animality in anthropology include the now disbanded evolutionary models 
which considered some human groups closer to animality than others, and an interest in the way non-
human species function within the economy of hunter-gatherer group (see Shanklin 1985, Mullin 1999) 
I focus instead on symbolic anthropology as a background, followed by the subsequent efforts to 'bring 
the animal in', as these moves situate my effort to reconsider human thinking (and thinking about 
thinking) as part of relations with personable animals. 
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(2007:2Descola 2013:60-77, see also Hurn 2012:30-31, 41-45).   
 
While anthropologists interested in human/animal relatedness are substantially varied in 
the mechanisms through which they explicitly reject Cartesian thinking, the tendency to 
do so has been tidal, on both academic and ethical grounds. Alf Hornborg’s 2006 essay 
compares animism, fetishism and objectivism, and acts as an exemplar of the way 
modernity is ousted in order to advocate for better acknowledgement of, and achievement 
of, relatedness. He argues, ‘The social condition of modernity … amplifies a pervasive 
(Cartesian) dissociation of self from non-self that...is at the root of both solipsism and 
objectivism.’ (2006:28-9). For Hornborg, modern epistemology inevitably entails, 'a 
relinquishment of responsibility' (2006:29) for the 'natural' objects that are passively 
known. The problem is not that Western people cannot have moral relationships with the 
non-human environment, he clarifies, but that modern epistemology enables them to 
'sever' their sense of relatedness such that they can shut off from the moral predicaments 
of their relationships: 
 
We probably all have treasured spaces in our lives where we are practicing 
animist, in the sense that engagement and 'relatedness' take precedence over 
detached observation ... Our training in the skills of modernist detachment and 
objectification is contextual, as illustrated by ...the industrial butcher who 
privately cares for his dog. ... Science and technology does not so much make us 
into robots, as make specific parts of our behaviour robot-like. 
(Hornborg 2006:23-24) 
 
 Not all 'animal turn' scholars would agree with Hornborg's formulation of animism, 
modernity, or relatedness; however, his argument is a strong example of the tendency 
among multispecies ethnographies to position Cartesian modern thinking as not only 
opposite to, but practically immiscible with, relational registers of knowing. Hornborg's 
point (which resonates with the broader trend) is that ethical relationships with non-
human others are afforded only by evading, rebuking or momentarily escaping the 
epistemological apparatus of modernity.   
 
This comparison oversimplifies the complexity of Western concepts of personhood 
(Murray 1993, Laidlaw 2010:154, Hurn 2012:41). Bruno Latour has convincingly argued 
that peoples' engagement with that model has never been straightforward, consistent or 
unreflexive; that 'We have never been modern' (1991), a sentiment Donna Haraway 
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echoed with her follow up call, 'We have never been human' (2004:2,3). Latour and 
Haraway, along with other Science and Technology Studies scholars, emphasise how the 
dualistic divisions between nature and culture, human and non-human, retain a currency 
and import in Western thinking but require ongoing management and creative 
construction (see also Barad 2003, Birke 1991,  Birke, Bryld and Lykke 2004 Despret 
2004, 2013, 2016). This scholarship has convincingly argued that modern forms of 
knowledge are not deprived of relatedness, but are constituted relationally through 
embodied, social, political contexts. Nevertheless, in this literature, objective(ish) 
knowledge that attempts to distinguish thought from world is still considered starkly at 
odds with the relational dynamics it exists within. Relational ways of knowing, that 
acknowledge the affective, responsive, interactive body, are proposed as a better 
alternative, more likely to enable the flourishing of human and non-human interactants 
(Haraway 2003, 2008, Despret 2004, 2013, 2016). I adopt, from this literature, an interest 
in attending to the sorts of embodied thinking-practice afforded by horses and equestrian 
environments. My project is not merely to show that sociable relations with animals do 
exist in the West (an ethnographic gap which is steadily being attended, for example, 
Serpell 1986, Knight 2005, Swabe 2005, Alger and Alger 1999, Sanders and Arluke 1996, 
Irvine 2008), but to investigate how animals are known as (or like) persons within/despite 
a context described on the one hand as harbouring a deep commitment to Cartesian 
modernity, and on the other, as demonstrating late-, or post-modern 'ontological 
instability'. Counter to the main thrust of the multispecies literature, I will demonstrate 
specific forms of representational knowing, individualistic thinking, epistemological 
doubt, and objectification that are central to the practice of ethical, empathic, embodied 
knowing of horses in this context. 
 
'Knowing well' as an ethnographic object for ethical anthropology 
 
The reflexive and evaluative practices of British amateur equestrians lend themselves 
well towards engaging with the contemporary anthropological 'ethical turn' (Faubion 
2001).  Emerging debates within this scholarship can be seen to contend with the extent 
and forms of epistemological practice that are universally, or locally, relevant to the 
ethical dimension of life. I have divided this section into three sorts of epistemological 
practice that feature in ethnographies of ethics; knowledge about the other, knowledge 
about the self, and knowledge about the predicament, and I will begin with the later. 
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For some anthropologists of ethics, ethical predicaments are characteristically 
unfathomable, complex, and messy. In these descriptions, not-knowing seems a 
constituent part of the moral condition, such that, tragically, one cannot clearly and 
completely know the impact of one’s actions, nor the causes of ones' hardships (e.g. Das 
2013, 2014, Mattingly 2008, 2013, 2014). There is an affinity here with multispecies 
literature, for example, Cheryl Mattingly describes an antiquarian humanist 'first-person' 
virtue ethics that 'emphasises the fragility of life, the sociality of being and the 
vulnerability of action in the face of circumstances out of human control' (2013:168), 
which (somewhat ironically) resonates with the entanglements that Donna Haraway 
describes in which each movement one makes unknowingly affects how others live and 
die (2008:45-69, 81-82). For some, recognising this chronic un-knowability is ethically 
important itself, such that to render certainty in knowing one’s ethical relations with 
others would be to oversimplify the encounter. When considering an ethic of non-cruelty 
in Vedic texts, Veena Das describes stories in which people relate to animals through a 
sense of togetherness, but also show 'a certain difficulty of reality [that] there are aspects 
of our existence from which we are fenced out.' (2013:18) The stories evoke a known, 
not-knowing that she suggests is endemic to human relationships with animals, beyond 
the particularity of the texts. It is this form of not-knowing that she feels is absent from 
'ontological' descriptions of human/animal relatedness, such as those of Vivieros de 
Castro (2013:18, 28-30). 
 
In contrast, Webb Keane describes the process of 'objectification' – of describing an 
ethical event in explicit and recognisable terms, from a generalisable, 'third person stance' 
- as a crucial mechanism in ethical life. He doesn't use the term to suggest ethical 
predicaments are holistically knowable but to demonstrate how the act of recognising a 
situation – rendering it recognisable, even if only on the 'surface' – is indispensable for 
ethical practice (2010: 74-74, 87-82, 2015:68-69, 159-160, 208). Different, yet again, is 
David Graeber's assertion that the ultimate state of reality is 'simply irrelevant' to the way 
value functions – as 'players' engage with the 'game' of obtaining values in the eyes of 
others (2013:231). Across this variant emphasis on knowing, or not-knowing the reality of 
ethical predicaments, these scholars are similar in that they argue that certain 
epistemological practices feature universally, as constitutive parts of ethical conduct. In 
other words, ethics, in these accounts, relies upon knowing/not-knowing in certain ways. 
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In contrast, and in dialogue with these positions, I will investigate how the concept of 
grasping/not-grasping 'real' holds ethical traction, not as a universal mechanism within 
human ethical life, but as a particularly valuable and important idea within this late 
modern, multispecies context. 
 
I will investigate the cultivation of certain epistemological skills that are the subject of 
ethical evaluation, not only the means, such as empathy. Anthropologists have 
investigated empathic knowledge from a phenomenological, embodied perspective 
(Throop 2008, 2010, 2012, Csordas 2008); as the intersubjective basis for the functioning 
of verbal dialogue (Rumsey 2010, Sidnell 2010,  Duranti: 2006, 2008, 2010 Keane 
2015:93-95); or in relation to developmental psychology where shared attention, mutual 
gaze, and theory of mind have been identified as important milestones in child 
development (Keane 2015:45-47, 80-83, Tomasello and Carpenter 2007). Mattingly is 
particularly useful in her exploration of narrative form as a means of imperfect 'mind-
reading' (2008). In each of these cases, a 'basic' (Hollan 2012:71) form of provisional, 
mutual, working knowledge of the Other features as a universal human, moral, trait 
(though not all authors agree on exactly what constitutes this shared trait). However, 
another theme in anthropological research is to demonstrate the variety (or 'vicissitudes' 
Throop 2010) of possible empathic experiences, including cross cultural variation in the 
way in which statements about intentions and experiences are, themselves, ethically 
ambiguous, prohibited, or sanctioned (Duranti, 2015:233-242,  Hollan and Throop 2011,  
Hollan 2012:72-75, Luhrmann 2012, Ochs 1982, Robbins and Rumsey 2008, Throop 
2008). Most of the variety in the ethnographic record to date involves instances where 
knowledge of internal state is considered inappropriate or unknowable (though see 
Hermann 2011 for a contrasting example in Fiji), demonstrated in contrast with Western 
traditions of empathising that are, in fact, ethnographically under-explored. I contribute a 
comparative ethnography in which empathic knowledge is scrutinised, but also sacralised. 
In this case, enhanced understanding is not (only) the means, but also the aim, of riders' 
projects of self-improvement. Furthermore, I provide a description of the ethics that 
accompany empathic relations with a non-verbal other, including the responsibility that is 
entailed when speaking-for another. This is an especially interesting problem within a 
geographical/historical context that particularly links intentionality to voice (Duranti 
1993, Rosaldo 1989). While anthropologists who have taken an interest in human/animal 
ethical relationships have focussed on embodied attentiveness (Dave 2014, Rose 2002, 
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2007), it remains to be investigated how embodied registers of knowledge might enter 
into verbal dialogue and constitute an ethics of speaking-for and knowing well. 
 
Finally, the anthropology of ethics has been intimately tied up with the question of how 
people think about themselves; how one reflects on oneself in line with particular values 
and virtues, gains self-insight, and/or is driven to give an account of one’s behaviour. For 
example, Jarrett Zigon proposes moments of 'moral breakdown' as deliberative ethical 
events that occur as ruptures from the usual, habitual patterns which characterise morality 
(2007). In contrast, James Laidlaw describes Foucault's notion of 'problematisation' as the 
historically variant, self-evaluative aspect of ordinary life (2013:118-124), while Lambek 
likens ethical evaluation to an act like speaking, something that can be done 'intuitively' 
(2010b:43-44). Many scholars have been keen to emphasise that self-evaluation is never a 
solitary event, but occurs within particular political conditions and interactive situations 
(e.g. Laidlaw 2013:124, Lambek 2010:16, Mattingly 2012:163). Webb Keane, for 
example, emphasises the intersubjective constitution of an individual’s 'stance', which 
occurs through triangulation with an interaction partner and a shared matter of interest 
( 2015:154-156, following DuBois 2007). Michael Lempert calls for ethnographic 
research to investigate variety in self-evaluative ethical projects; not only in terms of the 
different virtues that people might be drawn to cultivate in various predicaments, but in 
terms of the forms of reflection at play also. He asserts, ' reflection comes in many more 
forms then a concept like “choice” lets on, and in many more degrees and modalities than 
a trope like moral “breakdown” allows. (2014:469 see also Laidlaw, 2013, 2014, Keane 
2014). Reflexivity itself (or particular forms of it, or even lack of it) can be pursued 
(reflexively, see Laidlaw 2013:151-154) as an ethical virtue in and of itself, for example, 
the academic valorisation of a highly abstract and critical form of reflection is described 
by Bourdieu as 'the scholastic point of view' (1990). In comparison, Saba Mahmood 
describes Egyptian Muslims following piety movements as cultivating an embodied state 
of submission so complete that it is instinctive, rather than deliberative (2005:e.g. 137). 
This ethnography contributes a comparative example of metacognitive reflexivity (Mair 
2018), that is, how people think about thinking, or evaluate their processes of evaluation. 
The multispecies environment contributes a novel angle here, as I will investigate how 
horses have an influence on the forms of reflexivity valued within this sphere: horses 
respond positively or negatively to the variant embodied thinking practice of riders. We 
will see how horses are thought to act as 'mirrors to the soul', revealing aspects of riders 
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interiorities that were unbeknownst even to them, and how this sort of intersubjective 
reflexivity is valued by British amateur riders within the aim of obtaining a 'real 
connection' with their horse. 
  
 
Summary of the argument and overview of the chapters 
 
My principle assertion is that relating well, in this context, is largely about knowing well. 
In making this assertion, I position myself against certain arguments within the animal 
turn that consider affective, embodied ways of knowing a radical alternative to the 
'detached', representational model of thinking associated with modernity.  I will 
demonstrate that objective, individualistic, and representational thinking are central to the 
forms of ethical, embodied relatedness that exist between British amateur riders and their 
horses. I will show that British horse riders harbour a complex and deeply ambiguous 
engagement with representational thinking; a sincere commitment to the idea of accurate 
truth, but also the perpetual desire to overcome the scepticism and interpretative effort 
that this commitment to truth entails. 
 
 In Chapter One, I will introduce British equestrianism as a changing context for 
horse/human relationships, in which a broadening demographic and increasing consumer 
market provide an impressive arena of choice for horse owners. I compare my 
ethnography with that of Rebecca Cassidy's study of horse racing society in Newmarket, 
where a stable hierarchy between different classes of people and different qualities of 
horse was maintained via the idioms of nature, breeding and heritage. In contrast, in my 
ethnography, connectivity and a sense of belonging were organised more prominently 
around the notion of individual choice, and I show the importance of ambition, 
individualism, and responsibility. Following Marilyn Strathern's analysis in After Nature 
(1992), I describe a tensive, and at times, paradoxical relationship at play between the 
idea of 'choice' and that of 'nature'. I demonstrate social and moral instability associated 
with that choice/nature conceptual tension, and I show that 'epistemological 
responsibility' answers to, and recreates, this precarity.  In sum, this chapter establishes 
'horsiness' as an exclusive, natural and chosen category of person and introduces the 
concept of 'epistemological responsibility' as key to my participants' projects to forge 'real 
connections' with their horses. 
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Chapter Two continues the exploration of epistemological responsibility through 
attending to the 'revolution' in horse training practices. In particular, I investigate an 
imperative on owners to remain 'open minded' and to 'learn from the horse'.  In order to 
describe the specificity of this imperative, I compare this equestrian 'open mindedness' 
with two other sorts of 'open'; that described within multispecies literature as a way of 
being available and attentive to the animal (Haraway 2008, Ingold 2000, 2006), and that 
described by those following a Foucauldian interest in resisting normativity through the 
creation of 'critical openings' (Dave 2011). British amateur horse riders demonstrate a 
dual project of recognising/objectifying their horses in highly specific, narrow terms, on 
the one hand, and maintaining a status of 'open-mindedness' by demonstrating their own 
epistemological flexibility and independence, on the other. I argue that the multispecies 
version of being 'open' to connecting with animals is not sufficient for describing the sort 
of 'open-mindedness' riders cultivate and critique, because the former contends 'openness' 
as an alternative to objective thinking, while the latter  maintains an ethical, critical 
commitment to the idea of objective truth and accurate knowledge when representing the 
real horse. 
 
Chapter Three develops this theme of engaging with the ethics surrounding descriptions 
of horses. In this chapter I attend to narrative form and describe the responsibility that 
owners have to narrate their relationship to their horse well. I demonstrate two 
particularly common narrative genres in the equestrian world; the triumph narrative 
(which celebrates rider bravery) and the care giving narrative (which sees the horse as 
needy patient). I argue that these narrative forms tie the human character and equine 
character together, so that descriptions of horses are always already formative of the sorts 
of ethical judgements that will apply to the human. I argue that experiences of particularly 
'blurred' human/animal intersubjectivity can cause ethical problems since they 
demonstrate moments of 'dysnarrativia' (Bruner 1990:222), where riders do not know 
which story they are living in. 
 
Having established the import of knowing horses well in Chapters One to Three, Chapter 
Four takes on the interesting question of why riders might describe their horses in non-
real terms. The subject matter of this chapter is 'infantilization' (describing horses as 
likened to human children), which is prevalent among riders - but so is the internal 
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critique of infantilization. In this chapter I investigate instances where horse owners 
rhetorically mark their own descriptions or behaviours as somehow not really-real, and I 
ask what ethical work the not-real register of knowledge might afford. I describe three 
local registers of speaking and relating to words, which I call 'care with words', 'the 
language of tough love,' and 'words from the heart.' I explain the way infantilistic 
language is managed and moderated within, and between, these different speech registers. 
I argue against the suggestion that metaphorical knowledge of animals is more 'detached' 
than more ontological alternatives, and I show that management of the not-real is part of 
British amateur horse riders' ethical conduct. 
 
Chapters One through Four have demonstrated the epistemological problems managed by 
horse riders, such that the horses are performed as difficult things to really know. Chapter 
Five responds to this assertion by asking, in this context, what might constitute moments 
that qualify as 'real connection'? In this chapter I foreground the affective and embodied 
relationship between horse and rider, and I argue that embodied relationality and 
perceptions of felt 'togetherness' are not departures from the critical and reflective 
environment established in previous chapters. I show that the specific sort of embodied 
relationality that riders desire is valuable precisely within this particular epistemological 
context. Working towards real connection requires cultivating certain ways of 
thinking/moving in both horse and human bodies, such that they might come into 
harmony together. This pedagogical work grapples with, and performs, a number of 
epistemological risks; riders’ ability to author and compose their own thoughts, to know 
their own bodies, and to know another’s body in a way in order to recognise and enable 
an enhanced, but not 'manufactured' or 'dominating' relationship. There are gendered 
aspect to many of these concerns, which are fundamentally about the risks and promises 
of connecting to others via the fallible, illusive, and vulnerable body. 
 
In the conclusion I will gather together contributions to the animal turn and the ethical 
turn from the preceding chapters. I will draw out the variant ways that the notions of 
'choice' and 'nature' have featured as important concepts throughout the thesis, and I will 
emphasise that these horse riders are constituted as responsible not only for choice-
making, but for what and how they know (about others, selves, reality). While other 
ethnographies of ethics have described the principle site of ethics as the problems people 
face when working out 'best good' (Mattingly 2012), dealing with 'difficult reality' (Das 
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2014) or a value conflict (Robbins 2007, 2013); I emphasise the ethical, epistemological 
work involved in ascertaining reality about the state of entanglement one is engaged in 
and required to react to. Crucially, I will show that certain forms of detached or objective 
thinking are inseparable from British amateur riders' projects to achieve profound 
embodied connectedness with their horses. I will explain how my argument for the 
importance of epistemological responsibility is particularly pertinent for this multispecies, 
late modern context where 'reality' and 'connectivity' are related, risky, valorised, 
concepts. I will emphasise the importance of language to human ethical relationships with 
non-humans, will propose the contribution multispecies literature can make to the 
anthropology of ethics, and call for further ethnographic research to investigate varieties 
of ways in which empathic knowledge is pursued, taught, and evaluated. 
 
Methodology 
 
My research involved 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork, including participant 
observation, unstructured interviews, and Dictaphone recordings at three primary field 
sites; a livery yard, equine college, and alternative training centre. In order to aid my 
research, I took a horse with me into the field. I will discuss four aspects of my 
methodology in detail; my relation to the field, the selection and recruitment of field sites 
and participants, data collection and management, and the challenges of accounting for 
'the horse in the data.' 
 
My relation to the field 
 
While ethnography has traditionally been associated with the participant observation of 
exotic, or radically different, groups of people in faraway places (as often attributed to 
Malinowski's example), 'anthropology at (or near) home' or 'insider anthropology' 
(Messerschmidt 1981) is now a widely accepted cornerstone of the academe (see Pierano 
1998, Reed-Danahay 1997, for example, Abu-Lughod 1986, 1988, Cohen 1982, 
Schnieder 1980, Strathern and Oxford, 1981). These insider studies prompt reflexive 
consideration of how intimate familiarity with the field site may provide particular 
affordances and challenges (Kanuha 2000, Roth 2009, Ellis 2007). Ethnographic 
descriptions of multispecies relatedness have often taken an autoethnographic approach, 
describing in detail the phenomenological experience of authors' own encounters with 
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animals or non-human environments (Game 2001, Locke 2017, Haraway 2008, Hayward 
2010). A central aim of this methodology section is to explain why this is not the 
approach that I have taken. 
 
 In my case, I am not only an 'insider' ethnographer investigating my natal country, in my 
mother tongue, but furthermore, I conduct research in a particular sphere of activity – 
equestrianism -  in which I have achieved a considerable level of expertise. This is an 
uncomfortable fact for the novice ethnographer. I recognise in my methods training 
courses and in the writings of my ethnographic role models an ethically, politically and 
aesthetically charged imperative to enter the field site humbly, as a clumsy alien, or naïve 
child, who understands little and respects a lot. However, it is my equestrian background 
that led me to anthropology (rather than the other way around). I see myself not as an 
'opportunistic anthropologist' (Adler and Adler 1987) who studies communities they are 
already a member of, so much as an equestrian who harnesses anthropology 
opportunistically to satiate an epistemological hunger that my horsey friends (of both 
species) instilled in me. It is therefore important to explicitly describe and reflect on the 
relatedness between my equestrian and anthropological endeavours, as this contextualises 
the rest of the thesis and explains many of my methodological and analytical decisions. 
 
While I am from a non-horsey family, (as are many other contemporary riders, discussed 
in Chapter One), I was obsessed with horses from a young age, eventually landing a 
voluntary role at a rescue stables at age 11. I knew every horse and owner in the vicinity 
and learned much from a local horse dealer whose ponies I rode to get them 'child-ready' 
and then to 'show off' to clients – wealthy families looking to buy ponies for their 
children. Realising an opportunity, I began buying and selling ponies myself. I got this 
initiative off the ground with cash from weekend work, but soon I had sold several horses 
and was amassing enough money to cover the vet bills and competition entries, and to 
buy better quality horses. I developed a reputation for being able to get horses to 'go well’ 
and started charging to train others' badly behaved horses, all before I had sat my A levels. 
Enthused, upon leaving school, I started learning everything I could, spending time 
apprenticing in a variety of training yards, including three months taming wild mustangs 
in Colorado when I was 19. Among my efforts to learn, I passed the 'Intelligent 
Horsemanship' (IH) range of exams. This is an educational organisation central to the 
'revolution' in horsemanship, affiliated to Californian horse whisperer Monty Roberts, and 
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run by his British protégé, previous champion jockey, Kelly Marks. At 21, I became the 
youngest ever recommended trainer of IH, at 24 I became the first woman to ride 
unbroken horses in Roberts’ demonstrations. In many ways, this was the time of my life. I 
appeared in demonstrations in front of audiences of up to 2000, in various countries, 
speaking into a radio mike about horse psychology, and achieving success after success 
with the challenging horses I rode. I wrote answers to 'ask the expert' sections in horsey 
magazines, composed and marked 'horse psychology' exams for IH, was featured on 
question and answer panels at large equestrian events, and took part in a number of 
television series on 'Horse and Country' Sky TV channel. The most rewarding aspect of 
this developing career was the capacity to get horses and people behaving better towards 
one another, I could instigate significant changes in a dysfunctional relationship so that 
horses stopped biting (for example) people stopped hitting, and nobody (of either species) 
was, or felt, at risk of being killed. This is a significant achievement, and one I continue 
to be proud of. However, during this time, I also began to feel uneasy about my old horse-
selling banter creeping into my interactions with clients and students. 
 
I can sell almost any horse to any buyer. This is something I am half proud, half ashamed 
of – horse dealers have a reputation in the equestrian world similar to second hand car 
salesman, and not without cause. Of course, I didn't sell the wrong horses to the wrong 
people (I hope), but sometimes, I could almost be caught up in my own rhetorical 
capacities. I knew just what to say, just how to pitch it, just what character definition 
might make this behaviour appealing to this sort of person. In my horse training work, I 
became aware that I would get out of the car in a new stable yard and reconfigure the 
training descriptions to suit the sensibilities of each new client; this one needs to hear 
'respect', while that one needs to hear 'trust', this one wants efficiency, this one 
emotionality. As I began to tune in to the training narratives I was advocating, I became 
aware of what – at that stage - seemed an absurdity in some of the verbosity of the 
equestrian world at large. Hypocrisy, in particular, stood out to me at every turn; how was 
it that someone could talk about their desire to win the horse’s trust, in one moment, and 
joke about the horse’s stupidity and insolence the next? How could a horse need 'rescuing' 
from one owner whose biggest crime was not to name him, only to be often whipped in 
his new 'loving' home? And, if I believed that self-regulation was an ethically valid thing 
to teach a horse, why did I deliberatively dress it up in a language of 'freedom' for my 
clients? These are the rough, early questions which provoked me to begin my study of 
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social anthropology, as a mature undergraduate student, and which have now been 
drastically reconfigured into the research questions described above. 
 
An ethical and methodological advantage of this intimacy with my field site is that I 
began fieldwork with a sensitive understanding of horse riders’ interests, values, and 
emotional experiences. This meant I could tread carefully in forging amicable 
relationships with new participants, and also that my research efforts were welcomed 
enthusiastically, participants were eager to hear about the research and the process was 
very dialogical. While writing up, I gave many talks about my research to riding clubs 
and was asked to write articles for the Intelligent Horsemanship magazine. During my 
studies, I have raised my research interests with my equestrian friends, teachers and 
clients, and have had my intrigue restoked repeatedly by the interesting fact that many 
equestrians consider these questions as urgent and important as I have. 
 
One challenge of this familiarity is that I was liable to overlook some aspects which an 
outsider anthropologist may have better recognised (Hayano 1979:102), parts of the 
practical workings of horse/human relatedness only really became visible to me as 
phenomena when discussed with my supervisor, sometimes, long after the event. Details, 
for example, of the equipment used, or aspects of equestrian terminology, were only 
revealed to me as interesting, rather than obvious, while writing up, and may have been 
ethnographically recorded and explored in more detail by an outsider anthropologist. 
 
Another complication I faced was whether to withhold my own expertise from situations 
where horses and humans were putting one another at risk. I can find little literature from 
other expert-ethnographers to guide me on the ethical and methodological dynamics 
involved, though some nurse-ethnographers have written about similar experiences of 
occupying mutually contrasting roles (Simmons 2007, Burns et al 2012). The Ethical 
Guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropologists states: “The researcher should try 
to minimise disturbances both to subjects themselves and to the subjects' relationships 
with their environment” (ASA 1.2.a). There were many relational dynamics between 
horses and humans that were reminiscent of those I had been employed to 'fix' in my 
previous career, yet I particularly wanted to study how equine behaviour was evaluated 
and managed outside of my own approach. This wasn't just a matter of whether to 
practically help in each case, but also of how open and honest to be with my participants. 
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If they knew me to be a horse trainer, the dynamic was very different in times of 
relational dysfunction than if they knew me merely as a researcher. Interestingly, they 
would be more inclined to watch their language and defend their approach in the former 
case. A trainer with my 'horse whispering' associations represented a moral observer, 
whereas an academic researcher was considered naïve and neutral. I handled this 
complexity by trying to background, rather than hide, my own training. I introduced 
myself primarily as an ethnographer, mentioning my own equestrian background was 
mostly with youngsters and problem horses, if I was asked. I raised my previous 
affiliation to the 'alternative movement' only when it would have felt dishonest not to, for 
example, if asked directly, or if it would have been disingenuous to take part in a 
conversation about that training system without admitting my experience with it. In fact, 
nobody asked for my behavioural opinion on their horses during fieldwork, they quickly 
accepted me as another horse owner, and interested researcher, rather than as somebody 
with a particular affiliation and knowledge. On one occasion I offered help without being 
asked, and it was accepted. This was a child’s pony who was bucking the child off, I had 
arranged to watch her ride for research purposes, and after the 11-year-old was flung off 
once into the fence, and got a nosebleed, I felt the only ethical thing to do was to step in 
and advise how to get things back on track, which involved several sessions of teaching 
the child, pony and her mother. This went well, but forever changed the dynamic of that 
research relationship, as they became very dependent on my advice and would call me 
frequently with all manner of equestrian questions – I continued to record these 
encounters and included them within my field notes and analyses. 
 
Sourcing participants and choosing field sites 
 
One of the ways I managed the ethics and practicalities of my intimacy with the field was 
through carefully choosing where and how to conduct research. It was beneficial for me 
to predominantly 'start afresh', contacting and meeting participants as strangers, rather 
than relying upon my pre-existing equestrian networks. I found a number of potential 
livery yards (where horses are kept) through a google search and chose one that seemed 
'middle of the road'; in terms of finances, facilities, size, and approach to horse riding and 
training. By chance, the yard manager's wife was chairman of the local riding club, which 
I joined, and this led to further participant recruitment. I followed ASA and AAA 
guidelines in obtaining clear, informed constant from research participants (ASA 1.4, 
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AAA  A.B.2), and in re-establishing this consent regularly during fieldwork, when asking 
to attend a certain event, or to take photographs, or make notes. Various instructors, 
farriers, vets and saddle fitters visited the yard, some of whom also joined the study, and 
in shadowing their visits to other yards, I recruited further horse owners. This fresh 
networking afforded me opportunities to notice things about my new friends that may 
have been too familiar to acknowledge with my longstanding equestrian community. It 
also enabled me to introduce myself as researcher from the very beginning, and to remind 
participants of this fact regularly, therefore avoiding some of the ethical challenges of 
'deciding what to tell' when researching intimate others (Ellis 2009). 
 
I was pleased that I was quickly adopted into a student-researcher-friend sort of role, and 
not treated as a specialist, expert, nor as an affiliate loyal to one side of a 'revolution'. This 
was aided by three things; firstly, the fact that while I recognise I have a good way to 
influence horse and human behaviour, I genuinely am open to questioning much of the 
ethics of equestrianism – even those I have promoted, such that it was a relief for me to 
return to the position of student, rather than expert, and to truly explore other ways of 
working out ‘best good’. I am sure the authenticity of my inquiry helped. Secondly, I 
located myself within a field that I am an eager novice within; the world of competitive 
amateur eventing (dressage, show jumping, cross-country riding). I did not have to hide 
my competence here, I knew little of the rules, and my riding technique needed much 
improvement. Finally, the fact I had a horse with me helped immensely. This is an 
unusual ethnographic method, though Karen Lane's employment of her Wheaton Terrier 
as research assistant acts as a trailblazer; she found Torriden 'authenticated being there' 
and initiated conversations (2015). George, my equine 'research assistant,' gave me a 
reason to be legitimately and actively engaged in equestrian worlds at least twice a day, 
provided me with an authentic investment in conversations about horses, and meant that I 
could adopt the role of student, taking George to many different instructors and clinicians 
and experiencing the pedagogical process first-hand. 
 
George, I borrowed from Kelly Marks, my friend and mentor. He was a beautiful, 
athletic, long legged youngster, who had the potential for competitive success but was 
lacking the education. He was ideal in prompting numerous discussions with owners and 
trainers alike, and perhaps most useful in enabling me to embark on long 'hacks out' – 
riding out across the countryside, with my participants, talking about horses (and, for 
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some, moaning about husbands) all the way. However, George's presence raised some 
ethical concerns too. While I wanted to challenge, and reconsider, aspects of my own 
ethical conduct, I did not want George to be subject to any especially harsh treatment. 
While the multispecies movement advocates recognition of animals as persons, our 
disciplinary ethical guidelines are yet to substantially engage with what this might mean 
about anthropologists' responsibilities towards animals. The ASA guidelines do not 
mention non-humans at all, and AAA code contains a brief reference directed towards 
primatological research (A2, Hurn 2012:211). George’s vulnerable position with relation 
to my research factored into my selection of field site, and sometimes into my decisions 
about which instructors to attend lessons with on George, and which to watch from the 
sidelines. While I was open to subjecting him (us) to some training that I was unsure 
about while I learned, I did not put him (us) in a position where he would be, what I 
considered, violently treated (even though I was researching the sheer variety of meanings 
the term 'violence' holds, and reconsidering my own position). 
 
During early fieldwork, I became interested in the broader pedagogical environment that 
the livery yard was situated within, and so I initiated a second field site, at an equestrian 
college where 'traditional' horsemanship is taught. I enrolled on a number of courses as a 
student, explaining to the course convener, and my teachers about my research in 
advance, and introducing myself fully to my fellow students on our first meeting. I trained 
towards and took my 'riding and road safety' and British Horse Society Stage 2 stable 
management and riding exam during fieldwork – this is not a particularly high standard 
but qualifies one to work as a groom. I also contacted a number of alternative horse 
trainers from strains other than the methods I was already trained within, and they were 
eager to take part in the research. One in particular became a longstanding research 
participant, I regularly accompanied her to visit her clients, and we had long 
conversations in her car afterwards. I also conducted some research, later into my 
fieldwork, on the alternative horse training courses that I had previously taught on, 
though when it came to writing up, I chose to focus more regularly on the systems that 
were new to me. While my research brought me into contact with over a hundred riders in 
varying degrees of engagement, I count 35 riders among my close, long-term participants. 
Most of these were female (all but two), and most were amateurs (six were instructors). 
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Data collection and management 
 
A typical fieldwork day would involve arriving at the yard at 7am to put George out in the 
field, alongside other owners who visited before work. I would take my time with stable 
chores, so as to catch the later morning shift that included those who work part time, 
flexibly, or not at all, and might 'do' their horses any time before 9. Then I would 
accompany participants who were riding during the day or had planned excursions – 
perhaps a trip in the horse lorry to a nearby instructor, or to hire an arena, or to take the 
horse to the beach. Or, I would accompany instructors in their beaten-up cars, travelling 
from yard to yard teaching lessons – working owners would forgo their lunch break at 
work, or finish early, or would sneak a riding lesson in when supposedly 'working from 
home.' In the afternoon, the yard would become busy from around 4pm until 8.30, with 
owners completing stable chores and riding in the arena, or in the summer, out on hacks. 
Weekends were the busiest time, with competitions and clinics to attend, long hacks out 
in the afternoons, or seized time to get chores done – the muck heap stacked, the tack 
cleaned, the horse bathed, the lorry cleaned out. There were regular occasions when my 
participants would socialise together too, and I attended birthday drinks, 'yard family' 
meals, bonfire night, summer barbecues, a day out to the races, and the Christmas party. 
 
Most of the equestrian activities I took part in were unconducive to easy note-taking. My 
early attempt at a paper notebook got rained on, trodden on, and muddied, before I 
stopped bringing any form of note taking equipment into the field. This contributed to my 
developing reliance on the Dictaphone for collecting data. I found it a very useful 
technique to switch the Dictaphone on, at the beginning of a ride, and put it in my pocket 
(leaving the zip open) so that my hands, and mind, were free to concentrate on riding. I 
would then recall the riding experience from memory when writing field notes in the 
evening, before listening back to the Dictaphone recording of the spoken words. This was 
incredibly informative, since precise turns of phrase were difficult to remember during an 
hour or more of riding – particularly when being instructed – and I felt the specificity of 
the wording was important. I also used the Dictaphone to record some of the lessons I 
observed (rather than took part in), since I felt it was less obtrusive than scribbling notes 
or videoing and enabled me to keep my eyes up to observe the three-way equestrian 
interaction between rider, horse and instructor. 
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 The Dictaphone presents some ethical considerations, particularly in that it is a stealthy 
instrument that is easily unseen and quickly forgotten, so I made sure to seek permission 
from participants before switching it on each and every time, and when any new parties 
joined in on conversations that were already being recorded (ASA 1.4.d). Occasionally 
participants seemed embarrassed at the idea of being recorded, particularly in relation to 
the equestrian propensity for swearing (see Chapter Four), but quickly this awkwardness 
passed. A methodological problem associated with the Dictaphone involves the tendency 
to lean heavily on dialogue and verbal transcripts when analysing my data and evidencing 
my arguments. The Dictaphone both supported my pre-existing interest in the textual 
dimension of the non-verbal equestrian relationship, and it drew me further to attend 
particularly to the spoken words about the horse. The thesis has benefited greatly from 
my supervisor's advice to invest in thicker ethnographic descriptions than my first drafts 
were likely to contain, replacing dialogue with description and observing how this 
effected the argument. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that my interest in textuality has 
shaped the thesis, and this is both a loss, and a gain, compared to the sorts of project that 
might otherwise have emerged. I would argue there are good grounds for this 
methodological bias, since questions about the ethical work of language are valid grounds 
for enquiry. These questions are of explicit interest to my participants, and, furthermore,  
the 'speaking-for' aspect of human/animal relations is less frequently attended in 
contemporary multispecies ethnographies which tend to foreground embodied registers of 
knowing. 
 
The horse in the data 
 
Completing ethnography that investigates horse/human relationships provokes 
consideration of how to incorporate horses within my observations and analyses. 
Anthropologists have utilised a number of methodological models for considering the 
non-human within their research. Some advocate the person-like qualities of the non-
humans they study, arguing that a degree of intersubjectivity, empathy, and understanding 
can enable valid observations of animals-as-subjects (Alger and Alger 1999, Hurn 
2012:31, Irvine 2008, Milton 2005, Noske 1991). Others take their human informants 
descriptions of animal-persons as really real, levelling the political hierarchy of 
researcher-researched at the same time as dismantling the species-ist assumptions of 
'Western' knowledge (Nadasdy 2007, Vivieros De Castro 1998). A further approach is to 
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utilise ethological research to aid observations made of non-humans alongside humans, 
which has been particularly useful within ethnoprimatology (e.g. Fuentes 2010). Some 
chart the 'rhizomic' assemblage’s animals and humans are engaged within as though 
completing a complex ecological mapping (Tsing 2012, 2015), or, inspired by Bruno 
Latours' Actor Network Theory 'bring the animal in' by recognising the affordances and 
reliances that co-construct non-human and human lifeworld’s (Latour 2005 e.g. Callon 
1984). These models are not mutually exclusive, though a significant variable seems to be 
the degree to which the non-human’s point of view is foregrounded (as in Alger and Alger 
1999) or backgrounded (as in Callon 1984) in the argument and evidence. 
 
Samantha Hurn distinguishes between 'anthrozoology' – which retains an anthropocentric 
focus consistent with the discipline of anthropology, and 'human-animal studies’ - which 
'places all of the research subjects on a level playing field' (2010:27-8). Following this 
terminology, the methodology for this thesis is anthrozoological, in that it is ultimately a 
study of how people make sense of equestrian relationships. It is not the 'multispecies 
ethnography' Alan Smart defines as observing the way that; 'interactions between 
different non-human species are not necessarily mediated (only) through their interaction 
with humans' (2014:3-4). While of course I do acknowledge that horses relate to one 
another without human mediation (for example), these are not the dynamics I have 
focussed on here; the human is the lynchpin of this account. There are several reasons for 
this. Firstly, I agree with Matthew Watson's sharp critique (2016) of multispecies 
anthropologists' narrations of animals, which are often thick in particular political and 
aesthetic symbolism that is not necessarily shared by the human or nonhuman research 
participants, nor acknowledged explicitly and reflexively by the anthropologist. He 
argues, ‘We have adopted animals as mythemes. The pawns, knights and rooks are crows, 
elephants and meerkats. They're easy pieces to play with. They've long performed 
mythological roles, and they rarely talk back to their handlers.’ (2016:162). He doesn't 
argue that we should remove such 'mythology' from our thinking, but that we should 
pause to think about what sorts of philosophy holds the current 'onto-epistemological 
privilege' (2016:167), and to recognise the human 'theatre' within apparently non-
representational, posthuman arguments. His concern is the political coherence of these 
accounts, particularly their (lack of) ability to answer geo-political environmental 
concerns from a considered and responsible perspective (see also Hornorg 2017). My 
concern is similar, in that too prominent and confident a description of animal being can 
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flatten the epistemological, political and ethical problem that non-humans (ontologically) 
bring to the table. 
 
In legitimising anthropological observations of animals, multispecies ethnographers often 
argue for the personhood of the non-human animals they study. However, such person-
like status is well established for horses in the equestrian realm I studied, the thorny 
question is not whether we should observe them as persons at all, but rather, how not to 
misrepresent the types of person-like beings they really are; this is a politics of voice 
(Hurn 2012:203). It is because they are something like human persons that I (and my 
friends) are concerned with their (mis)representation. In many ways, I have treated horses 
just as I would treat any group of non-verbal persons who are controlled and spoken for 
by another group, such that I cannot ask them directly to confirm their sentiments in 
words. I tread with care, moderating, editing and considering each word I utter on their 
behalf, however familiar, congenial, fulfilling and spontaneously immanent my 
experience with them may have felt. This is a factor of my background, I have seen what 
looked like sheer terror in a horse I was told was 'just playing', and I have been unsettled 
by others’ descriptions of apparent 'learned helplessness' in a horse I felt was so obviously 
'happy in his work' (as I described it then). Therefore, while fieldwork involved a 
‘passionate immersion in the lives of the non-humans being studied’ Tsing (2011:19), I 
have not been so bold as to advance my own best-knowledge as an adequate substitute for 
horses' experiences. Remember, I could sell you any horse. I am cautious with my words, 
I am trying to be gentle. 
 
This leads to my second consideration; my relationship to my participants' perspectives, 
which, as the thesis describes, are contested and often changing. The more detail I add to 
horses’ behaviour, the more certain it is that I will have alienated at least some of the 
participants who shared their experiences in good faith, rendering their perception a 
projection onto my reality. I was staggered by the diversity in the way equine behaviour 
was interpreted. Only very basic elements are uncontentious. Participants would agree, 
for example, that a particular horse was behaving in a 'high energy' way, but not on 
whether this was excitement, anger, anxiety, remembered fear, pain, a 'busy' temperament 
and so on. They would agree that he bucked, but not whether he leapt, exploded, chucked 
her off, gave a dirty look, flinched, stomped, sprung, plotted, surprised himself or mucked 
about. I could have taken the interpretation of the participant directly involved in each 
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situation – the rider bucked off, for example - though her narrative would likely change 
on each recounting, and all such narratives are made with the (defensive or receptive) 
awareness that there could have been another telling. I could have given my own detailed 
description, allowing the other stories to triangulate from there, perhaps even charting the 
way others' descriptions sometimes challenged my own sensibilities. This is similar to a 
technique many multispecies authors use. Bringing the animal in often involves bringing 
the author in more too – but perhaps pushing the other human people out (e.g. Hayward 
2010, and see Watson 2016). However, this is not the method I chose, as so complex and 
ongoing are my own ruminations on these subjects that I feared an autoethnography 
would become too navel-gazing. This would document my own process of handling 
knowledge about horses, but not attend adequately to the way knowledge about horses is 
performed as a problem and managed through observable human-horse-human 
relationships. 
 
Observations of horses do feature in this thesis. However, I have preferred not to 
explicitly work out in detail how to describe equine minds or personalities. The horses are 
outlined and introduced, rather than theatrically depicted or rigorously interrogated. This 
leaves the horses - I hope - present, subjective, active, somehow familiar and yet also 
interesting, under-defined, enigmatic and elusive. 'The elephant in the room' is that thing 
that nobody talks about, despite the fact it is right there. In almost symmetrical contrast 
'the horse in the data' is the subject everybody talks about, yet it is not rendered entirely 
present, visible and tangible. I recognise this is a departure from current methodological 
trends, but it is a deliberate one. In the end, I feel this approach follows the advocacy of 
the animal turn to be experimental, tentative, and flexible in recognising how our 
relations with animals are part of what constitutes us as human: ‘There is hope that these 
alternative perspectives of what it means to be human will inform a new ethics of living 
in the world. To do so, multispecies ethnography must continue to reveal attachments to 
other species and things that make us 'think, feel and hesitate'’(Ogden, Hall and Tanita 
2013:7). It has been an ethical, methodological, and personal experiment for me not to 
describe horses in detail in these encounters, to 'think, feel and hesitate', and to leave the 
matter open, not pinned down, unresolved between the lines uttered by my participants 
and me. If it leaves the reader eager to know the horses better, I am content. This is my 
best effort at keeping 'polite distance' (Vinciane Despret’s term, 2013:65). Nonetheless, I 
believe the thesis communicates something substantive of what these horses, as well as 
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these humans, are all about. 
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Chapter One: Horsiness – born and chosen 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to describe the classed and gendered context of British horse riding, 
and particularly to show the landscape in which a sense of epistemological responsibility 
emerges. The demographic of equestrian pursuits has changed significantly over the last 
few decades. In the early 20th century, the typical participant in equestrian sport was male, 
high-born, and high-ranking within the military (Crossman and Walsh 2011, Hedenborg 
and Hedenborg White 2012, 2013). Now, the typical figure is a middle-class woman, for 
whom horse riding is much more than a sport, horsiness is understood as a constitutive 
part of an individuals' true nature. What is more, contemporary horsemanship foregrounds 
the development of an accomplished and fulfilling relationship with ones' horse. The 
broadening participation demographic, and a growing consumer market of options, has an 
unsettling effect upon traditionalist equestrian styles and sensibilities, leading to a 
contested field in which horse owners must decide how best to pursue an authentic and 
legitimate personal connection with their horses. 
 
In this chapter I make regular comparisons with Rebecca Cassidy's ethnography of horse 
racing society in Newmarket (2002). Cassidy describes a British equestrian context in 
which a stable class and gender hierarchy is maintained through the central idiom of 
breeding and heritage. In this environment, 'lads' (stable workers), jockeys, trainers and 
horses are organised within an infrastructure which, for the most part, runs 'like 
clockwork' (2002:18). This provides a wonderful juxtaposition to my ethnography of 
British amateur horse riders. My participants had little involvement or interest in the 
racing world Cassidy describes, but the patriarchal, hierarchical structure of heritage that 
Cassidy evokes are relevant to the traditionalist associations of professional equestrianism 
(instructors, professional competitors, judges, vets) that my participants did interact with, 
as this chapter will show. In contrast to this traditionalist equestrianism, I will describe the 
individualisation and responsibilisation of my participants as 'postplural', in Marilyn 
Strathern's terms (1992:135-7). This refers to a destabilisation of taken-for-granted 
'natural' connectivity between people, as a consequence of increased focus on individual 
choice. 
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In Section One, I will introduce the horse riders who populate my ethnography, through 
attending to their life stories and describing the typical horse show and 'livery yard' 
(where horses are kept). In this section, I examine the exclusivity of the communities I 
studied compared to Cassidy's racing world. I utilise my participants' life stories to 
investigate the distinctiveness of the term 'horsey' – which participants use to differentiate 
themselves from their 'non-horsey' friends and families. I find my participants emphasise 
their own choice and commitment, but also ground their sense of belonging in the idiom 
of a giveness and essentialism to their 'horsey' natures.  In the second section, I 
investigate how horsey women manage lives that move in and out of this exclusive horse 
world. I show that the idea of horsiness affords women opportunities to both reject and 
reinscribe the essentialism of broader societal gender norms and expectations. While 
Sections One and Two deal with the distinction between horsey and non-horsey people, in 
Section Three, I investigate the distinctions that are made between different horsey 
individuals within the horse world. I explain that while class elitism has been challenged 
by the broadening demographic, judginess about equestrian competence sometimes re-
evokes judgements of classiness during horsey people's evaluations of one anothers' 
horsemanship. This is particularly the case with regards to distinctions made between a 
traditionalist style and newer, more fashionable alternatives. Finally, I reflect on the 
awkward relationship between the notions of choice and nature, through dialogue with 
Marilyn Strathern’s description of 'postplural nostalgia'. I describe a superfluence of 
choice available to British horse owners, which is met with both enthusiasm and anxiety. 
Their challenge is that they must each choose how to make a good connection with their 
own horse, while also acting under a broader British scepticism about the poor capacity of 
choice to forge real relatedness. 
 
The new horsey set 
 
British equestrian history 
Midday, midsummer in middle England. The big back field at Paddock Farm is usually 
used for making hay, but today, it is teeming with horses and riders, because Paddock 
Farm is hosting a regional riding club show. There must be close to sixty horses on site, 
with more arriving all the time, lorries and trailers joining the rows of parked vehicles, 
horses stomping and whinnying, eager to be unloaded. The air smells of cut grass and 
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manure, and the horses smell of tea-tree and citronella, a futile attempt to keep the horse 
flies at bay. Five temporary roped rings are set up, three dressage2, two show jumping3, 
each of which hosts a continuous flow of horses and riders valiantly giving their best 
efforts at the tests prescribed. A steward operates the gate of each ring, briskly organising 
the next competitor to be ready, ticking off entry numbers on a clipboard, and shouting 
“best of luck!” at the incomers. Two collecting rings, one with two practice jumps, one 
'flat', contain a frenzy of horses and riders warming up and preparing to enter the 
competition ring. There's a shoal-like current to the way horses move in relation to one 
another, because there are rules in place to prevent collision - as at all horse shows. These 
rules are known by all competitors, occasionally enforced with a tut and a head shake, not 
formally declared or marked anywhere on site. They include: only jump with the red-
flagged wing to your right, slower horses stick to the rail, and always pass oncoming 
horses left hand to left hand. Many riders can happily recount that the latter is a hallmark 
of equestrian military heritage; the sword (right) hand is kept a trusting and mannerly 
distance away. Some competitors have brought their instructors, or experienced friends, 
as support, who bark a few words of encouragement in the collecting ring. “Kick like hell 
into the double, don't let him look at it or you'll get in too deep!” they might say. Outside 
the rings, movement is more stagnated. Those who are yet to compete attempt to soothe 
fresh, bright eyed, fidgety horses. Some riders mentally rehearse the course, tracing the 
pattern they will ride with the tip of their whip drawing in the air. Riders wear tweed or 
navy jackets, beige jodhpurs, polished long boots, leather gloves, crisp shirts and ties or 
stocks. Horses are plaited up, hooves oiled, saddlery polished. One lithe black horse 
wears a red ribbon in his tail, a sign to other competitors that he is known to kick. Those 
who are happy with their completed rounds have discarded their jackets, kicked their feet 
out of their stirrups and loosened their ties, and sit on top of their sweaty horses, eating 
ice cream, and watching their friends attempts. Others head smartly back to the privacy of 
the lorry for a rigorous analysis of what went wrong. Along the hedge line, there is a 
secretary's tent set up, where competitors can enter classes, receive their number, and find 
                                                 
2An Olympic sport with military heritage, now available at a range of levels 'affiliated' to British Dressage 
or 'unaffiliated' and run more informally. Dressage demonstrates control, cooperation and 
communication, horse and rider complete set patterns of movements known as 'tests' and receive a mark 
out of ten for each movement. The higher levels involve impressive degree of precision, balance and 
strength from horse and rider. 
3An Olympic sport in which horse and rider set out to clear a course of knock-down show jumps, quickest 
clear round wins. Riders can compete at shows affiliated to British Show jumping with the highest level 
at 1m40, or at unaffiliated events, where the lowest classes are 50cm. 
37 
out their placings; and a judge’s tent, where volunteers are preparing a ploughman’s lunch 
and white wine for the (volunteer) judges, though it looks like lunch will be late. A 
loudspeaker hums with updates; some cracking rounds have been jumped so competition 
is tight, there has been a horse loose in the lorry parking, a terrier has been found and not 
claimed, and someone has had a fall in the show jumping ring. I hear along the grapevine 
it's Sarah come off Benji again, she just won’t accept he is too much horse for her, I am 
told. 
 
There is something quintessentially British, and somehow almost timeless, about this 
scene (lorries and ice creams aside). Show days conjure a compound of images in the 
British imaginary that resonate with period TV dramas like Downton Abbey. The horse 
show is a 'story seed' (Carrithers 2009:40-49) which speaks of village fetes and fairs, 
picnic lunches, well-ordered efforts of community spirit, trophies and tweeds. An 
atmosphere of both warmth and respectability accompanies the idyll of rural leisure 
pursuits, and to some extent, today's equestrians seem eager to animate and embody that 
imaginary. 
 
 British equestrian sport has a long historical association with the military elite and 
gentleman amateur, which is best documented in relation to horse racing and breeding 
(Longrigg 1972, Vamplew 1976). The format of non-racing contemporary British 
equestrian sports (dressage, show jumping and cross country4) originated in cavalry 
training exercises and military parade manoeuvres, developing through engagement with 
the Olympic games during the first half of the twentieth century (De Haan and Dumbell 
2016). During this same period, the working roles of horses, in agriculture and transport, 
increasingly diminished5 such that by 1960, the government all but gave up its interest in 
monitoring the horse population as an economic resource and asset (Crossman  and Walsh 
2011). In 1947, the British Horse Society was founded, and soon began developing a 
formal education programme for grooms and riding instructors (BHS website, 2015). At 
the 1952 Olympics participation in equestrian events was opened up to include non-
military competitors, and also women (Hedenborg and Hedenborg White 2012:305, ) 
                                                 
4Horse and rider gallop across the countryside over a set course, jumping 'solid obstacles' such as ditches, 
walls, banks. This is one of three phases included in the Olympic sport of 'eventing' (along with 
dressage and show jumping). 
5
from over 1.1 million agricultural horses in 1915 to a negligible number in 1960 
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(though some upper-class women had been taking part in less formal competitions, 
hunting, showing and breeding, for much longer Munkwitz 2012). These milestones 
illustrate that the mid-century marks the beginning of a significant change in the role of 
the horse, as equestrianism flourished during the growth of the sports, leisure and rural 
pursuits markets, (as well as a continuous increase in pet ownership) through late 
capitalism (Franklin 1999, Dashper 2014, Crossman and Walsh 2011, Hedenborg and 
Hedenborg White 2012). Horse riding became more affordable as a diverse market of 
equestrian services and goods expanded. The uptake of horse riding by those who didn't 
own their own land provided an alternative income stream for farmers who converted 
land and barns into DIY (do it yourself) livery yards, such that in the early 2000's, the 
government (DEFRA) regained an interest in the horse population as an important aspect 
of agricultural economic health (Crossman and Walsh 2011:100). 
 
Broadening participation in equestrian sport 
Despite the increasingly broad demographic taking up horsey pursuits, equestrianism has 
to some extent retained an association with upper class exclusivity, a point which irked 
many of my participants, whose work mates considered their hobby a sign of some 
hidden wealth or posh breeding.  'Bring on the dancing horses!' reported the (non-
equestrian) press during the 2012 London Olympics, articulating a dominant discourse 
among non-horsey folk, that riding is the folly for an old-moneyed upper class (Fletcher 
and Dashper 2013). Some parts of the equestrian world earn the classed reputation more 
than others (we will visit the racing world via Rebecca Cassidy, and Pony Club elite, via 
Joanna Latimer, shortly). However, a closer look at the show day's multispecies 
participants will show that this is not the elitist horsemanship of old. There are not only 
plenty of labradors, spaniels and terriers on site (as might be expected of the Pony Club 
community Latimer describes, 2009), but Chihuahuas, French Bulldogs, and Cockerpoos 
too. These are associated with new money, celebrity glamour (Redmalm 2010) and/or 
suburban comfort; in short, these are towny dogs. There also are spotty horses, patchy 
horses, retired and rejected racehorses, hairy cobs, and shiny warmbloods intermingling 
(we will revisit these breeds in more detail shortly). All and sundry queue to eat at the 
burger van (judges excluded) and try to prevent ketchup splodges staining tweed jackets – 
be they inherited, made to measure, budget make, or borrowed just for the morning. 
 
Let’s zoom in on one of the show day participants. Layla, a twenty-four-year-old part 
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time receptionist, begrudges having to remove her nose ring as she prepares to compete. 
Not because she doesn't value the traditionalist aesthetic of competition dress, in fact, I 
came to know her as one of the strictest sticklers for 'correct' detail in that regard. It's just 
that the piercing is only just healing up and it hurts to put it back in. She wrestles her 
thick hair into a hair net. It is at least three shades of pink. The dye is fading too quickly, 
Layla says. Layla is getting ready to ride Twiggy, a bay mare of mixed breeding, 
technically shared with Layla's mum, because she couldn't afford to buy her alone. This is 
a fact Layla likes to forget. So too, is the fact she currently pays rent on her childhood 
room at her mum's house. She and her mother are probably too similar, she says, they 
fight too often. She'd like to move out, but the money all goes on the horse (and the 
nightlife). Layla is fiercely independent and self-willed when it comes to her horsey 
pursuits. She had wanted to work in horses, at a stud, but she didn't finish the college 
course, she tells me, it was 'shit, a waste of money,' and the lecturers knew less than she 
did. And she doesn't want to 'just be a groom'. Layla is often first at the yard (5.30 am) to 
ride before work, she is always working towards some competition goal, and she is stoic 
in insisting that the rather less motivated Twiggy can, and will, eventually win some 
rosettes. 
 
As we await Layla's allocated dressage time, I ask about Twiggy’s breeding. Twiggy is 
part thoroughbred (the racing breed at the heart of Rebecca Cassidy's ethnography). Layla 
thinks Twiggy clearly doesn’t know about her 'posh side'. On the other side of her 
breeding (so says her passport6), is a spotted appaloosa horse from North America called 
'I Love Willie.' This is a source of much hilarity to everybody within earshot. The odd 
name opens up speculation, no-one can fathom why Twiggy was bred, 'An appaloosa 
cross thoroughbred, what was the point?' Layla wonders (pre-empting my interest in the 
structural and ethical import of human choices in relation to nature, which will be re-
examined throughout). 
 
 Even though Layla is younger than the majority of horse owners at her livery yard (one 
22, others 32-65, average 42), she is invested in the yard community, maintaining several 
                                                 
6A legality since 2005 that all horses carry a passport, to prevent them entering the human food chain while 
medicated (Crossman and Walsh 2011:106). This is an unspoken ugly truth about the precarity of  
horses' roles as family member or sporting partner, 'problem' or 'unsound' horses can quickly lose value, 
while some declare 'a horse is for life', generally speaking, horses are sold on much more regularly than 
dogs or cats, and can even find their way, via horse dealers, from pet to plate. 
40 
cross generational friendships. She often helps others with their horses when they are 
short of time. In return, they fondly tut and sit her down with sweetened coffee, when she 
turns up to do morning chores on a come-down after a heavy night out, not having yet 
been to bed. Horsiness, for Layla, is everything. When I began my fieldwork, Layla was 
going through a horse-less period, and she was often to be found hanging around the yard, 
mucking out others' stables, cleaning tack, and offering to ride any horses whose owners 
were on holiday or busy. Without a horse, she told me, she felt useless. She'd wake up at 5 
in the morning with no reason to get up. A show would be coming up and she had no 
horse to get fit. When Layla bought Twiggy, she was visibly energised and fulfilled. 
“Now I can get back to being the real me” she announced while giving Twiggy a vigorous 
brush. 
 
Paddock Farm and livery options 
Layla keeps Twiggy at Paddock Farm (henceforth PF), the show venue. It is an old dairy 
farm, occupying 27 acres divided into grazing paddocks, with stabling for 25 horses, a 
tack and feed room (the old milking parlour), outdoor riding arena, and a 3-bedroom 
1960s built brick cottage. As is fairly common for a livery yard, it is rented (in this case, 
from the council) by a 'horsey' yard manager, 37-year-old Bertie Morris, who lives on site 
with his 'horsey' wife Jill. Jill works full time as a director of a large business in London, 
but also acts as the chair for the local Riding Club7. Bertie feels lucky to be able to do 
what he loves for a living, ever-pursuing his dream of competing at top level. Cheaply 
bred horses and working-class riders have made it to the Olympics, he reminds me. 
Though he clearly only has so much faith in that sentiment; all of Jill and Bertie's savings 
are currently tied up in Ada, an £18,000, 5-year-old steel grey sports horse who might just 
'go all the way'. She is clearly talented, the apple of Bertie's eye, and a near-celebrity 
among Bertie's liveries and students, but Ada occasionally point-blank refuses to jump. 
Bertie makes ends meet by running the livery business, teaching riding, 'schooling'8 
horses on behalf of their owners, and buying and selling horses occasionally too. 
 
Livery here costs £160 a month, including hay and straw. More expensive livery yards 
                                                 
7Riding Clubs are staffed by volunteers and usually affiliated to the British Horse Society, who quotes 
33,000 riding club members (BHS 2017) They run clinics, talks, and competitions, and compete against 
other riding clubs in team competitions. 
8The term 'schooling' refers to training under saddle, in the arena, in order to perfect the horses' responses to 
the ridden 'aids' or commands. 
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might offer an indoor arena, competitions and visiting trainers on site, a cross country 
course of solid jumps to train over (£350 a month), and 'full livery' options, where one’s 
horse is cared for by yard staff so that the owner is not bound by daily horse care duties 
(£580 a month).  Cheaper livery yards were available, run by a farmer with little interest 
in equestrianism, where owners might get less support, but on the other hand, feel more 
independent and less bound by the manager's rules and opinions (£85 a month). Cheaper 
still, one can rent an odd bit of grazing with no facilities and perhaps no good off-road 
riding, there is just such a field at the edge of PF's nearest village, with three young shire 
horses in it (£65 per month per horse). On the other side of the village is a river bank on 
which eight traveller’s ponies are tethered, which is the source of much concern among 
Paddock Farm-ers. Travellers and toffs were on the horizons of my participants’ 
equestrian lives, geographically and figuratively. One of my participants had 'rescued' 
(bought) a pony from the travellers, and other horses with unknown histories were 
presumed to have come from travellers if they seemed afraid of people. At the other end 
of the scale, 'posh' equestrians were occasionally the butt of jokes for being laa-di-daa and 
not part of the real horsey world, too spoilt to spend the time forging a real connection 
with their horses. In one instance, a horse was sold to 'toffs' who were mocked after 
visiting to view the horse, but in the end it was decided he had really 'landed on his feet' 
with 'the posh, hunting lot.' 
 
PF is a buzz of activity between 6-8am, and 4-9pm, as people fit stable chores and riding 
around work. Five cats live on site (three pets, two mousers) and three dogs (labrador, 
collie, cockerpoo), and many of the liveries bring their dogs with them, in every shape 
and size. There are also two lots of chickens, one group owned by Bertie (all named after 
famous riders), one lot owned by a livery, Roxy (just called 'the girls'). PF liveries lived 
within a 25-minute drive and had other livery yard options available to them within that 
radius which was not unusual. Equine population distribution is spread fairly evenly 
across southern and midland counties9 (Boden et al 2012). PF liveries held a broad 
spectrum of employment statuses; full time, part time, self-employed, unemployed, bed 
and breakfast owner, publishing agent, nursery staff. Three worked 'in horses'; 
 a freelance groom who provided holiday care services, a self-employed equine 
                                                 
9In making this assertion I am omitting the population hotspots associated with racing towns Newmarket 
and Lambourn, and on the outskirts of London providing for horse owners who live within the city. 
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physiotherapist, and a part time riding instructor for a local riding school. 
 
As the employment types of Paddock Farm liveries suggest, the socioeconomic 
demographic of equestrian sport is now spread fairly evenly, The British Equestrian Trade 
association reported that in 2006, 36% of participators in equestrian sport belong to NRS 
socioeconomic category AB (upper-middle/middle class), 29% BC (middle/lower middle-
class) and 36% C2DE (skilled working/non-working class) (BETA 2011) 10 98% of horse 
riders are white ( according to Sport England 2011), and none of my participants were 
anything but. As we shall see, there are a multitude of options and styles of horsemanship 
available for different tastes and budgets. There are 2.7 million regular riders in the UK, 
and between them, they spend £4.3 billion across a range of equestrian services and 
consumer goods (BETA 2015). 74% of riders are female – with higher proportions of men 
taking part in the top levels of competition and the most prestigious employment 
(international judges, celebrity status riders, managerial roles within the various sporting 
and welfare organisations, company CEOs) (BETA 2015, see Hedenborg and Hedenborg 
White 2012, Plymoth 2012, Dashper 2013). Among my research participants, mostly 
local level competitors, the female proportion was much higher than the national average. 
 
Horse riding, from the birds-eye perspective of statistics, could be seen as just another 
incidence of late-modern growth in consumerism and leisure spending (Giddens 1991: 
throughout, e.g. 80-85, Harvey 2007, Horne 2005:119-130). Equestrianism could appear 
like any other sport or hobby, one among many choices available to the 'expanding 
middle classes' (Biressi and Nunn 2013:77-78) in terms of how to spend (and make) their 
money, and a feminized option at that. However, this perspective grates with the meaning 
that 'horsiness' holds for my participants' sense of identity and belonging. Horsiness is 
figured not as a lifestyle choice, or aesthetic preference, or historical trend, but as part of 
an individual’s true nature or even soul. Horsiness differentiates one individual from her 
family and friends, distinguishes her from the rest of her gender, and therefore somewhat 
separates her from the 'non-horsey' world.  This figuring of horsiness as individualised 
distinction can be seen in the life stories of horse riders, particularly when compared to 
                                                 
10   NRS social grades are sorted by occupation of the chief income earner of the household. A: upper 
middle-class, Higher managerial administrative or professional, B:middle class intermediate managerial, 
administrative or professional, C1:lower middle class, supervisory or clerical, C2: skilled working class: 
skilled manual workers, D:working class, semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, E: not working. 
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the form of inherited equestrianism that Rebecca Cassidy describes (2002). 
 
Who belongs in horsey worlds? 
 The members of Cassidy's racing world are largely born into their racing life. This is true 
of those at the top of a clearly organised hierarchy (owners, bloodstock agents, breeders, 
trainers) and those at the bottom (jockeys, apprentices, stable lads and stud hands) 
(2002:31-49). Lads, owners and trainers alike take the idea of heritage very seriously, in 
terms of the noble bloodlines of the horses they race and also in terms of the inherited 
nature of one’s affinity for racing. As racing people like to repeat, 'blood will tell' 
(2002:140). The focus on pedigree as a significant way of differentiating types and 
qualities (of people or horse) contributes to the perpetuation of exclusivity of the racing 
world as a whole, and also to the apparent naturalness of distinctions between types of 
individual within it (2002:140-161). Young, lightweight boys grow up hoping to follow in 
their jockey father’s footsteps (2002:39). They, like the trainers and owners, also valued 
the feeling of having insider knowledge, belonging to an exclusive world, and potentially 
being connected to the next big winner (2002:120-124). The idea of 'belonging' within the 
racing world is undergirded by one’s connection to winners, reflecting success and 
competence in whatever role one plays in relation to a winning racehorse – buying it, 
training it, riding it, caring for it. However, it isn't competence that Cassidy identifies as 
the central idiom around which Newmarket belonging revolves, but pedigree (2002:31, 
140-155). This is because pedigree is called upon (and creatively interpreted) to explain 
competence or success, it is seen as the natural facts, and therefore, the explanatory 
principle behind the differentiation of winners from losers, in life as in racing (2002:33). 
While racing can be seen as a celebration of the extent to which 'man' can cultivate nature 
through the breeding, producing and training of horses, it is the idiom of an unyielding 
nature -in blood - which underpins racing folks' hierarchical organisation and exclusive 
sense of belonging. 
 
In contrast, a common life story told by Paddock Farm riders involved coming from an 
un-horsey family and yet feeling obsessed with horses and striving for access to them 
since a young age. Key features in this narrative are the hopelessness of the parent’s lack 
of equestrian knowledge or engagement, the burning need, hunger, and love for horses 
that eats up the poor child (who is reflected upon, in hindsight, with both sympathy and 
pride), and the gumption she plucks up in getting access to horses in one way or another. 
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Variants included; 'Sitting and watching seaside donkey rides for hours on end and then 
asking if I could lead the donkeys since I couldn't afford to ride them and that was the 
nearest I could get to a horse', and, 'Standing on the footpath near a riding school so that I 
could just smell and hear the ponies until eventually the owner let me help with the 
mucking out.' Stories told by those whose un-horsey parents lamented and bought them a 
pony carry similar hallmarks of the useless, humorous ineptness of the parents, and the 
child answering her equestrian calling, perhaps somewhat haphazardly at the beginning, 
but nonetheless bravely and with growing responsibility and skill. In spite of the 
frequency of these narratives, they are always told as though they are one-offs, as though 
this child (now adult) was particularly imbued with horsiness and prepared to act on it, 
swimming against the current where necessary to realise her unique equestrian potential 
and to satiate her true nature. These horsey life stories are also often coming of age 
stories, about realising independence and one's own control over destiny. These ideas of 
young women’s empowerment through equestrian endeavours constitute a familiar 
narrative within British literature. Victorian heroines evade romantic suitors by literally 
galloping away on horseback, while in more modern 'pony girl' books young women 
outride egotistical boys, displaying physical strength and bravery in buckets, and seek 
solace from the dramas of teenage life in the heartiness of the barn (Cunningham 1996, 
Singleton 2013). 
 
Three Paddock Farm-ers had horsey parents, including Bertie, (PF tenant manager), his 
mother, Gail, a riding instructor herself, was one of his liveries. As we discussed the roots 
of their horsiness, these born-and-bred equestrians clearly harboured suspicion regarding 
the genetic factor. This lay not only in the difficulty of distinguishing nature from nurture, 
but also the underlying feeling that they would have been horsey wherever and to 
whomever they were born. Genetic links to horsemen in previous generations (I was told 
of a cavalryman and barge worker) were generally speculative and made lightly, 
compared to the centrality of pedigree for Cassidy. More central elements in the stories of 
equestrians like Bertie were their unique relationships with particular horses, the ups and 
downs of their developing competitive lives, and the influential (sometimes terrifying) 
instructors and bosses they were able to learn from and apprentice under. 
 
Joanne Latimer describes what she calls the 'Anglo-Irish' equestrian culture as rooted 
within a rural elite and its apparently natural affinity with the countryside landscape 
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(Latimer and Birke 2009:6, 11-14). Children learn to ride at the same time as learning 
how to belong to this exclusive community through institutions like The Pony Club. This 
observation would appear to be true in my field site too - to a degree - if the comments of 
my participators are anything to go by. They, like Latimer, recognise the way skills are 
absorbed from a young age as 'experience' which enables some people to be more 'natural' 
around horses, more knowledgeable regarding equestrian culture, as well as more well 
connected within horsey communities, than others. They are critically attuned, we might 
say, to a Bourdieusian sense of habitus (Bourdieu 1987). Those with access to these 
pedagogical worlds reflect on it and consider themselves lucky. Bertie told me, 
 Pony club was sometimes brutal, but growing up in that world, absorbing it all, 
means that now, you don't even remember where you learnt most of it. You can't 
even remember not knowing how tight a throat latch should be, or how to bandage 
properly. It only stands out to you when you realise all these adults who have 
ridden for years and somehow don't know the most basic things. That's the luxury 
of growing up in that world. You can't – well it's really hard to – get on so well 
when you've come from the outside. 
From field notes, August 2016 
 
Those without insider access at the right time can reflect that their performance and 
success doesn't fully reflect their innate capacity, since their equestrian potential was 
stunted. Who knows what they could have achieved were they born to a horsey family? 
As Jess told me: 
I wasn't a Pony club girl. I had to make do and figure it out myself. I had a little 
bugger of a first pony, I fell off him more than I stayed on I think, but I loved him 
so much, we got that bond, eventually I got the hang of him and nobody else could 
ride him like I could. But I had to put him out on loan to go to university. Working 
in horses just wasn't an option for me. So, then you pick it up again once you can 
afford to, so then I am basically still trying to catch up on everything I want to 
learn...You look at Emily King [daughter of famous eventer, coming into her own 
as international competitor herself] and you think, she's had it all right there, of 
course she was going to be good. She was practically born onto a horse. The rest 
of us have to do what we can with what we have and try not to compare yourself 
too much to the Emily Kings, just try to get as good as you can for your horse and 
for yourself. 
Dictaphone recording, August 2016. 
 
 In Section Three, and Chapter Two, we will revisit Jess's predicament; the classed 
assumption that she must go to university rather than work in horses renders her a 
perpetual amateur and relative novice. For now, however, Jess's narrative evidences 
horsiness as an individualised quality and personal endeavour. The project Jess describes, 
'To get as good as you can for you and your horse' indexes a typical programme of self-
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improvement, focussed on developing the relationship with one’s horse (often measured 
in part, through competitive successes). The amateur horse riders I studied were 
continually engaged in projects of self-development and improvement, and keen to tell 
you about them through discussion of their current endeavours, future aims and evidenced 
improvements. This reflects a broader contemporary (and arguably middle class) British 
affiliation with notions of ambition and meritocracy (Littler 2013). Riders were likely to 
introduce themselves to one another through reference to a narrative of progress and 
improvement, regardless of the standard they ride at (e.g. I'm Rosie, my horse is George, 
a warmblood, we event and we are working towards competing at BE90 level....). 
 
Horsiness 'in the bones' 
Ideas about the ‘horsiness’ of individuals present within these equestrian life stories could 
destabilise the naturalisation of classism present in Cassidy's Newmarket and 
traditionalist equestrianism more broadly. When Cassidy's informants state 'racing is in 
the blood' (2002:116), they suggest it comes through individuals, but from a lineage 
before them. When my participants told me 'horses are in my bones' or 'I'm horsey to the 
core' they meant it was fundamental to who they were as individuals, not as new 
formations of pre-existing substance. This is evident in the way Leanne told me, “Horses 
is [sic] who I am. It's just me. I don't know where it came from, no-one I knew growing 
up was horsey. But I always have been sort of drawn to them, and only happy when 
horses are in my life. I don't know what I would do if I didn't have them, I literally don't 
know what I'd do.” (Field Notes, September 2016) 
 
 This unique individual being is understood to be further shaped and enhanced, but not 
entirely re-made, by experiences – hence the suggestion that the same individual might in 
theory have been born to horsey-er parents, changing her accomplishments, but not her 
unique nature. The part-replaceability is important. It means there is nothing natural about 
which individuals are born to which opportunities – it could have been Jess in Emily 
King's shoes, Emily and Jess are considered not qualitatively different in nature – each of 
them similarly unique, and each of them similarly exemplifying the horsey disposition. 
 
Finally, in true meritocratic style (Biressi and Nunn 2013:60-62), it is understood that one 
can maximise on the horsey affinity one has been given through personal endeavour, and 
eagerness to get at the right experiences. This means individual nature is a potential – to 
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be achieved, recognised, or stunted through self-application, rather than a pre-given birth 
right. Taken together, this gives those born to horsey families no real right to greater 
horsey success than those born to non-horsey families, despite the recognised fact that 
they might actually demonstrate greater success, or greater 'horsiness'. In other words, 
there is nothing 'natural' about the difference between Pony Club kids and those looking 
over the fence, it is a similarly unique horsiness and ability to work hard that they both 
share (and these are considered the important elements), and 'only' luck and opportunities 
which differ. Natural affinity (talent) and choice (endeavour) are the moral trump cards, 
even where money and inherited networks clearly play a part in success. This is almost 
the direct opposite to Cassidy's case, wherein success is explained as based in the natural 
facts of pedigree even where a pattern between family line and racing success is hard to 
establish. Relatives could be ignored where racing success was unforthcoming, and links 
could be exaggerated or emphasised with periphery relations who are connected to 
winners (2002:33). 
 
To conclude this section, it seems as though a broadening equestrian demographic 
destabilises a more traditional, naturalised exclusivity replacing the logic of class and 
breeding with the celebration of individual endeavour. However, we also find the idiom of 
'natural belonging' reinstated, not through inheritance, but in the uniqueness of individual 
constitution. This individualism was not complete atomisation or personal detachment; 
'horseiness' provides its bearers with an inbuilt, naturalised, 'real' capacity for a particular 
form of relatedness (with horses). Horsey individuals speak about themselves almost like 
a jigsaw piece, always gravitating toward an equine connection to complete the form. 
They are always already bound for a highly specific sort of absorbing relatedness that 
simply must be pursued. This was more than a mere whim or hobby, riders were keen to 
attest. Horsiness was in their soul. Choice is, paradoxically, valued ('I made it on my 
own') and de-valued (against a real, natural, essential affinity) simultaneously within 
these life stories. My participants’ life stories served to introduce my participants to me as 
people who felt distinctive in that they were bound towards equine connectivity, but also 
personally responsible for making that happen. 
 
Horsey girls, not girly girls; owning the capacity to care 
 
The figure of the jigsaw-piece horse-person introduces the relational aspect of 
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horsemanship in my field site, which is particularly important to the ways in which 
gender is experienced. Since my participants moved in and out of the exclusive horse 
world in order to interact with non-horsey families and working lives, horsiness provided 
women with the means to reconsider the importance of personal choice, or essentialised 
nature, in their experience of gender. 
 
Tough hands and the wrong shaped bottoms: Essentialism and individualism. 
 Cassidy's Newmarket offers a model for the sort of patriarchal structure that the horsey 
women I met rejected explicitly and indignantly. In Cassidy's Newmarket, men are 
considered more suitable jockeys due to their strength and body shape (2002:23), more 
successful at the networking side of elite racing life since 'men communicate better with 
men' (2002:36-38), and more likely to place serious bets, while a £2 'ladies bet' is just a 
bit of fun (2002:78). Imaginings of equine pedigree are strongly patrilineal, in that a mare 
is considered 'empty' until she is in foal (while a stallion is always complete), and then the 
speed of the foal is thought to come more directly from the stallion than the mare 
(2002:135, 149). There are startling similarities in the way horse racing human's 
pedigrees are traced. A handful of famous 'insider' Newmarket surnames are invariably 
related to the successful racing exploits of generations of men (2002:32). Trainers' wives 
described their role in life as the support and complement to the male trainer’s racing 
pursuits: hosting owners, providing food, perhaps exercising racehorses also. As one 
trainer’s wife put it: “My role is to look over the stable door and say, Ahhh” (2002:38). 
The idea that women are naturally inclined to nurture and care for others was used to 
explain the higher proportion of women employed in the stable lad’s role rather than 
higher up the racing hierarchy (2002:37). Since the lad’s work is stigmatised in the racing 
world as the bottom of the pile - the behind the scenes, mundane, machinery that keeps 
the front-of-house prestigious racing and breeding activities afloat, the naturalisation of 
women as carers is part of the ideology of male dominance and supremacy (for another 
example of patriarchal essentialisms in a British equestrian setting see Hurn 2008 on 
Welsh cobs). 
 
The horsey women I got to know would hate to be considered the victims of such 
gendered presumptions. They considered themselves tougher, more resilient, independent 
and less image obsessed than non-horsey women, who they called 'normal girls' or 'girly 
girls'. The way horsey women describe their relationship with horses, it was decidedly not 
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about playing second fiddle to fathers, brothers or husbands, but pursuing one’s own 
dream, with guts and determination. What is more, horsemanship requires physical 
strength and bravery. Note, the term horse-man-ship, denotes a fundamental masculinity 
to equestrianism which horsey women were proud to possess (comparable in some ways 
to the masculine concept of 'Brotherhood' pursued by the female Brotherhood of 
Freemason Sisters, Mahmud 2014:93).  Horsey women lift hay bales, fix fencing, and get 
rope burns never mind wrestling with the notorious wilfulness of their mounts (more in 
later chapters). Female bodies are considered to hold the potential for physical capability, 
as seen in the formal gender equality within equestrianism, it is the only sport in which 
men and women compete on equal footing in the Olympics (and throughout lower levels 
too) (Hedenborg and Hedenborg White 2012, Hedenborg 2015). 
 
My participants enjoyed a relative relaxation of body image and promotion of a pragmatic 
relationship with the body when they were around their horses (Birke and Brandt 2009, 
Dashper 2012, 2013).  Leigh would arrive dressed in a skirt suit and office shoes at the 
end of the working day, totter across the yard hastily, disappear into her horse’s stable for 
a few moments and emerge in wellington boots, jodhpurs and a waterproof jacket, visibly 
more relaxed and somehow unfurled, occupying space in a more loose and ungainly way, 
sometimes even giving a stretch or a sigh, or exclaiming cheerily: “Right, now I've got 
that lot off, tell me how your jumping went yesterday while we get some hay!” or similar. 
This relaxation of appearance management was described by participants to being able to 
'take off' a mask and just 'be the real me'. The relationship with the horse was considered 
particularly 'real' for the fact that (as Layla told me): “Horses don't care about hair do's or 
high heels.” 
 
To some extent, then, the horsey relationship enables women to feel as though they can 
defy essentialised gender norms (though see Birke and Brandt 2009, Daspher 2012 on 
feminization and aestheticization within equestrian sport). However, I found that the 
much-celebrated freedom to escape feminine norms through horses was established by 
foregrounding the individual’s capacity to choose, rather than in a substantive resistance 
against such normativity itself. This can be seen, for example, in the mocking of 'girly 
girls' look-ish ways, and (more later) the distaste for 'PTA11 mums' obsessions with their 
                                                 
11Parents and Teachers Association. The phrase 'PTA mum' indexed a particularly involved, doting, 
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role as child carer. Both examples figure 'other women' (Scharff 2016:52-64) who have 
not made empowered choices, and who are subsumed by their gender rather than acting 
as real individuals. Both Angela McRobbie (2009) and Christina Scharff (2016) describe 
similar dynamics of among young British women, whose rhetoric of individualisation has 
disbanded the notion of unified feminist revolt. In my case, horsey women in fact did not 
reject, but embraced aspects of the association between women and care, opting in and 
out of its usual formulation, reconstructing care as brave, public, and accomplished, and 
injecting the concept of care with an aura of self-willed autonomy, choice and 
empowerment. 
 
At PF, horse care activities are centre stage, and women’s essentialised capacity to nurture 
and form feeling connections were considered to make them more likely than men to 
belong here as relevant and worthy individuals with 'real' horsey status. In this context, 
horse care enjoys the status of a central element of a chosen and therefore valued (rather 
than enforced, background or essential) pursuit. Each owner cared for the horse that they 
rode, owned, and trained. This structural individualism related to a close dyadic 
relationship between particular horses and their people. Individualised horse care usually 
involved twice daily visits to the yard in order to feed the horse, clean the stable, change 
its rugs, put it out/bring it in from the field, exercise it, groom it, provide fresh water and 
hay.  Rarely did I hear anybody complain about the work. In fact, they seemed to relish it. 
Being positive, efficient and pragmatic about physical discomfort is part of a typically 
equestrian outlook. Horse care is valued, apparently intrinsically, both in terms of 
providing good quality, rigorous care that is aesthetically pleasing to the care provider, 
and as the chance to develop a real connection and bond with the horse through the 
intimacy of daily nurture and the familiarity that entails. Those who needed to employ 
help with these chores sometimes bemoaned not being able to complete them personally. 
There is a public and outward-facing element to equestrian care chores. A common way 
to compliment another livery is to comment on how well cared for her horse is: 'Doesn't 
he look well, he has really muscled up!' or 'Gosh, what are you feeding him? His coat is 
fantastic!' 
 
The valorisation of care is related to an exclusion of men, who are considered naturally ill 
                                                 
responsible mother. 
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equipped for it. Despite their pride in 'toughness' and the underlying masculinity 
associated with horsemanship, PFers felt it was obvious and unremarkable that 
horsemanship was predominantly female, seeing it as an oddity that it had previously 
been a masculine pursuit in Britain or was commonly male dominated in other countries. 
Jo suggested this may have been because these historical or cultural others pursued 
dominating or mechanical relationships with horses rather than 'real' connections, 
Rochelle and Layla agreed. And as for their lack of prevalence in my field site: “Men 
aren't very good at taking responsibility for another living being, are they?” Rochelle told 
me. “They'd rather do golf or ride motorbikes or something that doesn't involve a 
relationship. They haven't got the tact for it.” Reasons for men's lack of propensity for 
riding referred to their lack of relational skills, empathy, or 'feel' for another living being. 
 
Good horsemanship was something people took pride in as a natural virtuousness 
associated with being a good human too: tactful, empowered, autonomous, yet 
communicative. This was distinguished from faults considered to be an excess of gender 
in either direction. Good horsemanship was neither too girly, emotional and soft, nor too 
tough, egotistical and unfeeling. This seems, again, comparable to the Freemason Sisters' 
pursuit of 'fraternity' as the (always inherently gendered, classed) 'attempt to forge a 
universalistic relationship above and beyond the constraints of specific, gendered bodies' 
(2014:93). The comparable point is that both groups hold the idea that overly gendered 
bodies shouldn't get in the way of the meeting of real individual (horse and human) souls, 
even as they also hold gendered ideas about what constitutes that 'neutral' utopian 
meeting. However, in my ethnography, it was considered more likely that (some) women 
could 'toughen up' to the naturalised virtuous ideals of horsemanship, than it was thought 
likely that men could, or would, 'soften up' to them. 
 
Some linked this to male bodies. Leanne told me most men simply never look right on a 
horse, and horses just don't take to them. 'It's because their hands are too stiff, they have 
no feel in them. The horses hate it,' Katie suggested, while Leanne giggled something 
about their penises getting in the way of a decent riding position (mirroring a remarkably 
similar comment about women's 'wrong shaped' bottoms among Cassidy's racing folk 
2002:36). This body essentialism was not exclusive to considerations of gender, while 
ethnicity rarely emerged as a conversation topic due to the complete ethnic homogeneity 
of horse riders, I was shocked on one occasion when participants explained to me that, 
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'Black people can't ride well because they have heavy bones', and 'They have different 
skin which smells bad to horses.' 
 
 While my participants recognised that there were some remarkably talented individual 
men (like Bertie), the average man seemed awkward, laughable, and unwelcome in the 
predominantly tough-female equine spaces that I studied. Visiting husbands, fathers, 
boyfriends, or brothers' ineptness was often mocked. It was a matter of minor but regular 
frustration for my participants that the non-horsey world considered riding to be a girly 
pastime. While the view from the inside was that the average man was not good enough 
(at skilful relationships) to ride, the irksome view from the outside was that the average 
man didn't ride because horses were not good enough for him (too girly, silly, emotional, 
soft). Therefore, although horsey women celebrate their own capacity to overcome 
normalised expectations of their gender through individualised capacity to choose 
otherwise, they also reinscribe essentialised gender norms in many ways, not least 
through asserting their own distinction from 'normal' girly girls and 'normal' (empathy-
lacking) men. 
 
Moving between worlds: creating optionality. 
The different expectations of the female body inside, and outside, the horse world, 
provided opportunities and challenges to those moving between the two spheres. Some 
spoke of embarrassment at going to work with 'hat hair' after riding in the morning. 
Several Paddock Farmers had their nails painted in strong, dark colours in order to hide 
the grease that somehow got stubbornly embedded right under the finger nails. A few 
months into my fieldwork, a news story hit the headlines in which a shopper was thrown 
out of a large supermarket because she was wearing wellington boots and had been to see 
her horse, which was considered unhygienic by the management. Paddock Farm-er’s 
response to this was varied, Leigh said she would have been mortified with 
embarrassment and always, “Put on normal clothes to go to normal places,” while pink-
haired Layla refuted, “Sod them. A little bit of mud never hurt anyone. Why should they 
dictate what you can wear?” In either case, it is evident that moving in and out of the 
horse world provided an opportunity for reflection on the normativity itself, and therefore 
provided (required) choice at each entry/exit point. As Marilyn Strathern explains, when 
normative behaviour becomes explicitly recognised as such, it also becomes optional and 
loses any naturalisation as taken-for-granted (1992:e.g.47). 
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However, while Strathern largely associates growing optionality and explicitness of 
norms with potential instability and anxiety, for some Paddock Farm-ers, it also seemed 
to provide opportunity for freedom and the sense of a core self that can 'do' more than one 
sort of 'real'. The act of transformation itself was empowering for some women, not only 
in 'taking off' a high maintenance look and relaxing, but also in 'dressing up', both for 
parties and nights out with horsey friends, and for equestrian competition. I helped Liz 
prepare for a competition: she put on makeup that she declared, “Subtle, but strong and 
sophisticated,” (mascara, eye liner, deep red lipstick), wore simple diamond stud ear 
rings, threaded her diamanté belt onto her beige jodhpurs, gave her boots a final shine and 
put on her show jacket (that she had saved up for and had fitted). “It's about saying to the 
judge: ‘Hello, look at me and my beautiful horse. We take ourselves seriously, we are 
poised and professional...look how well we have got our shit together!’” She explained.  
Similarly, I had a feeling that while Leigh liked getting out of her work clothing, she also 
quite liked being seen in it first – showing her horsey friends that she had another side, 
owning her right to both sets of ideals. When the Christmas yard night out came around (a 
3-course meal and disco at a local hotel, which escalated into something like a screeching 
hen-do), she went all out, buying a black floor length, low cut, sparkly evening dress, 
getting her hair died, a fake tan, a new set of nails. The transformation procedure (rather 
than only the result) was recorded on Facebook, and as I talked her through her dress-
choosing dilemmas weeks in advance of the event, it became clear that she really hoped 
to surprise her horsey friends to show that she could be powerfully sexy and fashionable 
just as she could be powerfully tough, relaxed and physically strong in jodhpurs. 
 
In some ways, the exclusivity of equestrianism bought women independence not only in 
the way they dressed, but also in the way they spent time and money. Rochelle is one of 
the PF liveries who didn't have employment. Her youngest (of 4) children was 14, and 
Rochelle had never worked since she and her husband had got together when she was 16, 
shortly after she left school. He preferred it that way, she said, so that she could take care 
of the house and children, and she was fine with it, it gave her lots of time to ride in the 
day as well as complete her family jobs. Rochelle had no access to a bank account – her 
husband took care of, 'All the paperwork and money and post and things,' she told me, 
which is why she particularly appreciated being able to do 'odd jobs' at the yard. This 
involved clearing muck from the fields, fetching horses in and out, and cleaning tack, for 
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which she was paid a few pound coins at a time here and there. Her husband had no idea 
about this money, she told me, scandalously, so she could just spend it straight back on 
the horses (she had 2) and he would never know. She bought them food treats, sparkly 
headcollars, or paid for riding lessons with this secret cash. Casual horsey work moved 
Rochelle from the 'at-risk girl' Anita Harris describes as haunting a contemporary moral 
imaginary (with early motherhood, lack of career) towards the counter-category, 'can-do 
girl' (the capacity to invent the self, plan a career, succeed, and display a consumer 
lifestyle) (2004:13-47). Rochelle’s case might be considered an outlier, since her financial 
dependence was considered worrying by other liveries, but the pattern of earning small 
amounts of cash through horsey chores without the knowledge of other family members 
(or the tax man) was fairly prevalent. And freedom in the way money was spent was also 
granted due to the exclusivity (and secrecy) of the horse world. For example, when 
buying a saddle (worth £1100), Jess explained to me that her husband wouldn't like how 
much she had spent, but she could 'fiddle it about a bit' by inventing an extra farrier and 
vet visit, as he didn't know what was needed. 
 
Legitimising horse time through the concept of nature 
Horsiness presented tensions as well as opportunities within family life, which was most 
striking where horse riders had young children. Leigh was out competing her horse or 
taking him to training clinics almost every weekend and riding every evening after work. 
She was unstoppable in her (relatively low level) competitive ambitions, measuring 
herself keenly against close peers and past performances and industriously plotting 
improvements. Sometimes, she brought 7-year-old Emma along with her, and Emma sat 
in the car on her phone, or played with the yard dogs and cats, until Leigh was ready to go 
home.  Mostly, during Leigh's horse time, Emma was at home with her husband or with 
Leigh’s mum. “I'm not one of those women who has a child and then gives everything up 
to run around to PTA meetings!” Leigh proclaimed when I asked whether Emma liked 
coming to the yard. “Like it or lump it, that's the way it has to be sometimes so she'd 
better get used to it!” That horsey women might prioritise caring for their horse over their 
human dependents was something of a stereotype and even a joke. 'I better get home 
before he divorces me/before my poor neglected kids forget what I look like/I suppose I 
ought to do at least a bit of parenting this weekend,' were common ways of recognising 
the felt potential criticism - that one's family commitment was lacking. A popular satirical 
theme in images shared on Facebook compared horsey women’s care for the family with 
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care for the horse. While family home is filthy, stable is sparkling clean, while family eat 
fast food, horse eats organic wholesome meals lovingly prepared, while children's hair is 
unbrushed, horse is gleaming and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The irony reflects an interesting juxtaposition that women's independence (escape or 
neglect) from family responsibilities comes not in the form of rejecting the position as 
naturalised carer whole heartedly, but in offering that care in an alternate direction. In 
some senses, equestrianism gives women an enhanced capacity for choice, in terms of 
how they spend their money and time, how they relate to their body, and who they choose 
to care for. However, horsey women seem to need to defend this turf, and the strategies 
they use suggest that the legitimacy of their choice to ride is fragile - they utilise the 
bolstering capacities of the idiom of nature.  For example, the real, natural, needs of the 
horse can be used as the trump card in rationalising commitment from the owner. Hence, 
Leigh said to me, “Nothing comes before my horse, he gets what he needs first, and then 
the rest is up for discussion. Ultimately, he’s only a horse, and he is waiting for me to get 
Illustration 1: An image shared on facebook depicting the 
irony in womens' care for horses 
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here, and no-one can explain to him why I am late. If my husband has to make his own 
breakfast, so be it.” Species difference – particularly non-human vulnerability versus 
human responsibility, is employed here to render Leigh’s prioritisation of horse over 
family a fact-based inevitability. 
 
Another naturalisation holds that since it is in the true nature of horsey woman to spend 
time with horses (the born jigsaw piece equestrian), any stunting of that is a curtailing of 
who she really is, a form of violence to her core self. Hence, Leigh asserted later in the 
same conversation, “Horse time is me time... I've always said, if anyone tells me, ‘It’s me 
or the horse,’ then they know where the door is.”  Equestrianism is often talked about as a 
bug, obsession, addiction, need or hunger - note the lack of choice presumed in all of 
these terms, the assertion is that horse riding simply has to happen. 
 
In some ways, horsemanship has the potential to provide the answer to the dilemma of the 
woman who is supposed to have it all: a serious competitor, self-made, but in line with 
true nature, who can provide valued care, but in a brave, tough way, and who is be able to 
connect through the body beneath the artificiality of make-up, yet also able to employ 
appearance management masterfully and selectively. Most significantly, horsemanship 
provides women with the opportunity to articulate individualised choice and endeavour 
through (not versus) the notion of a deep relationality in which one might feel really 
connected and complete. The capacity to care, communicate and connect is reformed as 
an individualised self-realisation which partially detaches and liberates women from their 
human dependents. However, this capacity for potential empowerment relies, as we have 
seen, on a flexible and fragile employment of the notion of choice. Horsiness is 
empowering to the extent that it legitimises women as individual choosers, distinct from 
their non-horsey peers and families, a unique brand of can-do girls, who can choose how 
– and for whom- they do care. Yet horsiness is itself legitimised through the idea that it is 
more substantial, more real, more natural and more compelling than if it were only mere 
hobby or choice. The legitimacy of the concept of choice itself is both valorised and 
undermined by these negotiations of horsiness in relation to non-horsey expectations. 
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Class, competence and style. 
 
Individualised choice versus natural types 
Having discussed the ambiguous employment of 'nature' and 'choice' in distinguishing 
horsey people from non-horsey people, I move on now to consider distinctions that 
horsey people make amongst themselves. In Cassidy's racing world, the predominant 
differences between types of racing folk are class differences; marked out, performed, and 
re-inscribed through different sorts of tastes that are associated with different typical body 
types as well as through the structural organisation of the racing yard (2002:20-30). 
Jockeys are the most striking example of the way a body type relates to a particular 
position within the hierarchy of racing. Small, muscular, and tough, jockeys are regularly 
dieting, eating salads, high protein health foods, and soups (2002:23). In contrast, trainers 
tend to be tall, dressed to demonstrate affluence and success (whether by opting for an 
eccentric style or adopting traditional dress to the highest standard), with petite wives 
who wear well fitting, expensive jeans (2002:28). They fill the freezer with luxury foods 
ready to entertain owners at a moment’s notice, extravagant desserts, smoked salmon and 
so on. There are other sorts of differentiation at work too. Both horses’ and lads’ 
affiliations to particular trainers is identifiable on the heath since both wear clothing 
(exercise rugs, coloured bandages, riders' jackets) that follows the trainer's colour scheme, 
sometimes with embroidery carrying the trainer's monogram (2002:26). At the 
racecourse, jockeys wear silks in the colours of their mounts' owners. 
 
Things couldn't be more different for Paddock Farm-ers. As an optional activity, the horse 
world is organised around providing for the variant needs and wants of horse owners, 
who are relatively free from structural affiliations to others. This leads to a heterogeneous 
equestrian community, which is to some extent fragmented into sub communities, styles, 
and sorts, based on the activities, ethics and aesthetics the owner pursues. Riders can 
choose their 'discipline' (sport, e.g. dressage or show jumping), competition classes/levels 
(a constant renegotiation, based on current performance, waxing or waning of ambition) 
and affiliations/memberships to various societies, riding clubs, or breed associations. 
Furthermore, British horse riders have at their fingertips a burgeoning market for 
consumer goods. Shopping for the horse is clearly an integral part of enjoying the horse-
human relationship for many Paddock Farm-ers, reflecting a broader late modern pattern 
of performing affectionate relatedness through consumption (with pets, Holbrook and 
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Woodside 2008; with families, Carrier 2005, Miller, Jackson, Thrift, Holbrook and 
Rowlands 1998).  'Your Horse Live,' an annual equestrian exposition, boasts 'amazing 
shopping opportunities' as one of its main draws. I visited with Paddock Farm-ers, and it 
didn't disappoint, with three huge exhibition hangers, carpeted in the shocking pink that 
brands the event, full of trade stand after trade stand of feeds, vitamin supplements, 
sparkly whips, shampoos, riding clothing, horse rugs, saddle cloths, first aid kits, hay 
nets, tack soaps, and even high price items like horse trailers. 
 
At first glance this dazzling array of choice seems likely to suggest a dissolution of class 
in the sense that Cassidy found it: distinguished body types and tastes in line with socio-
economic capital and labour type. Rather, the leisure horse world demonstrates the rise of 
individual choice (Giddens 1991, Strathern 1992) and seems to distinguish people based 
on personal style. When choosing a horse, a livery yard, or a sporting aim, equestrians try 
to work out where they 'belong', 'fit' or 'click'. 
 
 Mary told me about her choice to pursue Western Riding with her horse Molly. Both 
Mary and Molly were gentle, thoughtful, soft, and steady types – but not pushovers, 
quietly determined. For two years, Mary tried to get Molly going better for competitive 
dressage and show jumping. Molly didn't seem to enjoy the big, fast movements – the 
expressive, flashy trot required for dressage caused particular problems, Molly 'held back' 
(and so did Mary, as she was told by her instructor). On a recommendation, Mary had a 
‘Western’ (North American, cowboy style) riding lesson, and it was revelatory. The 
movements were softer and slower, but not less skilled, ridden to a high degree of 
precision, but with the emphasis on the lightness of touch. Mary and Molly excelled, and 
found they got on fantastically with the whole Western community. “It was like finding 
my tribe!” she told me, dressed head to toe in cowboy style (jeans, shirt, hat).  The quest 
to find the place one really belongs was based on the assumption that there was a 
naturalness to one’s individual, horsey disposition and that there were others that at least 
somewhat shared it. 
 
An ethic of 'each to their own' permeates the shared landscape of the livery yard in which 
individuals endeavour to do horsemanship to the best of their own, personal, capacities 
and tastes. To some extent, the moral high ground is won by tolerating difference, 
showing open mindedness and respecting others' rights to do things their own way. 
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Lorraine told me of how it became awkward when a new riding friend tried to share tips 
on how to achieve a type of riding Lorraine didn't care for. Eventually, Lorraine had to tell 
her, 'Look, Di. You ride your horse, and I'll ride mine,' and apparently the relationship 
continued amicably from this point on. However, the concept of 'each to their own' in 
practice, was not always a leveller, but often a system of distancing and sometimes 
excluding. 
 
Reconfiguring natural types 
Stereotypes were common ways of articulating 'types' and sorting individuals in the horse 
world. These stereotypes seem to be useful in marking out categories of person as natural 
types, at the same time as using irony to acknowledge the non-conformity of individual 
uniqueness. All Paddock Farm-ers could easily run off a list of stereotypes of rider based 
on the sport they pursue or the breed they ride. But all also explained how they, or 
someone they knew well, as really individual individuals, somehow bucked the trend, too. 
Putting people in boxes was as much fun as remarking on how the boxes were 
insufficient. Many, at least sometimes, bought into their stereotypes with good humour. 
Dressage 'divas' were thought to be perfectionists, strict, Germanic, sticklers for detail and 
perhaps a little prissy (Diamanté studded hoody reads, “Stressage Queen”). Showjumpers 
were thought to enjoy a good party, have a rather large ego, more likely male and working 
class, and to be particularly flirtatious, perhaps even sexually provocative (women’s fitted 
T shirt reads, “Showjumpers know how to give a good ride”). Eventers were thought of as 
brave, perhaps to a point of madness, forthright, no-nonsense types, quite possibly posh 
or traditionalist, but full of guts and grit and good humour (notably less sloganned 
merchandise targeted at eventers, who tend to prefer the quality-understated look, though 
a lunch cooler reads, “Eventers keep calm and canter on”).  Paddock farmers were almost 
all eventers, or at least, aspiring eventers, owing largely to the fact this was Bertie and 
Jill's passion. They had either selected Paddock Farm because of the eventing link, 
knowing it would have their type of people on site, or they had 'got into' eventing because 
the general rhythms and chatter of the yard compelled them towards joining the trend 
(whereby some found themselves better 'fitting' than others). 
 
Similarly, breeds present further grounds for stereotypes, and again, the emphasis of 
stereotypes is disposition and personality. The coloured cob is thought of an ideal horse 
for the novice or nervous, dependable, friendly, uncomplicated. However, they can be 
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known as 'pikey ponies' and considered cheap and common. Welfare charities describe 
them as the 'problem breed' – filling rescue centres like 'the staffie of the horse world' 
(WHW conference 2016). Cob owners are at pains to insist they are more sensitive, able 
and complex than their stereotype suggests. Thoroughbreds are considered 'sharp' – 
intelligent, highly responsive and quick on their feet. They can be found at all levels of 
society; their British-ness and racing association buy them access to an old-moneyed 
hunting, shooting association, while on the other hand, the mass of cheap, retired and 
failed racehorses makes them an affordable 'project' for those with high ambitions and 
low resources. Warmbloods are designed for expressive paces and maximum jumping 
potential. They are the sports car of the horse world and can be thought of as too athletic 
for their own good, quite possibly unintelligent (“dum-bloods”) or over-reactive, 
associated with top competitors, as well as those with an inflated sense of their own 
abilities, and too much money, lower down the competence hierarchy. There are clearly 
moral judgements within these typologies, with classist tones. A mis-match between horse 
and rider is often recognised by commentators as an embarrassing if not irresponsible 
problem, caused by the owner’s lack of self-awareness, such that “she ought to have a 
cob” is akin to the statement, “she doesn't know her place.” 
 
Judgements and snobbery 
A hallmark of recent interest in class is the recognition of complex, changing and 
contested moral and aesthetic judgements, whereby 'class' groups are not established as a 
static social fact linked to inheritance, so much as 'classiness' can be identified as a form 
of ‘judginess’ employed in various ways ( Lawler 2005, Skeggs and Loveday 2012, 
Cannandine 2000, Biressi and Nunn 2013, Sayer 2002, 2005). As is already emerging 
within the ethnography, competence level in some ways supplants, or supports, 
'classiness', as a naturalised way of sorting people into a hierarchy of worth and influence. 
 
A particularly clear example of classiness/competence in the horsey world is the 
distinction between traditionalist styles and newer alternatives.  A 'traditional' aesthetic 
includes brown leather tack on the horse, and navy or brown clothing predominantly for 
the rider. Traditionally kept horses' manes are 'pulled' short and plaited for competitions, 
and they come into the stable frequently, particularly in the winter. In contrast, more 
'natural' alternatives involve leaving the horse in the field more often, leaving the mane 
and tail long and untrimmed, and perhaps even leaving the feet unshod (Hurn 2011). 
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Furthermore, one is also able to reject traditionalism and choose a nylon pink or green 
bridle for one’s horse, a diamanté or coloured 'blingy' crystal browband, and even a zebra-
striped turn out rug.  A growing trend is to dress horse and human 'matchy matchy,' which 
involves colour co-ordinating bits of both rider and horses' clothing to match. Along these 
lines, jackets and saddle cloths that were embroidered with the name of the owner/rider 
and the show name12 of the horse were also popular.  Note the way this dress system 
makes explicit that this horse and this rider belong to one another. In comparison, 
traditional dress communicates one's belonging to the more elitist horse world of old, and 
recall Cassidy's ethnography, where horse/rider dress colours communicate one's 
belonging to a trainer’s string or a particular owner. 
 
Traditionalist horse people often showed disgust at the newer styles available, while, on 
the contrary, matchy matchy riders felt traditional approaches were snobby and dogmatic. 
Bertie, quite literally, turned his nose up whenever a livery accrued an item of 
questionable taste (neoprene gloves rather than leather, Velcro fastenings rather than 
buckles, and so on) and regularly enjoyed telling me the history and details of various 
traditional dress codes and rules (which determine who/when one should wear stock or 
tie, tweed or navy jacket, colour of breeches, and so on). These were explained through 
pointing out failures among (he presumed) ignorant or lazy competitors in collecting 
rings. For Bertie, acknowledging custom closely was a sign of respect – to the horse (who 
is not just a play-thing – he emphasised), to the judge, to his own past mentors, and to 
equestrianism as a whole.  I spoke with Bertie about his dislike of the newer styles and his 
preference to adhere to traditional standards: “To be honest, it’s more classy,” he 
explained, “It’s probably just snobbery really, isn't it? But it [newer styles] is more like, 
Essex, like, fake stick on nails, isn't it?” I asked him whether he felt there was a pattern 
between particular classes and the way they dressed themselves and their horses. I knew 
Bertie wouldn't consider himself as coming from an upper-class background, so was 
intrigued by his use of the term 'classy'. “You don't have to be high class to be classy,” he 
replied. A link between competence and snobbery is evident in that professional 
horsepeople – often from working class backgrounds – were likely to be the strictest 
defenders of traditional, equestrian standards of 'classiness'. 
                                                 
12Most horses have 'stable names' such as 'Bobby' and 'show names' – the names in their passport used for 
competition, such as 'Bobby Dazzler'. 
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Professionalism and competence snobbery 
The area's most proficient riders and prolific instructors hold minor celebrity status. Many 
amateur equestrians admire and respect professionals, even when they don't all follow the 
traditionalist styles associated with professionalism. Like Bertie, professional riders have 
often apprenticed for long, successful stints under better-known competitors, developed 
strong equestrian networks, and learned the required embodied habitus for moving and 
working in and around horses and equestrian environments. This often includes a sharp 
understanding of obedience, hierarchy, and respect. These working equestrians have 
found success through developing a high regard for correct detail, hard work, and 
deference, and they expect the same from others. The professional groom and particularly 
the accomplished rider are liable (but not guaranteed) to be invested in the traditionalist 
(some would say) 'snobby' horsemanship as part of their figuring of real horsey 
belonging. 
 
Whether working class or middle class (and that distinction is not so easily made, 
Edwards, Evans and Smith 2012), my participants who rode and cared for their own 
horses, just for fun, at times felt excluded from, or belittled by, the 'really horsey' 
communities of professionals. Jess raised this predicament, towards the start of this 
chapter; working in horses wasn't an option for her, horsiness had to be chosen as a 
consumer good. In line with career aspirations associated with her middle class 
background, she ‘had’ to go to university, rendering her forever inside-outside the truly 
'experienced' horsey set who lived their vocation. The figure of the Essex girl looms large, 
as Bertie exemplified in his above critique. Biressi and Nunn demonstrate a British 
disgust at ‘Essex girl’s’ out of control consumption practices (2013:20, 24, 40-41). 'Essex 
girl' is brazen and self-entitled, she does not know her place and lacks any class, they 
describe. Among traditionalist equestrians, the distaste of over-consumption spreads also 
towards condemning the more moneyed, middle class yummy-mummy type who (the 
critique goes) spoils her far-too-for-her-good horse, while togged up in rural fashion 
brands. The prevalent distaste for spoiled women resonates with what Catherine Gray 
(2000) calls 'Barbie-bashing,' disgust generated towards bourgeois women who are 
deemed as having too much choice, and too little grounding in reality. My participants 
were keen to distance themselves from this potential critique, sometimes by identifying 
others who better deserved it. “All the gear, but no idea” was a phrase I heard repeatedly, 
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for example, it was whispered about a lady at a competition, when, next to her huge, 
brand new, top of the range horse lorry, she struggled to get her smart horse to stand still 
so she could get on board. Both Bourgeois Barbie and Essex Girl are evoked by distaste 
for those who have all the wrong sorts of capital: too much consumer choice, and no 
authentic equestrian talent or connection. In this discourse, traditionalism features not as 
merely another choice, but as the opposite of overrun choice, as an anti-fashion 
(Goodrum and Hunt 2011) 
 
Marilyn Strathern shows that while the rubric of 'choice' has been differently constructed 
by the English historically, the idea has consistently been associated not only with 
opportunity, invention and enterprise, but also with anxieties about openness, variety and 
fragmentation (1992:10-14). Choice, she argues, appears a particularly precarious way of 
connecting people when held in comparison with the (variable) English conception of 
'nature' as grounded, established, given and real (1992: e.g. 56, 87). Once a plurality of 
traditional or natural 'styles' have been explicitly rendered as optional, Strathern argues, 
nothing grounds those choices as substantial or binding, and this superfluence of choice is 
recognised by society,  felt as a fragmentation and dissolution of community (1992: e.g. 
43, 163-4, 183, 224) which Strathern calls a 'postplural nostalgia'  (1992:32). 
 
In line with Strathern's predictions, among my participants too much choice was 
considered incompatible with substantial relatedness. An unease about consumerism, 
choice and invention preoccupied the equestrian world.  It was common for riders aged 
anything over 25 to reminisce about a time when equipment was more rudimentary, but 
horsemanship more skilled, and also somehow also more authentic. A general consensus 
was that there were too many opinions in the horse world, or at least, that the large 
number of opinions was incompatible with a smoothly functioning community: there was 
too much critique, contestation, judginess and even bullying. Bertie told me, “Bitchiness 
is a [common] problem on yards when there is a vacuum of proper knowledge, so 
everybody thinks their own way is the right way.”  Bertie’s comment shows that a 
multitude of personal opinions become moralised judgements precisely because 
equestrian relationships are not considered merely matters of choice, wherein any choice 
might be equitable and valid. Rather, these relationships are treated as though there is a 
natural reality to them that ought to be properly attended and recognised, such that doing 
horsemanship well, is not just a matter of doing it differently in any manner one chooses. 
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Who is world-making? 
One could speak of a competence snobbery in which amateurs feel awkward and out of 
place in the horse world, despite their majority in numbers. However, this trend is 
revealed at the same time as it is under challenge. Take, for example, the Wobbleberry 
challenge. In 2009 British Eventing introduced a lower level class, the BE80T (80cm 
jumps, T for 'training' level), which aimed to make affiliated competition accessible to 
almost any horse and rider with the right preparation. This followed a pattern over the last 
two decades of gradually lowering the entry standard. There are no pre-requisites to entry 
(other than purchasing day, year, or life BE membership) but some worried they were not 
of a good enough standard to 'go affiliated' and would be humiliated, outclassed and 
unwelcome on the day. The 'Wobbleberry Challenge' seemed to answer to this feeling, by 
giving those who felt they were not-quite-appropriate a legitimate reason to compete. The 
idea was that middle aged, out-of-shape, nervous, or novice riders (the anti-thesis of 'real' 
horsemanship by eventing standards) would be sponsored by friends and family to train 
towards and then compete at an affiliated event, earning the sponsorship money for a 
cancer charity on completion. The Wobbleberry trend grew quickly. Wobbleberries 
supported one another via Facebook, wrote Wobbleberry blogs, and had wristbands and a 
mascot horse soft toy 'Wilberry' which some carried around the course with them by 
taping it to their wrist or shoulder, shattering the traditionalist aesthetic that is usually 
sustained in affiliated eventing. The self-mockery involved in being a self-confessed 
'Wobbleberry' makes visible the competence snobbery that the movement helps to 
overcome. Needless to say, it wasn't met by support from everybody. The two participants 
who have featured prominently in this chapter, Leigh and Layla reported their inaugural 
Wobbleberry day as a success because 'they made it round', and therefore had established 
a baseline affiliated performance to improve on, and earned belonging to an exclusive set 
of 'affiliated eventers'. But Tina, an ex-top competitor who ran the venue, reported that it 
was her worst day of eventing, ever. She told me that competitors fell off, didn't know the 
rules, kept losing their way on course, wore the wrong clothing, and threw the schedule of 
the day into chaos by taking three times the optimum time to complete the course. 'Not 
everybody should event. Period.' She vented. 
 
Joanne Latimer and Rolland Munro (2015:415) describe class dynamics as the 'battle over 
world-making' (using Bourdieu's phrase, 1989). They ask, whose values determine 
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legitimate personhood? The above described challenges to, and defences of, traditionalist 
aesthetics suggest to me the horse-world is mid-battle, world-making is all to play for. 
While the majority of equestrians are amateurs and relative novices by competition 
standards (even if they have ridden their whole life), amateurism sits awkwardly within 
the horse world, and the average equestrian is looking up, yearning to be a little more of a 
'real' horse-person than they currently are. A classist landscape endures, all be it 
destabilised and reconfigured in certain ways when compared to the centrality of blood 
and breeding in Cassidy's work. It is interesting that Bertie holds the position as yard 
snob, even though he is employed by those who were apparently (and somewhat 
regretfully) too good for horsey work. One-horse owners are in danger of appearing too 
spoiled, too superficial, too inexperienced to be considered really horsey folk. 
Nonetheless, the market is responding to the hordes of amateur horse riders and their 
profitable desires to perfect their individualised relationships with their horses and work 
towards their competition goals. The wobbleberries are world-making. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have shown that contemporary horsemanship is a heterogeneous 
landscape, populated increasingly by amateur, female, one horse owners who particularly 
focus on relationship development with the horse. I have shown that horsiness provides 
individuals with a way to belong to a community that feels somewhat detached from the 
rest of their world.  Horsiness marks some women out as distinct from their family and 
the rest of their gender, yet it also sets them up as 'jigsaw piece' equestrians, deeply 
invested in relatedness with another being. I have described horsey people as ambitious, 
tough and committed, and I have introduced the horse world as a potentially empowering 
site of personal choice, but highly fragmented, exclusive and fraught with judgements. 
The scope of variety and choice, and the destabilisation of traditional systems, leads to 
ongoing evaluations of legitimacy and 'real horsiness'. Throughout, I have demonstrated 
an awkward and imperative relationship between the concepts of choice and nature, 
which, in various forms, often form the basis for my participants' understandings of 
belonging, identity, and connectivity. There are many, often valorised, opportunities for 
choice - whether to spend time with family or horse, which horse to buy, where to keep it, 
how to dress it, train it, and compete it. Yet the moralised judgements about these choices 
often refer to a grounding in nature – to the concept of the raw, real, established and given 
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– how one ought to behave, who deserves to belong, what real horsemanship properly 
consists of, and, as we shall see in the proceeding chapters, what counts as a real 
connection. An 'epistemological responsibility' emerges out of this individualised 
responsibility, desire for close connectivity, and destabilisation of traditional knowledge. 
Each owner felt an imperative to know their horse well, and as we shall see, to know 
themselves well too, in order to pursue an authentic and legitimate connection to the 
horse. 
 
Good relatedness is what my participants' horsemanship is all about. The stakes of good 
decision making are fraught because they are considered more substantive than mere 
matters of style. With decisions of feed, medication, work regime, training approach, 
saddle fit, grass management, and more, the horse’s (and rider’s) health, welfare and 
potential to succeed all hang in the balance. These matters are met, increasingly, with 
differences of opinion. No longer able to rely on taken-for-granted systems, it is the horse 
owner's prerogative to resource and choose from the available options. While the premise 
is that each individual must decide for themselves what they feel good horsemanship is 
(cf. Giddens, Beck and Lash 1994:187), at the same time, the implication is that they 
cannot just decide what good horsemanship is according to their own whim and fanc
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Chapter Two: The revolution in horsemanship and the imperative to be 
open minded 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In Chapter One I noted the import of positive horse-human relationship to my 
participants. I also described a challenge to traditionalist styles and systems, and a context 
in which individual owners held responsibility for making good choices on behalf of their 
(equally individual) horses. In this chapter, I build on these topics by investigating a rift 
between two systems of training the horse, known as 'traditional' and 'alternative'. The 
'alternative' movement has been described as a 'revolution' in horsemanship (Miller and 
Lamb 2005), alluding to the explicit contrast with 'traditional' horse training that 
alternative practitioners invoke. The conflict between these systems engenders an 
environment of critique, but also an ethic of 'open-mindedness'. This chapter sets out to 
interrogate that ethic of open-mindedness, investigating exactly what sorts of 'openness' 
equestrians value and how they put open-mindedness into practice when interacting with 
horses and with one another. As an initial introduction to the ethic of open-mindedness, 
Jodi, an alternative horsemanship instructor describes:   
 
You have to keep looking outside, you have to be open to seeing it another way, 
keeping a clear picture on it, learning from real horsemen, even the ones who 
don't know they are real horsemen and aren't necessarily making a big fuss about 
it.  Just watch their horses. The horses will tell you what's right and what's not, if 
you are ready to learn it. 
 Dictaphone recording, October 2016. 
 
Jodi was talking to me about following Pat Parelli, Californian horse whisperer, and 
explaining why she didn't blindly accept everything her role model said, after all, “The 
most important thing he has taught me is to think for myself,” she pointed out. Jodi's 
advice points towards two aspects of the equestrian ethic of open-mindedness: the ability 
to hold a critical stance (thinking from the “outside”, as she puts it), and the ability to 
allow the horse to change and adjust one’s mindset (learning from the horse). I will 
investigate these two aspects through comparing the open-mindedness evidenced in my 
ethnography with two other sorts of 'open'; 'critical openings' described within 
ethnographic studies of queer activism (Dave 2011, 2012, Heywood 2018, also Povinelli 
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2012); and the (variable) affective 'open' of mutuality, permeability, and possibility 
described within multispecies literature (Game 2001, Haraway 2003, 2008, Ingold 2006, 
2008, Kohn 2013, Locke 2017). 
 
 My aim is first to describe how traditional equestrianism is portrayed within the 
discourse of alternative trainers and their followers. I will show that there are some clear 
similarities between the multispecies version of open and the alternative equestrians' 
valorisation of open-mindedness, particularly in the injunction to make oneself 'open' to 
learn from the animal by recognising the embodied, affective relatedness between horse 
and human. In both multispecies literature and alternative training rhetoric, openness is 
also constituted as a freeing of minds and an eschewing of other, more 'closed' 
epistemological systems. The multispecies literature I engage with defines 'openness' in 
opposition to scientific objectivity, scepticism and abstraction. In comparison, in the 
second section of the chapter, I draw on Naisargi Dave's use of Foucault, for whom 
critical 'openings' are defined in opposition to the 'enclosures' of normativity, 
recognisability and legitimacy. Dave's terminology is particularly useful for describing 
the formality and fixity of alternative pedagogical systems, wherein attempts to 
revolutionise end up creating new 'closed' normativities. This is recognised by critics of 
the alternative movement, who feel it invokes 'cultishness' in humans and programmatic 
'dead-eyed' over-obedience in horses. In the third section I show that my participants' 
ethical practices demonstrated frequent and constant management of both critical 
openings and objectifying closures. Finally, I will compare the three forms of 'open' 
described throughout the chapter, and I will argue that the multispecies version of 
'openness' cannot account for my participants' practices of 'open-mindedness.' 
Multispecies ethnographers are preoccupied with the difference between objective, 
detached, 'closed' ways of knowing animals on the one hand, and relational, affective and 
'open' alternatives on the other. On the contrary, equestrians are invested in open-
mindedness as a means of obtaining right, true, accurate and therefore ethical knowledge 
about what sort of subjective creature each horse, in each moment, is. 
 
 
The revolution as an opening of minds 
 
The contemporary horse world has been described as undergoing a 'revolution' (Miller 
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and Lamb 2005). Miller and Lamb use the term to describe a 'radical' multi-faceted, 
global change in the ways in which people relate to their horses. Originating largely from 
North America (two key proponents from California) and gaining increasing acclaim - 
and causing particular friction - in Britain since the 1980s, 'revolutionaries' explicitly 
position themselves as challenging old, traditional, harsh ways of interacting with horses, 
and introducing new, kinder methods, many of which draw on ethological or behavioural 
ideas about horses’ instincts, and 'natural' communicative, social or learning capacities. 
Sociologist Linda Birke has studied the uptake of the revolution (which she calls 'natural 
horsemanship,' or NH, but which I call 'alternative horsemanship'13 ' henceforth AH) 
among British leisure riders, through interview-based studies of alternative enthusiasts 
(Birke 2007, 2008, Latimer and Birke 2009). Birke (2007) demonstrates how AH 
enthusiasts describe their methods as kinder, gentler, and more interested in a two-way 
relationship with the horse than the traditional methods they rejected. I found this 
distinction came through clearly in the narratives of key instigators, Pat Parelli and Monty 
Roberts, during their live demonstrations. Roberts, for example, in both his autobiography 
(1997) and his live demonstrations, likens his father's brutality towards horses with 
similar brutality towards the young Roberts. “He taught me a thing or two about 'respect'” 
he says, “and do you know how old-timers spell respect? F.E.A.R.” 
 
A kinder, more intelligent way 
In order to begin to describe the AH movement as it appeared within my ethnography, I 
will introduce one of my participants. Hannah was keen to emphasise that she was not 
your typical 'natural horsemanship person.' Petite, blonde, mid-forties, and fiercely 
determined, Hannah kept her four horses at the home she was born in, a 40-acre estate, 
complete with 7-bedroom, part-17th Century farm house. The horses had vintage railway 
carriages as field shelters. She had mixed feelings about the property: sure, it was 
beautiful, but the money was made in trading slaves, so the family was cursed, she told 
                                                 
13I prefer the term alternative horsemanship because I found 'natural horsemanship' to be a highly contested 
term among this movement, where 'alternative' seems to capture the consistent distinction against 
mainstream/traditional methods. Monty Roberts – a key proponent in the 'revolution' – rejects the term 
'natural horsemanship' because he declares that no horsemanship can be wholly natural, the natural thing 
for horses to do is to eat grass on the plains, it is our responsibility to recognise that before all else. Pat 
Parelli – an equally monumental figure in the movement, declares the exact opposite – stating as his 
number 1 'Principle of horsemanship': “Horsemanship is natural”. He refers to the way that relations 
between horses and people are based on natural embodied capacities to communicate and co-operate. 
Often, despite Roberts' rejection, the term 'natural horsemanship' is the one that stuck among my 
participants, in referring to a broad range of non-traditional systems. 
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me darkly. Hannah's childhood had been pony obsessed, her mother, apparently a 
formidable woman (she died young), had bought Hannah and her sisters the best possible 
ponies and expected them to produce serious results, competing in 'working hunters'14 and 
show pony15 classes up and down the country. Hannah told me of a time when her mother 
had chased her into the lorry and struck her with a dressage whip, frustrated at her poor 
competitive performance. Showing is much like a beauty contest for horses (and, to some 
extent, for riders too, see Birke and Brandt 2009:192). It is among the most old-fashioned 
of sports in terms of traditionalist aesthetics, and the most exclusive in terms of 
participants, many of whom are from old equestrian, upper class families. Hannah loved 
the fact that her upbringing had given her an 'in' to this elitist world, she knew all the 
names, she knew all the judges. Hannah also recognised, sadly, that she seemed to have 
inherited her mother's ability to fall out with staff, family and friends alike. Repeatedly, 
she tried to be nice and pleasant, but invariably, ended up feeling she was not being taken 
seriously enough, not being listened to, or respected. Perhaps it was her small stature, or 
girlish looks, she speculated, but she seemed to keep having to lose her temper in order to 
get anywhere in life. 
 
Hannah had a mission. She wanted to qualify to compete (or even win, she speculated, 
eyes wide with ambition) at The Horse of The Year Show (HOYS) on one of her beautiful 
well-bred show horses, and what is more, she wanted to do so having used only kind, 
natural, intelligent training methods. She would not even carry a whip (which is highly 
unusual in terms of etiquette in the show ring), and when, in this vision, she would be 
interviewed by Horse and Hound (the most prestigious and old fashioned of the 
equestrian magazines) she would attest that a kinder approach is what got her to the top. 
That would ruffle some feathers among the highly traditional, elitist, and snobby showing 
set, she said with glee. That would show them how backward their attitudes were. It 
would take something like a HOYS win to achieve real change, Hannah explained, 
because the alternative horsemanship movement was currently too strongly associated 
with 'numpties' and 'horse huggers', amateurs who don't really do anything with their 
horses. 
                                                 
14Show class that involves judging the quality of a hunting pony. The pony is judged on conformation (body 
shape), jumping style, and ridden manners (obedience). 
15Show ponies are judges according to 'type' in different classes, much as Crufts dogs are judged by breed 
standard. 
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Hannah was rightly recognising a demographic trend among alternative horsemanship 
enthusiasts. Many were middle aged, middle class, amateurs who found themselves at 
odds with the stark professionalism and pragmatism that permeates throughout traditional 
pedagogical systems. The British Horse Society is associated strongly with the phrase 
'traditional' horsemanship, often acting as the 'status quo' against which alternative 
systems pit themselves. In fact, the BHS, a charity, was not so long ago a revolutionary 
force itself, instigating the first formal training and examination programme for 
equestrian instructors and professionals (grooms, yard managers and so on), in an effort 
to modify and raise safety and welfare standards (first exams, 1948). It also began an 
evaluation and certification scheme for approved livery yards and riding schools. It 
campaigns for safety (e.g. reducing tax on riding helmets), bridleway access, and welfare 
legislation. The BHS exams are still well respected throughout the equestrian industry, 
such that barely an equestrian job is advertised without reference to the relevant BHS 
stage (standard) required. The BHS has 92,000 members, and also acts as the central 
affiliation point for local riding clubs, so its presence is felt throughout the equestrian 
sphere as a background, bureaucratic hum of legislation and regulation. 
 
BHS training was set up with professional equestrianism in mind (on which, more to 
follow in Section Two), teaching students how to be efficient, effective workers on busy 
yards. The professional image of the BHS also made it alluring to many of my 
participants, who, as we saw in Chapter One, were liable to feeling excluded and belittled 
in comparison to the really real horsemanship of professionals. Several of my participants 
had taken 'BHS Stages' with no intention of an equestrian career, but as a marker of their 
own capacity and in line with the general rhythms of ambition, testing and measured 
progress that occupied many equestrian spaces. However, BHS training did not fulfil the 
desires of one-horse leisure owners to perfect their emotive relationship with their own, 
special equine partner. It did not afford nor encourage a high degree of personalisation, 
and often left them looking for something more 'about the relationship' as Jo put it. One 
owner told me why the BHS didn't work for her horse, “It was all the 'BHS way,' no 
flexibility, just this is how it has to be done because this is how it has to be done. They 
wouldn't be interested in thinking about it from any other angle, like thinking about what 
he [the horse] might actually need that might not fit that, what might actually suit us.” 
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It is against this background that the revolution in horsemanship has gained traction. 
Latimer and Birke (2009) relate enthusiasm for 'natural horsemanship' with a broader 
counter-culture movement, which both rejects the industrialisation of nature and 
emphasises ethics as individual lifestyle choices. This movement, they explain, can be 
seen in the growth of 'natural' remedies, diets and technologies, as well as in the 
'democratisation' of relationships with animals. It involves a rejection of 'tradition-as-
culture' and an imperative on individuals to make informed choices, rather than trusting 
the patterns of the masses or predecessors to provide the ethical answer (2009:23). This 
reflects the drive toward personalised horse care choices, that accompanies the increase in 
one horse owning, amateur participants, as demonstrated in Chapter One. However, it 
also begins to explain that it is precisely those perpetual novice, non-professionals, 
competing at lower standards, and riding 'just for fun' who are most attracted towards 
alternative training methods. I will return to this point throughout, but for now, we can 
recognise Hannah's discomfort about being associated with ineffective, unproductive 
community of riders who she glossed as over emotional, untalented, and undistinguished.  
Occasionally, Hannah self-described as a 'snob,' she couldn't bare 'spot-jobs' (spotted 
horses) or 'pikey ponies' (coloured cobs), and she saw the fashionable riding-wear trends 
as genuinely repulsive. 
 
To Hannah, 'traditional' horsemanship was an ambiguous concept. It captured prestige, 
respectability, and competence, but also was linked with physical domination, cruelty, and 
narrow mindedness. For many, the term 'traditional' was used as a euphemism for 'tough.' 
For example, Lucy asked Jo whether she would recommend Fran for a lesson, Jo 
responded, “She’s not for everyone, she's very, you know, traditional about things, if you 
know what I mean. She likes horses and people to do what their told.” On the other hand, 
'traditional' could simply refer to ordinary, or normal, as a pose to the novelty of the new 
alternatives, such that the local equestrian college would be recognisable as a 'traditional' 
learning environment, and dressage, show jumping and eventing were known as 
'traditional' sports compared to the new-fangled horse agility16. 
 
                                                 
16Horse Agility has been growing in popularity and developing formality over the last ten years. It involves 
a course much like dog agility, to be completed with the human running on the ground alongside the 
horse. Low level competition has the horse on a lead, and higher level, the horse is 'at liberty' (released), 
negotiating various obstacles to go under, over, across or through. 
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In alternative rhetoric, traditional is to alternative, as domination is to kindness. This is a 
generalisation that many refute: it is good horsemanship that doesn't require domination, I 
was told by one irate traditionalist rider, and, “Horse whisperers did NOT invent the idea 
of getting horses to want to do what you want them to do, that's just good, old fashioned, 
horsemanship.” Nevertheless, it is easy to see how the alternativists' distinction gains 
traction. I found plenty of evidence for 'obedience' and 'submission' as central themes in 
'traditional' riding lessons (those with BHS trained instructors, who did not market 
themselves explicitly as alternatives).  One common narrative which earns particular 
distaste from the revolutionaries follows a model of 'horse versus rider,' in which the 
horse is presumed likely to be looking to usurp the rider at every possible opportunity 
(more on this common narrative in Chapter Three).  In these narratives of opposition, it 
falls upon the rider to coerce, convince, or otherwise manipulate the horse into yielding. 
This instigates particular requirements for the 'docility' of riders too; riders must respond 
in the appropriate way – must 'live up to' the challenge posed by the horse and recognised 
by the experienced observer, instructor or judge. Occasionally, I saw riders chastised by 
their instructors, and it was often over their hesitancy in taking assertive (sometimes 
aggressive) control ordered by the instructor, usually via strong use of the whip, legs, or 
reins. Instructors could seem incensed when, from their point of view, the rider ‘went soft’ 
and ‘wimped out’ in moments where the horse required clarity and commitment. 
 
“Use your stick! I said USE IT! USE IT! YOU'RE NOT USING IT!” Christine, a 
roughly 60-year-old instructor of great regional acclaim, barked in increasingly 
terrifying tones at her student as a horse and rider approached, and then refused a 
jump, after multiple failed attempts. The rider's eventual 'tickle' with the whip (as 
Christine called it) did not appease her – it was too little and too late, the rider was 
summoned over and berated. The horse had needed one good 'reminder' (smack) 
behind the saddle, exactly when Christine had asked for it, she insisted. If the rider 
wasn't going to follow her advice, she might as well get off. “You either want to 
jump the fence, or you don't,” Christine pushed. The rider, Lucy, a 24-year-old, 
stared down towards her horse’s neck during Christine's barrage, wiped away a 
tear and gritted her teeth to hold back more, apologised and tried again. More tears 
followed after the lesson, and once Christine was out of earshot, Lucy could tell 
me why. Lucy's body “kept freezing” she told me, so she continued to fail to use 
the whip properly, ending the session thoroughly demoralised and ashamed. 
From field notes, May 2016. 
 
Later, I will show how equestrianism within traditional settings (riding schools, colleges, 
competitions) contains much internal ambiguity, sensitivity and conflict regarding the use 
of force and the recognition of 'naughtiness', but the vignette above, which was not 
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uncommon, is a prototypical example of the very meaning of the term 'traditional' within 
alternative horsemanship rhetoric. 
 
Embodied attunement 
The alternative to this horse/human battle ground, in Hannah’s words, was all about 
achieving a real connection with the horse. This was exemplified by the process Hannah 
worked through with her most difficult horse, Bobo. Bobo was a sleek, mahogany brown, 
athlete of a horse, 'clean limbed' and with a fabulous 'length of stride17', in horsey terms. 
Hannah had acquired her cheaply, since Bobo had begun chasing people out of her field 
and refusing to be handled. At just five years old, she had not even begun ridden work 
yet, and, with bloodlines that linked her to previous champions, and looks to die for, she 
was a project that Hannah could not resist, brimming with potential, and in need of deep 
understanding. At first, Bobo didn't appreciate Hannah's efforts to 'turn her around', often 
putting her ears back, snaking her neck, diving aggressively into Hannah's space, or 
wheeling round to kick out with her back legs.  A sea-change in Bobo and Hannah's 
relationship occurred when they completed a 'Join-Up®'. This is the process discovered 
(not invented, he asserts) by Monty Roberts, which he describes as mimicking 
communication mechanisms among equine herd members. The human uses body 
language to influence the unrestrained horse, at first, moving them forwards around a 
'round pen' (corral) in each direction, and then offering an 'invitation' which allows the 
horse to 'choose the human as herd leader'. This is achieved by walking away from the 
horse with conviction, and at this point, in a successful join-up, the horse will actively 
follow after the human, eventually placing their softly blowing nose against the human's 
back. Learning join-up, for Hannah, involved recognising the impact of her body on the 
horse, as well as that of the horse’s body on her. It involved 'tuning in' to small 
movements and gestures, and re-considering the horse as an intentional being, full of 
complex instincts and behaviours that were other-than-human. “It isn't about if she is 
naughty. We are the ones who should adjust our training in line with their needs, their 
language,” Hannah asserted, glowing after her residential course. When Bobo followed 
Hannah around with no rope attached after Join Up, Hannah and Bobo had tuned in to 
one another, and, in doing so, defied the system that wasn't working for either of them.  
Hannah felt Bobo had become a more willing, active partner in the training process, 
                                                 
17A horse who can take big, swinging steps is considered athletic and elegant. 
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Bobo's choices were being acknowledged and allowed - and she was choosing the right 
thing. 
 
Free minds and real connections 
For 'revolutionaries' like Hannah, escape from the fixity of the traditional system seems to 
involve connecting with the horse in a deep and profound way, becoming interested in the 
horses' sensory and emotional experience (as a non-human person), and becoming tuned 
in to the embodied affect of horse and human on one another. The sort of connection 
Hannah communicated seems covalent with current trends within contemporary 
multispecies literature. I use the term broadly here, to refer to the aim to include the ‘more 
than human’ elements in social science studies of ‘naturalcultural’ (Haraway 2008) 
lifeworlds. There, authors (e.g. Despret, 2004, 2013, Despret and Buchanon 2016, Game 
2001, Haraway 2003, 2008, Ingold 2000, 2006, 2008, Kohn 2013, Locke 2017) advocate 
recognising that humans are permeable to affective relationships with their non-human 
environments. A common device is to hold this sort of 'openness' to the animal as a 
contrast to traditional Western (and particularly, scientific) ways of imaging humans as 
bounded units that can think about animals in an objective, analytical, or representational 
way with a sterile and detached 'view from nowhere' (Nagel 1989). 
 
 Vinciane Despret is a key spokesperson of the argument that scientists (and others) ought 
to recognise 'Embodied empathy: feeling/seeing/thinking bodies undo and redo each 
other, reciprocally though not symmetrically, as partial perspectives that attune 
themselves to each other' (2013:61). Similarly, Tim Ingold's description of 'openness' is 
the perception of an environment that is full of lively entities, it is a world of process and 
movement, in which nothing is fixed or whole or finished, in which organisms move 
along paths, creating entanglements with other elements of the life world – in fact, 
organisms are entanglements (2000, 2006, 2008). This, he compares to the imagined 
'closure' of a 'logic of inversion' (1993:218-219, 2006:11), in which, he asserts, Western 
thought expects to find other entities as pre-existing objects to be thought about and 
looked at, like stage decorations and props. Donna Haraway’s version of 'open' refers to 
situations in which people recognise the subjective responses of their non-human 
companion species, and so, come to terms (at least, to some extent) with the moral and 
relational entanglements that they live in. “It is the shock of getting it,” she explains, 
“This, and here, are who and where we are?” (2008:368). Haraway's 'open' is therefore 
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part of her argument that communication between humans and non- humans can -in fact, 
does - occur (all be it, not of the 'body snatching' or 'ventriloquism' sort, she clarifies 
2008:226). She argues, “Response is comprehending that subject-making connection is 
real. Response is face-to-face in the contact zone of an entangled relationship. Response 
is in the open.” (2008:226-227) 
 
A similar idea of openness has informed ethnographers methodological practices as well 
as theoretical analyses of human/animal relationships. For example, Anne Game (with 
horses, 2001) and Piers Locke (with elephants, 2017) both speak of being 'open' to 
experiencing the animal in order to learn about human relatedness with it. As Piers Locke 
explains: 
 
In questioning the parameters of personhood, I did so without concern for 
authoritative legal judgment or scientific opinion, and I did so through my 
ethnographic willingness to surrender my being and open myself to new modes of 
experience... Only later did I focus my attention on local logics of personhood, 
and furnish my direct experience of engaging with elephants as persons with 
theoretical justifications. (My italics, Locke 2017:358) 
 
I refer to this literature because of the striking similarity between the way the above 
authors and some alternative horsemanship practitioners speak about discovering their 
'togetherness' with the horse by being 'open' to an affective, embodied connection with it. 
Particularly interesting is that in both the alternative horsemanship movement and the 
multispecies literature, this togetherness is linked to a degree of epistemological 
emancipation, not total freedom from human-held ideas and representations as such, but 
the ability, or necessity, to think 'otherwise'. As Despret argues, being open to the ways 
animals affect us (and us them) involves allowing animals to surprise us, causing us to 
challenge pre-existing truths, and to reconfigure our questions (2004, 2006, 2013, Despret 
and Buchanon 2016). As in Locke's example above, affective experiences with animals 
seem to have the power to at least put on hold, if not reject, pre-established theoretical 
and representational thought, in order to experience something more affectively and 
intuitively 'open'. Alternative horsemanship rhetoric follows a similar argument that an 
opportunity to think 'otherwise' to the traditional status quo, allows, and comes through, 
recognition of authentic connectedness with horses. In both Monty Roberts's discourse, 
and Hannah’s, it is clear that the idea of resisting established and inherited wisdoms is 
intimately tied up with the promise of authenticity in the embodied forms of relatedness 
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that might be 'made available' in Despret's terms (2004:123) 
 
The importance of epistemological freedom is particularly evident in that a common 
sentiment among self-described alternative enthusiasts held that traditionalists’ biggest 
fault was their epistemological passivity, or even stubbornness. They were seen as stuck 
in their ways, dogmatic, backward, pretentious, unable, or unwilling, to think clearly for 
themselves in order to recognise the real horse’s plight. This un-thinking condition earned 
both pity and anger from those who felt they had escaped it. There was a distrust of 
'tradition' and a criticism of its potential to dull or even 'program' human minds. For 
example, in the following conversation with an alternative instructor: 
 
Rosie: But, taking it seriously now, why would you go about loading horses [onto 
lorries] the old-fashioned way?18 What do they think they are doing? Why would 
that system be valuable or useful or desirable to them? 
Katy: I don't know?! It isn't! I mean, maybe they are thinking “Oh, I guess this is 
the way everyone does it so I'll just do that?!” Or maybe they are just thinking...I 
don't know..... they aren't thinking, are they?! That's the strange thing about it, they 
aren't seeing what's right in front of their noses! 
Dictaphone recording, September 2016 
Clear here, and throughout the alternative horsemanship rhetoric, is the idea that the 
emancipation of horses relies upon the epistemological emancipation of their humans – 
until humans can escape from the blind traditional systems which have them stuck in 
adversarial battles with their horses and see the horse for what he/she really is, both 
horses and humans are effectively un-free, and so unable to connect in an authentic 
cooperative partnership. 
  
 I'd like to pause here to dwell on how this idealised equation between ideas of free-
thinking and the capacity for real connection is prevalent throughout alternative training 
rhetoric. A clear example is that of Emma Massingale, whose training philosophy is 
summed up in her motto: “No Reins, No Rules!” and involves working with horses with 
no ropes or tack, in 'teams' (several horses at a time). Her most popular publicity stunt to 
date involved taking a group of untrained Connemara ponies to a small, isolated Irish 
island, where she lived off what she could catch in the sea, camping next to the ponies for 
a month, gradually training them 'on their own terms,' with no enclosure, no interference, 
                                                 
18The old-fashioned way we were discussing involved using a broom, bristles upturned, on the hind quarters 
(rump) of a reluctant horse to convince it onto the lorry. 
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no restraint. 
 
 
 
 Note the need for personal isolation, to put oneself on the edges of society, in order to 
enable a 'free' connection with the horse to flourish. Graeber describes particular forms of 
activism in strikingly relevant terms, wherein, “The structure of one's own act becomes a 
kind of micro-utopia, a concrete model for one’s vision of free society.” (Graeber 
2009:210). The term micro-utopia is particularly apt. As I hope to begin to show in this 
chapter and throughout the thesis, moments that are identified as natural, ethical and 
political symbiosis with horses are debatable, partial and fleeting. The more vigilant 
observer might spot a neck strap and a schooling whip among Massingale's apparel and 
wonder about the formalisation of movement (the horses lined up as if in parade) that 
evidences her 'no rules' partnership, but here I am getting ahead of myself. I have 
demonstrated the centrality of the idea of 'open mindedness' among alternative 
horsemanship rhetoric, I have shown that scholars of multispecies relationships' concept 
of 'open' shares an interest in affectivity, embodiment, and more-than-human relatedness, 
and I have described a link between the idea of real connection and that of free-thinking 
through challenging or escaping the norm. The next section of my argument involves 
Illustration 2: Emma Massingale, The Island Project, "No reins, no rules!" 
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showing the ways in which the alternative movement can itself come to be critiqued as a 
site for un-free (horse and human) minds. 
 
 Different sorts of pedagogical (en)closure 
 
 For this section, I will compare the traditional BHS system with one strain of alternative 
training, Parelli Natural Horsemanship, a California based company with international 
scope. Parelli, like the BHS, has a system of hierarchy based on the cherished knowledge 
contained within a community (which their marketing refers to as a 'vault of knowledge' 
and a 'goldmine of information'). This exclusive community of knowledge-acquisition is 
rather brilliantly named the 'Savvy club' – the term savvy conjuring practical knowledge, 
good judgement, but also shrewdness, even perhaps secrecy, and a feeling of being 'in the 
know.' Access to this club is bought (annual fees: £130 Bronze membership, £320 Silver, 
£640 Gold – these include different packages of DVDs and online learning 
resources/community access – compare BHS £67 per year gold membership to include 
rider-road-user insurance). The BHS training systems involve lessons and exams on 
riding centre horses (testing the human, not the horse), and the syllabus recommends long 
periods of apprentice type practice, under the stewardship of a boss or mentor. In Parelli, 
the educational structure is designed with the single horse owner in mind. Students work 
their way through multiple 'levels' with their own horses, self-monitoring their relational 
achievements using a syllabus-like check list of the Parelli 'games' they can complete to 
the required standards, and then, if they wish, sending video 'auditions' in to be certified, 
which earns them a colour co-ordinated 'savvy string' to use with their 'carrot stick.19' 
 
Parelli explicitly attends to emotional, embodied, relational skills, through their formal 
training and examinations, where the traditional BHS exam syllabus focusses on industry-
readiness, health, safety and efficiency. My argument will be that in making relation skills 
explicit and formal, with the aim of enabling relational skills to be recognised and 
flourish, the alternative model in fact 'closes' some possibilities that the traditional system 
leaves open, and that this closure is felt by its critics. 
 
                                                 
19The carrot stick is a tool to 'extend the trainer’s arm' and touch various parts of the horses body. Among 
critics, it is a re-branded orange whip. On the naturalisation of this and other NH tools, see Latimer and 
Birke 2009:18-19. 
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Formalising relational skills 
In traditional pedagogy, relational and moral skill sets seem all but absent from 
formalised pedagogical resources (syllabi, course materials, books). To illustrate: within 
the BHS stage 1 syllabus, of 93 points on which the student is assessed, only 3 explicitly 
describe interacting with the horse as a living, reactive being.20 Many of the assessment 
points involve competence in the storing, fitting, and management of equipment, fencing, 
grass, health and safety procedures and so on. Even those points involving interaction 
with the horse almost always describe the skills mechanically. Consider the similarity 
between the following two assessment points: “Rider should maintain appropriate length 
of stirrups” - this refers to the rider’s management of equipment, ability to know their 
own leg length and balance point and adjust the tack accordingly at the beginning of the 
ride. The exact same level of detail and wording is used in the immediately succeeding 
point, “Rider should maintain appropriate length of rein” (2012:14). Framed here as an 
equipment management technique, this point describes the manual and emotional 
techniques intricately involved in the communication and control offered by the 
connection of the reins between the rider’s hands and the metal bit in the horse’s mouth. 
This is an important, subtle, and ever-evolving skill set that riders work on throughout 
their equestrian lives. No doubt, the BHS examiner will assess the rider's competence 
using a subjective judgement that encompasses much of this complexity. But this 
relational skill is hard to define and pin down –  and appears apparently invisible, or 
perhaps more accurately, implicit, within the technical skills described in the syllabus. 
 
Parelli pedagogical structures deal more formally and explicitly with relational skills and 
teach them to all students from the very beginning.  The vast majority of the points on the 
Parelli Level One check list explicitly refer to the horse as a living, feeling, reactive 
being. For example, 
 
-Saddle is placed gently and politely, like a hug. 
-Student asks permission before forking leg over the horse's back, settles into 
saddle politely and with feeling. 
Parelli Level One Checklist, 2004:6 
 
                                                 
20
To make this categorisation, if the description talked about the horse in a way that could refer to a plastic 
replica model of a horse, with no feeling, experience, or possibility for unpredictable or individualised 
reaction, I did not consider it explicitly relational. 
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A similar assessment in the BHS syllabus simply requires riders to mount and dismount 
'safely and correctly' (BHS Stage One Syllabus, 2012:14). 
 
Relational and moral learning is formalised within Parelli pedagogy in many ways.  For 
example, training interactions are systematised into a number of set 'games' (while 
traditional equestrian language speaks of 'working the horse', and as a competent horse as 
'well produced'). Each game requires the handler to move the horse in a particular way, 
and is taught to the horse incrementally in stages, using codified body language, and 
through the application of 'pressure' (in four 'phases' of increasing strength) which is 
'released' when the horse does the right thing. 
 
Parelli provides all students with 8 Principles of Horsemanship which they are 
encouraged to learn by heart: 
 
1. Horsemanship is natural. 
2. Make and teach no assumptions. 
3. Communication is two or more individuals sharing the same idea. 
4. Horses and humans have mutual responsibilities. 
5. The attitude of justice is effective. 
6. Body language is the universal language. 
7. Horses teach humans, humans teach horses. 
8. Principles, purpose, and time are the tools of teaching 
 
These accompany the “Ten Qualities of a Horsemen”, “Seven Keys to Success”, eight 
“Mutual Responsibilities” and nine “Core Values.” The most celebrated and berated of 
Parelli's systems for formalising relational skill is the “Horsenality System.”  This aims to 
help students understand their horse’s needs by regarding their characters along two axes, 
extrovert/introvert (how much they 'want' to move their feet) and right brain/left brain 
(how fearful and reactive versus confident and thoughtful they are). This produces four 
basic categories; LBI (confident, lazy) LBE (confident, playful) RBI (fearful, tentative) or 
RBE (fearful, reactive). Note the ‘scientific’ sounding language, Parelli makes much of its 
82 
claim to represent the 'real' horse and, in that aim, refers lightly but persistently to 
ecology, psychology, and cognitive science. Students can attempt to work out their 
horse’s horsenality themselves, using a chart like the one below (this one has been filled 
in with black spots), or can purchase a unique horsenality report from Parelli which 
involves filling in a detailed questionnaire about the horse’s behaviours and attitudes. 
They can even purchase a 'match report' which works out the 'Humanality' of the person 
involved too, and gives advice regarding the way the horsenality and humanality are 
likely to work together and influence one another. 
 
 
In comparison, there is no formalised typology of behavioural types or character traits in 
the BHS system. Stereotypes were often employed (as described in Chapter One), but 
generally as stereotypes, and not fixed and robust typologies. When describing their 
horse’s personality (which people persistently do) horse people often emphasise the 
specificity of the individual case; each horse is thoroughly individual, and often 
remarkably unlike what he/she might seem like, or should be like (“He's much more 
sensitive than your typical cob,” Rochelle told me, about Dougal). Bertie recoiled upon 
reading a paper I wrote which contained a transcript wherein he had described a particular 
horse as 'dominant' and insisted her rider (Lucy, whose body 'froze' in her lessons with 
Illustration 3: An example of a completed Horsenality chart 
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Christine) 'win the battle' to prevent further battles emerging. He did not enjoy reading 
back his own words. He told me: 
 
 It's not like she's always dominant. She can be a very sweet mare. There are 
plenty of times when she has been really switched on, really with the programme. 
But then she can really push Lucy around, and I was thinking, this is going to get 
dangerous. And Lucy is, like, the LEAST assertive person – she just won’t stand 
up for herself – and I had to get her going- I had to get her -. But when I just read 
it like you've put it, just that one bit of the lesson, which is just one lesson – it 
makes me sound – well - like a bully to be honest. And it doesn't really describe 
the horse. She's not THAT dominant. Or me as an instructor. Not properly. 
Dictaphone recording October 2016 
 
Bertie's criticism highlights the contingency of narratives containing relational 
judgements. His descriptions were right for the impact they needed to create in the 
moment but were not holistic or lasting statements about the true and complete nature of 
the horse. Bertie's account of Lucy's 'dominant' mare was part of the constant flux in 
which Lucy and her mare’s relationship is continually developing along with Bertie's 
account of it. 
 
Parelli's efforts to enable riders to recognise horses’ individualities were criticised by 
traditionalists precisely for disabling that very capacity. While some saw it as harmless 
fun to work out, mock, and then quickly ignore, their horses 'Horsenality' through 
accessing the chart online, others were less tolerant of Horsenality language, arguing that 
it was that it was a ridiculous attempt to systematise, gain ownership over, ‘brand' and 
market the ineffable 'feel' and 'connection' between a good rider and their horse. To 
critics, the sorts of connectedness possible through these schemes was all form and no 
substance, too programmatic, too invented, too artificial. 
 
Recognisability is enclosure 
The traditionalists' distaste for such relational explicitness and formality resonates in 
some ways with the sort of 'critical openings' that Naisargi Dave describes among a very 
different group of participants.  For some of the Indian queer activists Dave studies, the 
ideal ethical aim is to resist normativity itself, rather than to resist a particular normative 
code or truism. However, this ethical way of life ends up all but unsustainable, it holds 
activists constantly undone under their own scrutiny, particularly since the sorts of 
political action required to make significant changes to society seem to require a 
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recognisable identity.  Dave describes (among other dynamics) how an activist letter 
writing network, which aimed at enabling and empowering the voices of marginalised 
women, began authorising only the more eloquent, politically competent voices in its 
desire to provide a legitimate, outward facing, politically effective, service. In Dave's 
language, the desire for inclusivity and possibility, ended up creating yet another type of 
'(en)closure', a new normativity, a new narrowing of human possibility (2011:12-14). 
 
Dave's use of the term closure reflects her debt to Foucault (Dave 2011:4-5), particularly 
in the sense that the concept she employs is both epistemological and political. She 
describes activism as an ethical practice that exists in critical relation with the narrowing 
effect of normative morality: “Always in creative opposition to the normalisation of lives 
and words” (2011:5). The link here between lives and words is important. The activists 
aim to expand and open the possibilities available to them in terms of how they might be 
known, and how they might therefore live. But “Invention is always also a loss,” Dave 
shows (2012:36), emergence creates new (en)closures; what begins as 'embryonic' 
quickly becomes 'ossified'. By naming the identity of activist groups in recognisable 
terms, something is always curtailed from whom they could have been otherwise. 
Similarly, when the alternative practitioners focussed formal pedagogy towards relational 
skills, they narrowed possibilities for the sorts of relationships that can emerge as 
legitimate and recognisable (within horsenality types, learned principles, categorised 
phases of pressure and so on). 
 
The heavy reliance on apprenticeship-type learning in the BHS takes on a new light now, 
not (only) as a way of instilling obedience, exclusivity and normativity, but as a medium 
through which students might be able to absorb that which cannot be formalised or 
communicated verbally, the idiosyncratic ways in which narratives such as the 
oppositional one described above can be employed. For example, the BHS Stage 1 
syllabus reports that reaching the appropriate level in giving the horse a basic groom 
(removing mud and loose hair from a well behaved, healthy animal, not including 
clipping, plaiting, trimming and so on) required a minimum of 80 hours of practice under 
light supervision (2012:5), though exactly what is supposed to be learned during this 
extended period of time, is, of course, unrecorded. This lack of formality regarding 
relational skills can be seen as providing an openness of possibility to the extent that 'feel' 
for the horse is left formally uncategorised, personally variable, un-described, 
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ungraspable, unsettled: a talent rather than a transmittable technique. 
 
Free minds and real connections (again) 
What is striking about the traditionalist critiques of alternative horsemanship is that they 
also often follow the form of linking poor connectivity to un-free thinking; only now, 
alternative horsemanship is the problem case. A common critique targeted towards Parelli 
members, and alternative practitioners more generally, is that they are cult-like, too easily 
won over, following instructions and marketing spiel like robots, or 'sheep', as seen in the 
following conversation with Jill (Bertie's wife): 
 
 Jill:  We were once at a show and these people had been trying to load. It had 
been a couple of hours and I went over and said, you know, if you want a hand, 
Bertie and I are here, and we do a bit of this sort of thing and might be able to 
help. But as I was saying this another woman ran up shrieking “I've got a Parelli 
halter! I've got a Parelli halter!” and I went “Bye then!” and turned around and 
walked away! 
Everybody laughed. 
 Jill: Like, a Parelli halter is going to work some special magic and then the horse 
will just walk right on. Good luck with that! 
Rosie (once laughter had subsided): But do you think she actually thought that is 
what would happen? 
Jill: Probably. They are like a cult. They don't know what to think, they think what 
they are told, and if they are told the halter is magic, they believe the halter is 
magic. And if it doesn't work, which it won’t, they will think it’s just that they 
don't have the magic touch so they will pay for more magic courses. 
From field notes, March 2017. 
 
As in the anti-traditional rhetoric, critiques of the alternative movement often link the 
dull-thinking of humans to the un-freedom of horses. To be sure, there are ready grounds 
for finding un-freedom in alternative training, despite its reliance on a rhetoric of free 
(horse and human) choice. For example, alternative practitioners often refer to horses’ 
wild instincts as herd animals (who, as Roberts and Parelli explain, want to have a herd 
leader); as a flight/prey animal (who cannot help but respond with extreme evasive 
reaction until trained otherwise); and as an 'into pressure' animal (who cannot help but 
resist and fight against physical forces of ropes and so on, until trained to do otherwise). 
Through these explanatory principles, narratives fluctuate between subjective and 
objective renderings of horses as choosing agents or instinctive creatures (see also, Birke 
2008).  There is a politically powerful dual framing: natural herd dynamics authorise the 
horse’s positive choice to have a leader, while on the other hand, learning mechanisms 
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and instincts de-politicise the horse's potential resistance. For example, in the join-up 
process described between Hannah and Bobo, the horse’s movement away from the 
human is often described as 'flight instinct,' while their movement toward the human is 
understood as 'free choice'. As Laidlaw noted of some anthropological treatments of 
agency, “We only mark them down as agency when people's choices seem to us to be the 
right ones” (2002:315).   
 
While alternative theories might defend the horse’s ethical right to choose, they also give 
grounds to remove the very possibility of resistance. Jodi, Parelli instructor told me, “If 
you think the horse said “No”, you either asked the wrong question, or you asked the 
question in the wrong way”. This puts the onus on the human to adjust for the horse, yet it 
also takes away any possibility for the horse to have a 'no' response. What might look like 
resistance or opposition is described as a horse who doesn't understand yet, or is enacting 
'natural' social dynamics, or is plagued by problematic instincts. At the same time, a 
'choice' which is corrected still features as a choice which has been 'allowed,' even as it is 
actively trained away, as in the system described by an alternative trainer below: 
 
 Traditional methods would be to keep the lead rope short and try to make the 
horse stand still, get strong, use your shoulder, maybe get a big guy, or get really 
tough and angry, make the horse stand, show the horse who’s boss. What we do is 
so different. We leave the line [rope] long. We say: He has the right to move. It’s 
his body, it’s his choice. But there are consequences to it. When he moves, I'll 
correct him, I'll put him back. Then he can learn the value of standing still. Learn 
it instead of be made to do it. You see the difference?   
Sally, alternative horsemanship trainer teaching students at residential course, 
Dictaphone recording. 
 
Through the system described above, horses learn to self-govern their own behaviours (cf 
Foucault), to become more 'responsible' partners in Parelli and Roberts's terms. 
 
Clearly, we can see moral agitation around the notion of choice, as was introduced in 
Chapter One. And, we can see the import of the notion of 'natural reality' for making 
moral sense of the real horse as a subject of ethical concern. Enabling/assigning the 
horse’s choices is a matter of knowing the horse’s nature, and the alternative movement is 
replete with such references to naturalness. However, there are competing claims on 
naturalness from the traditional camp. Criticisms of alternative training suggest that it is 
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all a trick, that it is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, every bit as interested in taking control of 
the horse, only marketing it as 'love' and 'leadership' to appeal to naïve and novice 
amateurs who can't see the relationship for what it really is. In this discourse, traditional 
horsemanship has the claim to naturalness and authenticity, pre-dating the modern, 
marketed, fantastical invention of alternative horsemanship, which can be considered 
fake, phoney and superficial. “I went to one demonstration and I walked out when he 
started using his 'carrot stick'” Leeanne told me. “Who is he to talk about non-violence 
and all this, and then just use a big orange stick and think we won’t see it’s a whip? OK, 
so he didn't thrash the horse with it, but then, neither do we.” Even demonstrations of 
impressively 'free' partnership such as that of Emma Massingale’s beach stunt, are not 
necessarily recognised as evidence of real partnership. “The horses all look dead-eyed. 
Like they have given up,” Leeanne told me. The horses’ apparent complete compliance 
rendered them machine-like, too predictable, uncanny, too signed up to the rider’s 
requests for this to look like a real, legitimate, free-thinking, recognisable partnership at 
all. 
 
The oppositional narrative I identified as common within traditional systems, might defy 
the horses right to resist, but it does, at least, allow or even celebrate the possibility of 
equine resistance – an 'open' acknowledgement (we might say) that horses want different 
things from people (see Despret 2016:103-106). The ethical, relational skill within that 
sort of narrative then involves how the horses are coerced or convinced otherwise – such 
that Christine's instruction of how to use the whip would be fodder for a complex debate 
within traditional horsemanship itself. 
 
 What looks like open mindedness from one perspective (Hannah challenging norms to 
recognise authentic embodied connectivity with Bobo) looks closed-minded, cultish and 
gullible from another. This means the prerogative to 'learn from the horse' is not easily 
met, since what might count as signs of accomplishing that learning are clearly a matter 
of debate – even 'co-operative' behaviour is contestable. Emma Massingale's flawless 
display of good partnership with her unrestrained horses is interpreted, by some, as 
evidence of over-programming and uncanny biddableness. Bertie's attempts to elicit 
authority in his student, having recognised a wilful agency in her horse, is seen as the 
mindless projection of traditionalist dogma and domination. There is an inside and an 
outside to these relationships, which means 'bringing the animal in' as the multispecies 
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authors advise, is an interpretative and representational challenge. This is a 'horse 
multiple' (derived from Anne-Marie Mol's phrase, 'the body multiple' 2002) and one 
description will not do. Yet – the snag - all parties agree there is one, real, natural horse 
who ought to be properly recognised. 
 
Both traditional and alternative descriptions of equine subjectivity seem to be felt to be 
too narrow, too closed, too prescriptive, too stunting when viewed from other perspective. 
While in the multispecies literature, 'openness' is a form of attunement, in contrast, 
opening, in Dave's description - a verb rather than a noun – emphasises that while one can 
attempt an 'opening' through critique, one cannot maintain an 'open' state. Rather than 
looking for a state of 'openness' within alternative or traditional relationships, the next 
section goes on to look at practices of 'opening' the mind, and then to describe the ethical 
import of the forms of closure that are manifested during these interactions with horses. 
 
Flexible forms of closure 
 
This section aims to show that the imperative to adjust to each horse flexibly through 
responsive interaction, advocated within both traditional and alternative training 
discourse, requires practices of opening and, particularly, closure. The imperative to learn 
from the horse was evident throughout my fieldwork. Here is Jodi, Parelli instructor 
again: 
 
You think you have got it, the system that works, you think you finally 'get' it, and 
then a new horse comes along who just knocks you for six. He doesn't do what he's 
meant to. He hasn't read the book. The things that you believe should work, just 
don't work. You have to rethink it. You have to figure out what works for him, for 
this horse, and maybe you learn something new. 
Dictaphone Recording, August 2016 
 
and Bertie, speaking to his student at the start of a lesson, before proposing an approach 
they hadn't tried before to overcome a stubborn problem21: 
 
                                                 
21The problem was the horse would not complete 'lateral' movements – moving sideways. The new 
approach was to practice them more from the ground, without the rider on the horses back. This would 
be considered a typically alternative horsemanship approach to the issue. Bertie was backtracking on his 
previous advice that the horse understood perfectly well, and was now considering that the horse was 
confused after all. 
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Horses are horses - they keep you on your toes... the minute you start telling 
someone what the horse is like, it will probably prove you wrong anyway. You just 
gotta keep learning from the horse you are riding, not riding the horse you think 
you've got, or the horse you had yesterday. 
 Dictaphone Recording, March 2017 
 
My participants, I feel, would broadly admire Haraway's description of feeling 'redone 
molecule by molecule' (2008:217) through relation with their animals, and of having to 
reconsider the meaning of partnership as part of the very pursuit of it. 
 
Epistemological independence and responsibility 
One way in which people (from both camps) practise open-minded agility to learn from 
the horse is through articulating the import of deviating from any established systematic 
knowledge about the horse. This can be seen in Jodi's comments that opened this chapter 
and advocating looking 'outside' the system you are closest to.  On one occasion, Jodi was 
frustrated that some new Parelli students had decided to ditch the system. On finding that 
their horses didn't really sit in any of the Horsenality types, they had mutually agreed the 
system was a sham and cancelled their shared appointments with Jodi. In response, Jodi 
emphasised that it was a common misconception that horses are supposed to end up 
fitting easily into just one Horsenality. It was more about tendencies, she explained, 
including between the types and even outside of them, and Parelli students should be 
encouraged to interpret and re-interpret their horse’s Horsenality on a moment by 
moment basis. The Horsenality tool was meant as a way of refining students 'feel', not 
replacing it. As Haraway asserts: 'Training is, or can be, about differences not named by 
taxonomy.' (2008:223). 
 
A similar sentiment accompanied interpretations of the BHS syllabus, as only guidelines 
from which to flexibly deviate, with a clear understanding that 'real life' exists outside of 
the (any) pedagogical system.  Even the instructor on an exam revision day, while 
answering questions about the 'proper' order in which to use grooming brushes, reminded 
us that, 
 
This isn't the way you have to do it forever more. Once you get out 'in the real 
world', you will start to learn …. but it's like a driving test. You do it the BHS way, 
and you learn the BHS way, and then you can adapt from there. You can return to 
it if you have a difficult horse or something, and then if someone gets injured, at 
least you can say “I was doing it the proper way!” So, for the exam, just get into 
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the rhythm of doing it the BHS way. Think about what the examiner is seeing. 
Dictaphone recording, June 2016 
 
I don't wish to follow Ingold in using this evidence to suggest that 'open' connectivity 
eschews, or does without, the 'closure' of formal grids, categories, and examination 
systems. Rather, I follow Dave in her argument that navigating the tension between 
established enclosures of recognisability and emergence of the new through possibility to 
be otherwise, constitutes a particular type of ethical work. It seemed an ethically 
important practice for my participants to relate to relatively established systems of 
knowledge, in large part, to actively and explicitly deviate from them (as above), but not 
to do without them altogether. Horse people were liable to tell me how their horse wasn't 
quite like a particular theory, didn't fit within a category, required a deviation from the 
Parelli system, or didn't like to be handled exactly 'the BHS way'. Both BHS and Parelli 
systems of knowledge not only create a risk of cultish following and passivity, they also 
gave “affordance” (Keane 2014) for critical and creative deviation. If analytical 
knowledge is considered an epistemological distanciation compared to relationality of 
affective knowledge, then we could say that my participants often practised a 'double-
distanciation' – critically and explicitly distancing themselves from systems of analysis, in 
order to relate back to the individual horse more closely.22 It matters that affective 
relationality is practiced in explicit opposition to – and therefore relationship with - 
categorical analysis. 
 
Part of being a good owner was being on the look-out for what is wrong with the system, 
how the available knowledge doesn't properly enable partnerships to flourish, how it 
could be improved or at least creatively applied for each particular horse.  From those 
who originally learned from Monty Roberts, many fractions of different (and sometimes 
oppositional) horsemanship techniques sprung up; Practical horsemanship, Ethical 
horsemanship, Logical horsemanship (all business names). Such continual de-bunking 
and reforming is typical of modern thought (Boland 2013) and profitable, for some, too 
(Latimer and Munro 2015). Well known Parelli students left to create their own systems. 
                                                 
22(we could argue, were it not for brevity's sake, that Ingold does the same to establish his 
own openness, see Heywood 2018:21-30 for a similar argument regarding recursive 
anthropology). 
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One responded to an audience member’s question about the split: 'Parelli is great, it 
helped get me to where I am today, but I found myself wanting to do things a little bit 
differently than the Parelli system. I found I needed that bit of flexibility.' While Roberts 
and Parelli had been originators in unveiling the historicity, artificiality and domination in 
accepted methods, in fact they had begun a pattern of debunking and reforming to which 
they would become fodder themselves. Equitation science, a new academic discipline23, 
emerged in the early 2000’s, setting out to reveal 'The Truth about horses' (McLean 
2003), which included outing the (as they saw it) faulty ethological and psychological 
truisms used within alternative training systems (Henshall and McGreevy 2014, Warren-
Smith and McGreevy 2008). But of course, the scientific approach was de-bunked too – 
scientists were not real horseman who understood authentic connection, I was told. A 
demonstration of 'equitation science' based methods, based heavily on learning principles, 
psychological mechanisms and control of stimuli – left one of my participants deeply 
unimpressed for its lack of 'feel'. 
 
Amid all of this fragmentation and contestation, when I asked riders about their 
allegiances during interview, they were very likely to refer to the importance of “being 
open to different ideas”, or of “using a number of different instructors to get different 
perspectives”, or to how “I don't agree with everything he [Parelli] says and does, but I 
still get a lot from it” and so on. Those who were the most invested in one system or 
another, through being highly qualified within it, for example, were the most likely to 
make a point of marking out their independence from it and ability to think otherwise. 
Hence, BHS instructors introduced themselves to me as “but not that BHS-y!”, and Jodi 
was keen to tell me about how much she was able to learn from her traditional dressage 
coach alongside her alternative education. Riders who did refer to the appeal of a whole 
system of knowledge as a system that could be holistically trusted were likely to be 
relatively novice, or at least, their statements could well be taken as markers of ignorance, 
naivety, and lack of horse-sense. The vast majority of my participants, at least some of the 
time, proudly considered themselves able to dip in and -especially- out of different 
'systems' rather than commit to one or the other. Most participants shunned and mocked 
traditionalists or alternativists at some times (to different degrees depending on personal 
                                                 
23The difference from the more established equine science is that equitation science aims to study horses 
within training/riding scenarios, rather than as a species in isolation. The discipline is also 
distinguishable in its efforts to scientifically interrogate claims made by trainers. 
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affiliation and social setting), and at other times declared a level of 'open mindedness' that 
brought them above and outside of the split itself. The internet provided websites, forums, 
blogs and vlogs, as well as groups and pages on Facebook, all of which offered platforms 
for this sort of active critique, invention, and evaluation. Owners felt responsible for 
collecting their own personal 'curated assemblages' of information (the phrase is from 
Sobo et al's study of US parents’ use of the internet to make vaccination decisions for 
their children 2016:538). 
 
While Despret argues that accuracy is the wrong sort of idea for thinking about 
relatedness (2016:170), in the equestrian environment, subjective descriptions about 
animals are also treated as 'fact-ish' statements, begging critique in terms of accuracy and 
truth.   Equally important, my equestrian participants do not aim for a state of extreme, 
radical critique which defies the confinement of recognisability as Dave's participants 
might support. Such critique is a risky practice, Elizabeth Povinelli explains, since it isn't 
simply about being in opposition to a recognisable norm but being outside of 
recognisability altogether: “[it] opens the very orders that provide the conditions on which 
performativity as such depends, leaving subjectivity, referentiality, and world dangling.” 
(2012:460). On the contrary, despite fervent critique and flexibility, participants did not 
maintain an ambiguous position during interactions with horses. As I will now show, 
constant 'enclosures' are formed in the 'ontological gambits' (Graeber 2013:232) that 
riders and trainers make in proclaiming the realities of the training scenarios they are 
immersed within. 
 
Agility and conviction 
The skill of successful horse riders, of either traditional or alternative bent, seemed to be 
to have a high degree of agility and yet also specificity in the way that they could consider 
relationality with the horse. This involves the light-footed agility to settle on a range of 
different certainties during interactions with horses, rather than a remaining undecided, 
unrecognisable, vague or ambiguous. Because the horse requires spontaneous and 
constant responses from the human, ambiguity or doubt is ineffective and ethically 
problematic, leaving the horse with no clear communication partner at all (more in 
Chapter Five, see Jones McVey 2017). The idea of describing the horse accurately – of 
closing down the actualities of the encounter - is not rejected on logical or political 
grounds by equestrians (compared with the imperative not to discuss others' minds among 
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the Korowai, for example, Stasch 2008). The problem is just doing it well enough. My 
participants saw it not only as acceptable, but as a matter of responsibility that one should 
be able to know and describe the horse. This regular narrowing is both ethically important 
in making the horse relatable in a highly precise way, and ethically risky in providing 
grounds for critique of what could have been seen otherwise. 
 
In two examples below, Bertie offers different ways of framing similar training 
encounters. It should be no surprise, by this point, that his techniques look a little like 
traditional and a little like alternative methods, nor that they render the horse something 
betwixt and between subject and object, nor that each to some extent reconfigures, and to 
some extent relies upon, concepts of choice, partnership, obedience, kindness, and 
efficacy. Nonetheless, each can be seen as a temporary closure of possibility, as a fixing 
on what sort of affective relationship Bertie and the horse are mutually immersed within. 
 
Bertie was trying to get Amber, a young thoroughbred mare, to go through water. 
He was riding her and using a whip – tapping (or was it sometimes smacking?) on 
Amber's flank and hindquarters, “To keep the pressure on until she gives the right 
response.” “She isn't afraid of the water,” Bertie asserted to Amber's watching 
owner, and the small crowd of friends – all Bertie's students, who had gathered to 
watch the dispute. “That isn't what this is about. She just won’t be told what to do. 
She is a very stubborn mare. She has drawn a line in the sand. But she is going to 
have to learn to be told what to do. She has to learn that she just has to go where 
she is told. Otherwise she'll know she can get her own way whenever she wants... 
she will be like this her whole life. Ultimately that's not what she really wants. 
That's no fun for her. She doesn't want to be getting beaten up her whole life. She 
just needs to realise how much fun she will have if she just gives in. This is 
actually the type of horse that loves cross country once they get going.” 
Field notes and Dictaphone recording, September 2016. 
 
The philosophising of his training approach betrays the ethical work that Bertie completes 
in closing possibilities down in the right way. It isn't narrow enough for Bertie to simply 
describe the relationship as mutually affective or as one of subjective interaction. It's 
important to Bertie, and other trainers and riders alike, to make more detailed sense of 
their encounter and to explain how relational ethics are to be configured through it. Here, 
though Bertie was using a whip, he emphasises that the success of the training endeavour 
(getting her into the water) is ultimately for her own good – the utility of the exercise is 
made valuable by its link to concern with Amber's welfare and enjoyment. Amber has a 
point of view of sorts, though she has to 'learn to be told what to do' via use of a whip – 
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clearly inappropriate treatment of a human point of view. At times she is described as an 
example of a certain type of creature, a “stubborn mare”, which further establishes how 
the audience should recognise this encounter. While she might appear some-what like an 
agent with an intentional mind, the narrative is given with such certainty as to render the 
description fact-like and objective, seen most clearly in the verbs; “She isn't,” “she 
won’t,” “she has,” “she will,” “she doesn't”– at no point does Bertie say, “She might”. 
The instructor knows Amber better than she knows herself: 'Ultimately that's not what she 
really wants,' he proclaims, and he even knows the way things will pan out in the future 
for Amber, along one of two paths, depending on the human's course of action in this 
moment. In knowing precisely what sort of subjective partner Amber is in this encounter, 
she appears as part of an almost mechanically predictable process – an intermediary, in 
Latour's terms (2005), rather than a mediator. 
 
The same instructor, Bertie, came to find me a few days later to tell me that he had been 
back to the cross-country course with another horse, Paul, who also didn't want to go in 
the water. “How did it go?” I asked. He replied, pleased with himself: 
 
 Well, I had said, there's no point forcing him. You can’t force a horse to do 
anything. It has to be on their terms, so I just said that she should sit there and let 
him choose. And it took only about 3 minutes, of doing nothing, and not even 
thinking about the water, just thinking of other things and relaxing and waiting 
there, and then he just went in on his own. Sometimes you just have to give them a 
chance, people always think they need to be fighting with them because they are 
so keen to overcome everything immediately, they have no patience. But you 
would never have been able to force him in. He had to choose to do it. 
Field notes, September 2016. 
 
In order to fully understand the method Bertie describes, I'll add here that this 'choice' 
would have certainly been supported, for example, by not allowing Paul to turn away 
from the water, graze, or trot off back to the horse lorry. In some ways, the narrative 
Bertie provided seemed to present an inverse of the framing that he had used so 
confidently in Amber's session. While the whip was warranted on Amber because of its 
ultimate kindness, here, the 'kind' approach (of letting him choose, keeping the pressure 
off) is legitimated primarily because it will work, because it gets Paul in the water where 
fighting with him wouldn't. Here, 'kindness' doesn't carry enough inherent value to be 
worth pursuing without its ultimate efficacy. The horse’s positive choice is centralised, 
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both for its utility and ethical import (the virtuous rider is compared to those with no 
patience, who don't give the horse a chance). While it was central to recognise and 
confront Amber's resistance, moments when Paul could be seen as making a negative 
choice (while he isn't going in the water) are retrospectively brushed over as moments 
when he hasn't really finished choosing yet. 
 
My aim is not merely to show the variable political and ethical framings that occur in 
Bertie’s descriptions. Rather, Bertie's two stories are useful in demonstrating the 
requirement for crystal clear, sharply defined, sorts of 'closure' during interaction. There is 
nothing vague about the way the concepts of freedom, agency, choice, and kindness are 
displayed within either account despite the agility between them. Each is highly specific 
and enables the rider to engage with the horse with (temporary, at least) conviction, 
giving the encounter highly particular – recognisable – enclosed ethical and relational 
meanings. Bertie's concern, and those of his peers, isn't to retain an openness of 
uncategorised possibility or flux, when working with the horse, it is to momentarily settle 
on the right sort of closure; to intricately narrow down the possibilities for ethical 
meaning and action. 
 
 Others who have reported flexibility in the framing of relatedness to animals have 
highlighted the way this can be a productive technique. Candea (2013) describes 
scientists moving between 'relational' and 'propositional' knowledge registers during 
interactions with the animals they study. Shir-Vertesh (2012) describes the 'flexible 
personhood' of pets in Israel, whose position as family members is vulnerable, for 
example, when a human baby arrives, and the pet becomes known as an animal other, 
excluded from shared spaces and possibly even re-homed or abandoned. Both of these 
accounts, however, speak of a flexibility in the extent to which animals are known along a 
scale, more or less subjectively or objectively. The flexibility that Bertie demonstrates is 
rather about moving between different sorts of fixings for what sort of subjective 
relationship one is involved in. Each is a narrowing, it must necessarily be so in order to 
be ethically informative in the way that matters. 
 
Closing statements: Different sorts of open 
 
I began this chapter by introducing the idea that ethical epistemology in the equestrian 
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realm is about independent ‘open-minded’ thinking, through embodied connection with 
the horse, often challenging existing norms. I then demonstrated that even ‘open-minded’ 
attempts to teach horses and humans relational skills involved a closing of possibilities 
for free-thinking and for authentic connectedness, recognised by interlocutors through 
critiques about programmatic interactions. Finally, I showed that a personalised flexibility 
known as ‘learning from the horse’ encourages horse riders to critique and deviate from 
established systems, and so to be somewhat ‘open’ towards the otherwise. But I also 
showed that in practice, learning from the horse also requires enclosures of possibility, in 
the regular sharp descriptions that make ontological gambits about each horse during 
interactions with it.  I'd like to draw towards conclusions by comparing the three sorts of 
openness referred to throughout this chapter; the open-mindedness valorised by British 
amateur horse riders, the affective openness of multispecies relationality, and the 
openness of possibility that emerges through critique. 
 
To some extent, multispecies 'open' and critical openings of possibility can be seen as 
symbiotic concepts, not least because the multispecies literature positions itself as a 
critique of normative Western epistemologies and therefore opens a 'possibility to be 
otherwise'.  Both Haraway and Despret argue, that by allowing animals not to exist as we 
expect of them, by allowing them to rework our concepts and surprise us, which is also by 
recognising the mutual affect we have on one another outside of any pre-existing 
framework, we might allow our relationships to 'flourish'. 
 
However, the multispecies open and the ethical activist’s openings are not necessarily so 
harmonious; the latter thrives on individuals’ ability to think about their relatedness from 
a position of epistemological detachment from societal norms. We might take Candea's 
concept of epoché (2013) as an example of a form of detachment that could also be seen 
as enabling critical openness, even though it exemplifies the opposite of the embodied 
‘openness’ of multispecies writing.  The scientists he studied learned to hold a state of 
cultivated doubt about the scientific unknowability of the intentions harboured by 
animals, despite the fact they also engaged with them at times relationally. We could 
argue that this state of cultivated doubt – consciously holding on to what is not yet known 
about animals, or not determined knowable about animals, enables a level of openness for 
them to exist uncategorised, undescribed and unexplained. Scepticism can be seen 
therefore as a form of open relatedness, rather than a detachment and closure from it. 
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What might be seen as analytical abstract 'distance' can also be seen to enable a degree of 
freedom, precisely in what isn't said, or isn't made say-able. 
 
Along these lines, the multispecies authors' attempts to make particular, specific and 
(variably) conditional sorts of 'open' relationality into explicit and literal descriptions, can 
be seen as enacting forms of (en)closure. Haraway recognises The Open (for example) 
through her dog, Cayenne's improving agility scores (2008:228) and apparently playful 
behaviours (240-241), Ingold through a particular and unconventional way of perceiving 
the environment (2006). My argument isn't simply that these accounts restrict possibilities 
for what is able to count as authentic 'open' affectivity through, and despite, their 
(analytical) arguments for recognising affect (though see Heywood 2018 for a similar 
argument regarding recursive anthropology.) This argument, while valid, I feel would be 
unsurprising, particularly to Haraway who is far from naïve about the tragic political 
predicaments involved in knowing animals at all: “Degrees of freedom indeed” she states, 
“the open is not comfortable” (2008:75). 
 
Rather, my point is that while these multispecies versions of openness carry similar 
hallmarks to the value of learning from the horse that my participants described, they do 
not encompass the ethical practices of knowing horses that my participants demonstrated. 
The multispecies literature is useful because it is almost apposite, it helps to sharpen the 
understanding of exactly what problems my participants are engaged in. The sort of 
openness that multispecies literature argues for involves the friction between objective 
and affective, detached and engaged. This friction doesn't hold the right sort of traction to 
be so relevant in my field. Rather, the important distinctions relating to managing the 
'openness' of riders' minds were twofold: on the one hand, there was an important 
differentiation to be made and managed between (own) free, clear, and independent 
thinking compared to (others') epistemological passivity or gullibility. On the other, 
participants worked to establish and maintain a cutting distinction between getting the 
horse right and getting him wrong. It was a given that the horse was a subject of some 
sort, the issue was narrowing down what sort of subjective and ethical relationship horse 
and human were entangled within. And narratives were narrow, when compared with the 
playful ambiguities characteristic of the multispecies literature (see Hornborg 2017). 
 
 Despret proclaims, 'If we want to gain an access that gives the chance for many more 
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entities to be active, we need a theory that prevents us from deciding too quickly what is 
cause and what is effect, what affects and what is affected’ (2004:125). She aims to, 
'Disclose perplexity...and overcome the distribution between causes and effects, between 
bodies and minds, worlds and bodies, world and consciousness’ (2004:125). Yet for my 
participants, ascertaining these distinctions was the very substance of ethical relatedness; 
sorting out the real horse from its representations, its choices from its natures, was of 
immanent, critical, and continuous import. 
 
For the horse riders I studied, (re) interpretations of the horse, whether in abstract analysis 
and critique, or in the fixed framings utilised in interactive encounters, often contained 
both objective-ish and subjective-ish thought. Scientistic thought – such as the horsenality 
grid – provided a resource for some to reconsider the horse and redefine it. It also 
provided a system from which to deviate, and a resource for de-bunking. These processes 
of invention, deviation, debunking and reclaiming were ethical epistemological practice. 
 
Generally, then, I find Dave's language of 'openings' more useful than the multispecies 
scholars' 'open,' as it gives me the opportunity to recognise that openings which were also 
closures, were ethical epistemological practices, rather than relational failures. However, 
the covalence between Dave's description of queer activists’ enclosures, and mine of 
equestrians, only goes so far. The equestrians I studied are less radical in the ethical 
openings they desire, they don't aim for expansive scope of possibility, or for radical 
variety, but for truth and legitimate accomplishment. They want closure in giving the 
horse a knowable and relatable identity of sorts, but they need open-mindedness as a 
bolster to ensure that the (temporary) closures they arrive at are robust; are really about 
the horse, not prescribed, not cultish, and not self-serving. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I have presented ethnography in which riders explicitly promote open-mindedness, 
flexibility and learning from the horse. However, they demonstrate a persistent re-
narrowing of what might be considered a legitimate relationship with the horse, a sharp 
critique of others' attempts at open-mindedness, and a tendency to speak with detail and 
conviction in constantly explicating exactly what/who each horse is and how he or she 
should be interpreted and responded to. This could be interpreted as a hypocritical state of 
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affairs: proclaiming open-mindedness yet practising multiple versions of epistemological 
fixity. However, I have argued that openings are always inevitably enclosures, and we can 
therefore look at these practices as particular in the specific ways in which they enact 
openings and the sorts of closures they seem drawn to (re)create. 
 
The most successful riders (by one another’s evaluations), showed an impressive agility 
in reconfiguring their bids for certainty about each horse and the way it should be related 
to, including how its choices were to be identified and valued, adjusting the story from 
one moment to the next, often without a moment of apparent hesitancy in between. They 
also showed considerable critical skill in relating to the certainties of others, particularly 
those that looked all-too-certain, too fixed, too generalised, obedient, emotional, fanciful, 
or convenient. Both of these skills; the agility between framings, and the ethical practice 
of critique, required an opening – a possibility of otherwise - but also a closing of the 
mind. It is this version of opening via critique and agility, and crucially, appropriate and 
narrow closing in describing subjectivity in recognisable details, that I take to be central 
to the prerogative to be open-minded and learn from the horse.   
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Chapter Three: Bravery, nurture and the narrative construction of 
selves and others. 
 
Stories happen to people who know how to tell them. Henry James. 
Introduction 
In Chapters One and Two, I introduced the personal responsibility that horse owners hold 
for knowing their horses amid a superfluity of choice and an imperative to ground choices 
in reality.  In Chapter Two, I demonstrated how important 'narrow,' exacting definitions 
about horses are to riders' ethical projects, but also that those definitions are easily and 
often critiqued. In this chapter, I am particularly concerned with the use of narrative form 
for constructing and communicating 'narrow' knowledge about the equine other in relation 
to ethical evaluations of the self, and I will demonstrate that experiences of blurred 
intersubjectivity can present a problem to be managed. 
 
The ethnographic focus of this chapter is how riders narrate moments of 'resistance' in 
their horses. The term is in quotation marks because it holds highly specific meaning to 
equestrians, when compared to its more normal British usage. In moments where the 
horse/human relationship is malfunctioning, the horse may well be described as 'resistant'. 
Horses show 'resistance' in a number of dynamic ways. They can jog on the spot in a 
frenzied sweat, refusing to settle to the walk. They can dig their heels in and decline to 
move forward, perhaps even reversing at speed into cars, fences and bystanders. They can 
get the bit between their teeth, cock their head to one side and bolt off, rejecting the 
rider’s attempts to slow them down. They can kick up their back legs in a 'buck', lurch 
with all four legs off the ground in a 'bronc', or stand upright on their back legs in a 'rear'; 
all can unseat the rider. While there are connotations of deliberate defiance that can 
permeate this term in certain usage, it can also describe a less calculated event, a lack of 
'softness' on the part of the horse that might come from a bodily discomfort or 
problematic instinct.  Resistance is not just a political term (as it most often features in 
anthropological discourse, e.g. Scott 2008, Ong 2010) but a material one too. It carries the 
quality of a resistant material, or an electrical resistance that impedes a free-flowing 
current of energy, therefore, it describes a tone of movement (braced, tense, sharp).  ' 
Chapter Five considers the tactile techniques involved in 'feeling' and 'working through' 
subtle signs of resistance, whereas this chapter considers the epistemological work 
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summoned when the horse behaves really badly, and the rider has to work out what sort 
of resistance story they are involved in. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to show a dynamic of co-implication between 'care of the self' 
(Foucault 2010/1984) and narratives made about others. At the same time, I hope to show 
how two, at times, opposing virtues of bravery and nurture permeate horse riders’ 
experiences of interacting with their horses. When horse riders tell of their experience 
with horses in a genre which exemplifies their bravery, horses often feature in these 
narratives as defiant opponents. In contrast, when horse owners narrate their experience in 
terms of their capacity to provide care, horses often feature as kind and noble victims in 
need. Notice, the causal relationship may seem back to front here - it is more commonly 
acceptable (to broader British lay knowledge and horse riders alike) to suggest that once 
already identified as defiant, the horse then requires a brave rider; similarly, that once 
recognised as ill, the horse then requires sympathy. That is, there is a sensibility to the 
idea that our ethical decisions surrounding how we should act, and who we should be, 
ought to follow on from already acquired information about the minds and needs of 
others. In fact, the reverse relationship might be considered a fault – the idea that 
understandings of others rest on our own pre-existing needs, identities, or familiar 
narratives suggests ‘projection onto others’ rather than authentic connection with them. 
However, part of my aim here is to reconsider either of these common-sensical dynamics 
which rely on priority– on what is established first- and to take seriously the possibility 
that sometimes, the bravery of the rider and the defiance of the horse are co-constructed 
simultaneously, in triangulation with one another, through narrative. This means that 
‘bravery’ in riders corresponds to ‘defiance’ in horses, and that ‘caring’ owners 
correspond to needy horses. I will show that this level of co-construction seems to present 
riders with a problem; they work to re-establish a proper priority order, to disassociate 
their 'feel' for horses' experience from their own emotional state for long enough to know 
reality. It is the 'problematisation' (Foucault e.g. 1997:117) of knowing self from other 
that leads me to recognise the value of the figure of the individual for horse people 
entangled within these deeply relational ethical dynamics.  It is only through 
authenticating the 'real' experiences of horse and human as separate – but related - 
entities, through a degree of dissociation, that riders consider they can properly relate 
their ethical actions to the horse. These narratives are not abstract representations, but are 
interactional phenomena, they are the means through which relatedness with the horse is 
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experienced and enacted.   
 
In examining the dynamic of relatedness between knowledge about self, knowledge about 
others, and ethics, this chapter is formed through bringing the later work of Michel 
Foucualt (Foucault 1984 [2010], Laidlaw 2002, 2013, Faubion 2001, 2011), into dialogue 
with Donna Haraway's elucidation of the interspecies co-construction of selves (2008), 
via theories of narrative self-construction (Bruner 2003, Frank 1998) and narrative mind-
reading (Mattingly 2008, Gallagher and Hutto 2008). The first section ethnographically 
evidences the importance of the virtue of bravery to my interlocutors and then shows the 
way that equine defiance is a key part of bravery type narrative plots. In this section. I 
will also introduce the narrative theory that enables me to investigate the role of genre 
and narrative form in projects of knowing selves and others. The second ethnographic 
section shows a different genre of narratives, involving care for the injured or ill equine 
body. The third section demonstrates the possibility for creativity in narrating horses' 
minds, and the distress riders feel at times of 'dysnarrativia’ (Bruner 2003:223) - that is, 
the inability to tell one's story, or not knowing which storyline one is living in. To 
conclude, I reflect on how this particular version of self-other construction compares with 
the autopoeisis of Foucault and with the ‘becoming-with’ of Haraway, and I summarise 
the import of the concept of the individual within the co-constructive dynamics that are 
evident between my participants and their horses. 
 
Bravery and the narrative of equine defiance 
 
The virtue of bravery 
 
Varied reconsiderations of Aristolenian 'virtue ethics' have been central to the recent 
reinvigoration of anthropological interest in the moral aspects of human life (MacIntyre 
1981, Mahmood 2005, Faubion 2001, 2011, Laidlaw 2002, 2013, Mattingly 2002, 
Pandian 2009). This involves attending to the diversity of states considered virtuous 
(intrinsically good) in different contexts, and to the variety of dynamics of evaluation and 
projects of cultivation undertaken to pursue those virtues. 
 Bravery is an important virtue among all British horse riders. Their particular aesthetic of 
bravery is easily associated with a stereotypical 'old-fashioned' Britishness that is a cheery 
version of war-time resolve, not unlike the scrapes and tussles that the children in Enid 
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Blyton books get themselves into but jolly-well get themselves out of too. There is 
something good-spirited and wholesome about the equestrian relation to 'danger' to be 
triumphed over. Role models, reported in equestrian media (such as Horse and Hound 
magazine) overcome injury with bravery and positivity. My weekly email news bulletins 
from Horse and Hound almost always contain some dramatic injury story foregrounding 
the resolve and resilience of the injured party. Michael Jung, the German Olympic Gold 
Medallist, and World Champion eventer, became idolised not only for his riding skill, but 
for the fact he won Burleigh (one of the world's toughest events) in 2015 on his second 
horse of the day – having broken his ankle that same day falling off the first ride. The 
extent of the injury wasn't understood until after the event, but this incident was reported 
both in magazines and in my conversation with participants with admiration, as an 
example of a true brave horseman, full of ‘grit’ and commitment. 
 
Kirrily Thompson and colleagues describe the British equestrian cultural relation to risk 
as predominantly 'accepting' (rather than the alternative risk management strategies they 
suggest of mitigating, deferring, or avoiding risks, 2015). I'd go further than that and say 
that at times, some of my participants seemed to revel in the physical risk involved in 
handling and riding horses. This seemed to fit with a general resilience in relation to the 
rider’s body, displayed – at times - through bodily neglect.  Caring for horses is hard 
physical work, and my participants were proud of the effects this labour had on their 
bodies, showing off blisters, bruises, chilblains, chapped lips and sun burn, as evidence of 
their outside, hard working lives and dedication to their horses. Many smoked, didn't eat 
well, or didn't eat during the day at all when with the horses, some snacking on sweets 
and shop bought cakes, drinking black coffee or energy drinks to keep them going during 
their equestrian activities, and remarking on their lack of need for food, warmth, or other 
comfort, sometimes through reference to those softer types who wouldn't be able to hack 
it. 
 
Among the 35 or so participants that I got to know particularly well during fieldwork, 
there were 6 hospital visits as the result of falls during my research year, and multiple 
minor injuries. Horse riding in the UK is a dangerous sport, with more accidents requiring 
hospital treatment than motorcycle riding (Chitnavis et al 1997, Silver 2002), and, from 
my observations, many accidents did not receive the hospital treatment they may have 
warranted, due to rider stoicism. Sally fell off her unruly horse 28 times within the 
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preceding year. While explicitly she posited falling as ‘no big deal,’ the celebrated 
significance of bravery was marked by the fact that she kept count of the falls and told the 
(increasing) number with a sort of half-pride. This had included a broken wrist, ankle and 
ribs, and she still continued to ride that horse and to clock up further falls during my 
fieldwork, though, admittedly, other participants suggested that while they admired her 
bravery, this had probably crossed the line into being sheer madness. Sally was not an 
entirely untalented or inexperienced rider, though the general consensus was that she was 
'over horsed' with Ben, a young, athletic, sensitive warmblood, which is something she 
was loathe to admit. Generally, injuries are acknowledged as part of the sport, something 
which cannot really be wholly avoided, and, furthermore, which certainly doesn't remove 
one's responsibility to the horse in any way.  I was not at all surprised to find one 
participant in a thigh high plaster cast pushing wheelbarrows, handling horses, and 
teaching riding, whilst limping around on crutches. A few weeks later, she was back in the 
saddle well before the doctor recommended it appropriate (which she made sure I knew). 
 
This is not to suggest horse riders wanted to take a totally slapdash or care-free approach 
to managing risks, far from it, for example, riding without a hat was considered as 
unprofessional, naive and incompetent as thinking you need a hat for mundane, relatively 
safe, ground-based tasks. The proper management of risk was part of a personal skill set 
which demonstrated real horsiness, and this included appropriately cultivating the virtue 
of bravery.  Even when deciding to avoid danger, fear should not feature in the rider’s 
emotional repertoire or decision making practices, which should embody a proactive 
initiative to respond to recognised risk with pragmatism and gumption. 
 
One graphic demonstration of the community's pride in their response to danger is the 
prevalence of injury photographs, including 'selfies' shared by the injured party on 
Facebook. 
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Owners enabled one another to be brave through mitigating risks on each other’s behalf. 
For example, after Jess's fall (pictured above) other horse owners pitched in to look after 
 
Illustration 5: Photograph shared on 
Facebook of Layla's hospital stay after 
being kicked in the face. 
 
Illustration 4 and 5: Photographs shared on facebook of Jess's first 
aid after a fall, and of Layla (below) after being kicked in the face. 
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her horse and basically banned her from the yard for a few days, despite – and, enabling – 
her regular insistence through social media in comments beneath this photograph, that her 
horse came first, that she didn't need to recuperate, that she was desperate to get back on 
again. 
 
The ethic and aesthetic of bravery was also observable in the praise given to riders 
(particularly 
children) for their bravery when handling or riding challenging horses, and especially for 
remounting after a fall (Birke and Brandt 2009:191)– not doing so was really admitting 
defeat and giving in – both to the horse, and to the fear. Those who were suspected of 
having 'confidence issues' would be likely to find this problem identified as the central 
issue of any of their riding troubles. Despite the tangible presence of bravery as a virtue, 
most of my (largely amateur) participants struggled with 'confidence issues' at some level 
– whether just a flutter of nerves when they wished they could be calm during a particular 
riding challenge, or for a notable minority, a debilitating, highly emotional, paralysing 
fear that prevented them from being able to really enjoy riding much at all. The 
fascinating thing is that they kept on riding, horsiness was too deep a part of who they 
were, it was too painfully wrenching to consider a life without horses in it. This became 
more evident as I got to know participants better, as for some, this was a matter of great 
embarrassment and guilt. 
 
 Ellie explained to me how 'ridiculous' she felt, unable to regain control over her own 
emotions and body – which shook and quivered and tensed when it should be relaxed - 
and unable to enjoy the sport which had helped her feel empowered and proud during her 
childhood and young adult life. She had 'lost her nerve' since having children, which was 
a commonly given reason for confidence problems. The rationality for this was three-fold. 
Firstly, time 'out of the saddle' away from horses during pregnancy and infant-care could 
cause women to lose their connection to horses and re-emerge more of a novice and more 
likely to be nervous. Secondly, my participants explained that women's own relationship 
with their bodily safety, and with risk in general, is changed by having children, such that 
they become more risk-adverse, 'their priorities change' so that the child's dependence on 
them overrules their ability to 'let go' when riding. Finally, the significant exertion the 
maternal body undergoes in bearing children leaves them physically weakened, too 
lacking in 'core stability' to be able to move in as balanced a way on the horse’s back. For 
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Ellie, her loss of nerve afflicted her to the point that tacking up (getting the horse ready to 
ride with saddle on etc) left her feeling so shaky and nauseous she was often physically 
sick before riding. More often, she said sadly, she was finding a reason not to be able to 
ride at all, such as the weather, lack of time and so on. She hoped her horsey friends 
hadn't noticed.  Others were more forthcoming about their 'confidence issues', and 
supported one another or garnered support from others pro-actively. Lydia, for example, 
loudly and theatrically took a homeopathic pill before each ride, the “brave-pants pills” as 
she called them. “I've got to get a bloody grip! If I'm being a wimp, just shout at me won’t 
you Rosie? Just tell me to kick on and shut the hell up and stop being a wet blanket!” 
 
Rider confidence needs have become a profitable market in the last few years. Services 
and products on offer include residential courses, hypnotherapy programs, mindfulness 
approaches, Neurolinguistic programming, therapeutic approaches to teaching riding, 
'learning to fall safely' courses, confidence-based books, lecture series and so on. 
Particular types of horses are seen as most appropriate for nervous riders. Known as 
“confidence givers”, they are usually hairy, thicker set types, but crucially, have 
unreactive, predictable (and some say “dull”) temperaments. Many of my participants 
found the thought of riding these types of horses embarrassing and associated them 
with lack of skill. Particularly frustrating and humiliating for riders were situations where 
their skill set and confidence level did not correlate; where they had to ride at a 'novice' 
level due to fear rather than lack of talent. 
 
We could analyse bravery as a virtue that riders pursue in line with Foucault's description 
of 'care of the self' (1986). Ellie, through her tears, evidences ethical self-evaluation. She 
examines her emotionality and resolve and finds it wanting. She therefore identifies what 
Foucault calls the “substance” (or ontology) that requires ethical work (Laidlaw 
2013:101, Faubion 2011:3). Riders like Ellie then work to improve the ease with which 
one is able to be brave as an embodied disposition, through finding ways to 'be brave' in 
the short term (homeopathic pills, encouraging peers, breathing exercises and the like). 
However, bravery is rarely something that riders experience as a personal problem, so 
much as a relationship malfunction; something which goes wrong between rider and 
horse. In this respect, confidence issues often emerge as part of a story about a horse. I 
shall now take a step back from the ethnography momentarily to introduce narrative 
theory and explain why it is particularly relevant to this field site. 
108 
 
Ethics and narratives 
Narratives have long been of interest to anthropologists, though Cheryl Mattingly and 
Linda Garro  (2000:6) recognise an increasing interest in narratives throughout the 1990's, 
where narratives gave anthropologists opportunities to investigate, 'Life as an unfolding 
affair, an engagement of actors who very often find themselves in interpretive and 
practical struggles.' (2000:17). An interest in narrative has proved a valuable tool for 
anthropologists interested in ethics, as it can demonstrate the ways in which narrators 
make meaning out of events, the expectations of cultural norms, the variable details that 
are important in communicating moral plots, and the ways in which narratives can teach, 
excuse, assign blame, identify and describe relationships, or offer exemplars. (Laidlaw 
2013:62 Humphrey 1996, Carrithers 2005, 2013, Mattingly 1998, Zigon 2012). Following 
an Aristotelian argument that narrative is the form through which people can learn, and 
exercise, the sensitivities of practical moral judgement (rather than through rational 
calculation), Alisdair MacIntyre declares, 'Man is a story telling animal' (1981:216) who 
asks, 'Of what stories do I find myself part?' in order to know, 'What am I to do?'    
 
Narrative has been investigated by Jerome Bruner not only as telling about the self, but as 
the way in which life is actually lived (2004). Bridging anthropology and cognitive 
sciences, Bruner argued that selves and stories are so closely interlinked, that it is difficult 
to work out which enables the other: “Is our sense of selfhood the fons et origio of 
storytelling, or is it the human gift of narrative that endows selfhood with the shape it has 
taken?” (2003:211). No autobiography is ever finished, he asserts, only ended, as different 
threads of meaning might be pulled together in different ways in order to weave a 
changing understanding of one’s past, present and future connection to events and to 
others. Investigating the changing role and style of narrative in different historical 
contexts, Amelie Rorty (1976) demonstrates the way that possibilities for self' are closely 
tied up with changing forms of autobiography and literary narrative. In this respect, 
Bruner argues, the invention of the modern novel has had just as monumental an effect on 
contemporary Western ways of seeing themselves and their world, as the invention of 
molecular physics (2004:699). This resonates with the way in which Duranti describes 
language as a “non-neutral medium” (2011:28), that is, the ways in which the form of 
language mediates the possibilities for human thought, communication and action. 
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 There are some striking similarities between the way Bruner describes self-narration 
through autobiography and the way Foucault describes self-reflection and care of the self, 
particular in terms of the relative degrees of freedom/creativity that the subject has to 
weave a narrative (Bruner) or self-reflect (Foucault), given the available normative 'plots' 
and grammars, and the idiosyncratic relational and political dynamics that the subject has 
to work with when communicating with their audience. For example, Bruner describes, 
“One important way of characterising a culture is by the narrative models it makes 
available for describing the course of a life”(2004:694). The similarities are highlighted 
particularly by Arthur Frank, who directly describes self-narratives of hospital patients as 
a form of Foucauldian care of the self. Frank investigates telling one’s own story as a way 
to forge one’s own identity, operating under a degree of freedom within contingent 
possibilities (1998). However, the extent to which narratives about others might be 
considered a form of self-reflection, or self-care, is perhaps more oblique. 
 
British horse riding as a storied world 
The focus on verbal language in this chapter and the next (which deals with metaphor) 
may seem an odd choice given the current momentum toward attending to the body 
within multispecies ethnography. However, it is based on observations of the way speech 
and voice were particularly important concepts to my interlocutors, such that verbality 
emerged as a central means through which horse/human relationships were experienced 
and managed. A very common metaphor involved referring to training as a 'conversation' 
between horse and rider, in which the horse should be 'listening' to the things the rider 
'asks'. It's worth pointing out these 'asks' are (mostly) tactile, not verbal, and 'listening' is a 
bodily posture and mental 'softness,' more relating to the horse being 'engaged' than to 
any actual aural skill. Tougher or clearer cues might be referred to as 'turning up the 
volume,' or, 'don't ask, tell!' An instructor might well advise that the student 'finds another 
way to ask the question' or tries to be more ‘encouraging in the way that you ask.’   
 
The stories that horse people most often tell revolve around the intentions of the horse. 
They usually describe not only what the horse was doing, but why the horse was doing it. 
This appears to be essential information in the grammar of the moral plots that hold 
meaning for horse riders, but this need not necessarily be the case. In other contexts 
intentionality appears less important - or at least less explicit - in establishing 'what 
happened' (e.g. the South Pacific, Mead 1928, Duranti 1984, Ochs 1982, Rumsey and 
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Robbins 2008). This only further establish my interest in the particularity of the sorts of 
co-constructive relationality afforded by narratives which do focus so extensively on what 
Bruner calls the “landscape of consciousness” (1986). Duranti proposes we imagine a 
continuum along which we might compare the extent to which intentionality is 'hypo-' or 
'hyper-cognised' (2015:233-242). This is not quite the same as a measurement of to what 
extent intentionality exists in people's experience, rather, it is a consideration of to what 
extent own or others' intentions are made explicit within dialogue or are rendered 
observable within interaction.  Equestrian narratives offer an example in which equine 
intentionality is 'hyper-cognised' in Duranti's terms. It is in relation to the horse’s 
intentions that morality is established, that other characters (like human riders) makes 
sense, that the important ontological details reside. 
 
Telling triumphant narratives 
Certain types of equine character (defiant, ridiculous, unreasonable) feature commonly 
within narratives that enable riders to develop and communicate the virtue of bravery. The 
narrative below is from Lesley, an estate agent who stabled her horse, Totnes, an ex-
racing thoroughbred, next to mine. Lesley used to ride dirt bikes, and prides herself on 
being as good at car mechanics as any guy. As discussed in Chapter One, Lesley is no 
'girly girl'. Lesley is fiercely committed to self-improvement and to competitive success 
with Tots, though she almost sold him after the first few months of owning him as his 
behaviour and her confidence deteriorated in parallel with one another. Often she would 
dismount (get off the horse) in angry tears midway through a ride while unable to control 
Tots, and would then be very frustrated at herself. However, with the help of the right 
instructor, she was able to get Tots, and her nerves, simultaneously under control, and this 
narrative is taken from a couple of months after the turning point in their relationship. It 
was part of a spontaneous dialogue between Lesley, another rider - Leeanne, and I, while 
we completed stable chores. Lesley spoke with a loud, cheerful, nonchalance, proud of 
how much less of a problem her nerves were of late: 
 
In his first [dressage] test everything was going quite well we were probably three 
quarters of the way through and we had to do a circle followed by a change of 
diagonal and I felt like he was pulling through my hands he has always been really 
hard to have a contact and just doesn't like to be told and now he’s trying to run 
through his forehand because he is trying to evade the contact again and I was 
holding him up and I was getting really fed up feeling like I was having to do all 
the work so as I turned the corner I put my leg on and said, “You will carry me 
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and we are going to do this!” and he basically told me to knob off stuck his head 
in the air like a giraffe and flitted across the arena so someone thought we were 
going to collide with the arena so we have this funny picture24 of him bunny 
hoping across the arena but within 5 minutes I had him back in an outline back 
under control and we finished the last couple of moves on the test, but yeah he 
basically just told me to “do one!.” 
Dictaphone recording, May 2016 
 
Lesley doesn’t explicitly talk about her own bravery, and yet, her bravery is evident in the 
genre of the plot. We can see a clear temporal structure to the plot, there is a beginning 
(everything was going fine), and then a middle, in which there is a 'jeopardy' which 'calls 
legitimacy into question'.  These are elements Bruner identifies as central to the making 
of an autobiographical plot (2003: 697, drawing on Burke 1945). The legitimacy 
questioned here is Lesley’s influence over Tots, which is called into question by his lazy 
and then defiant behaviour. However, there is a happy ending, peace is restored by the 
steeliness of her resolve. Lesley actually jumps temporally backwards after introducing 
the scene, to give us more of a back story about Tots’ character. She establishes him as 
evasive in order to bring us along on the same shared script, so that when we get to his 
resistance, we are ready to see it as both expectable and ridiculous rather than serious or 
legitimate. 
 
We are given three visual perspectives on Tots leaping across the arena; Lesley's initial 
description, the person who thinks she will collide, and then the photograph of him 
‘bunny hopping.’ This multiple visualisation adds to the drama of the moment, almost 
portraying it in slow motion. Lesley manages to communicate that this was a marked and 
dramatic event. However, she also conveys that it doesn’t need to be taken seriously, it 
can be overcome, it is a laughable effort ('like a giraffe,' and 'bunny hopping', as well as 
Tots' teenage like attitude: 'knob off!,’ he says). Though it might have appeared dramatic, 
she communicates that this is merely a predictable and silly defiance that she can handle. 
If there is a moral genre to this story, it is a triumph narrative, in which one can meet 
adversity with resilience and good humour. The horse, in this moral, provides the 
adversity by functioning as natural adversary. As she finished her story with a laugh that I 
somehow felt compelled to share, I affirmed the moral, the humorous genre, and the 
reading of Tots’ defiance as ridiculous as well as inevitable, at the same time as bearing 
                                                 
24The show photographer had captured the moment on film, and Lesley had bought the image. 
112 
witness to Lesley’s bravery. 
 
Stories like Lesley's were particularly common in my fieldwork. All sorts of events could 
be, and were, described in remarkably similar form or genre. First, the horse’s natural 
defiance creating risk  and unbalancing the appropriate horse/human relatedness; 
subsequently, or implicitly, the  rider's bravery, resolve and good humour; and finally, the 
rider's ultimate triumph. For Bruner, a genre is a specific, 'Set of grammars for producing 
different story plots' which, 'Commits one to use language in a particular way' (2004:696, 
Duranti 2011:41). Mattingly and Garro use D'Adrande's term 'schema' (1982) to speak 
about common genres, or grammars, in which things might make sense in different 
cultural contexts. They describe, 'Schemas are interpretive processes, integral to the 
constructive nature of cognition, which mediate our understanding of the world. For both 
teller and audience, schemas organise the hearing, telling and remembering of stories. 
Schemas are involved in conveying the specifics of a given story but also supply the 
narrative structures that characterise stories more generally' (Mattingly and Garro 
2000:13). 
 
Narrative-mind reading and self-evaluation 
Cheryl Mattingly (2008) investigates narrative mind reading practices carried out by 
African American mothers of ill children and the hospital staff they interact with. 
Mattingly demonstrates that narrative mind reading relies on 'shared scripts', that is, on 
certain accepted and expected patterns of human behaviour in relation to their 
environment, that provide predictable models on which narrative mind reading attempts 
can be based. Her particular interest is in the challenges faced when subjects from 
‘cultural borderlands’ do not ‘share’ the same scripts, and so tell different sorts of 
narratives about the same events.  Unsurprisingly, this leads to misunderstandings and 
friction. Similarly, my interest in human-horse ‘mind-reading’ involves people’s capacity 
to understand others across boundaries of difference. However, the specific dynamics of 
the equestrian relationship demands a subtly different approach. Mattingly could ask both 
mothers and hospital staff for their narrative version of events, and comment on the 
discrepancies in genre, form, and moral meaning. I rely upon human narratives of horses 
but aim to investigate the affordances for co-construction within these accounts. How 
might the human virtue of bravery depend upon horses who can be narrated as defiant? 
Therefore, while Bruner focuses on autobiographic narrative self, and Mattingly 
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illuminates narrative mind-reading as a way to understand others (who one can then 
ethically relate to in particular ways), I hold the lens toward the ethical affordances and 
challenges that come into play when one practises self-evaluation through articulating 
knowledge about the other. This involves a reconsideration of how narratives about others 
might form part of virtuous self-construction. 
 
For Foucault, ethical self-cultivation depends upon reflective thought. Such thought is: 
 
What allows one to sept back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to 
oneself as an object of thought and to question as to its meaning, its conditions, 
and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by 
which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as 
a problem. 
(1997:117) 
This quote seems to invite an image of the ethical subject as necessarily isolated to some 
extent, as in the phrases James Faubion carefully lays out 'autodidactic' and 'autopoeisis' 
(2011:e.g. 94). However, Faubion also reminds us, relations with others are central and 
crucial parts of this process (2011:71, 2014:95, also Laidlaw 2013:92-137, 149). Faubion 
argues for expanding the scope of self-other relationships that Foucault draws on 
(2011:14), part of his bid to do so involves examining in detail the dynamics of ethical 
relatedness between charismatic leaders and their followers (2011:80-90). However, there 
are grounds for focussing more directly on the role of reading others' intentions within 
projects of self-evaluation. Faubion refers to a 'triangulation' among Foucault’s interests: 
between the care of the self, governance and ethical care of others, and information that 
others can provide about the self (here, Foucault focuses on parrhesia25 and pedagogy). 
Webb Kane describes, 'To become aware you are a “an observable”26 ...is to find yourself 
amid other people, imagining their perspective on you.” (2015:79). The covalence with 
Foucault’s observations on the power of the panopticon for the development of self-
governance is clearly worth noting. I propose that there is a good case for focussing more 
closely on mind-reading, intention tracking, or other forms of knowing other’s minds 
within a Foucault-inspired interest in subject formation. Even in the example of parrhesia 
(telling truth to power), one must be able to distinguish the truth-tellers honourable 
                                                 
25Parrhesia is a highly specific speech act, involving circumstances in which the speakers is willing to 
accept significant risk (perhaps to his life) in order to tell a political superior the truth about their 
conduct, without rhetoric or flattery. (2010/1984:43) 
26This is Harvey Sacks' phrase (1972) 
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intentions from those with more complicated, perhaps self-serving reasons for making 
their case - some degree of mind-reading seems necessary for recognising truth in the 
eyes of those who speak it, and completing self-evaluation accordingly. 
 
Webb Keane describes the sorts of reflexivity afforded in the way one might acknowledge 
the other: 
 I am not only concerned with my own fact- most of the time I am also committed 
to yours...The practical dynamics by which one accords recognition to others is 
inseparable not just from their recognition of oneself but from one's own 
capacities for self recognition. 
(2015:104) 
 
He also explains how a sense of character is essential to this process, 'A great deal of 
work goes into ethical self-characterisation, which (to a greater or lesser degree) functions 
in coordination with the characterisation of others' (2015:153). In the context of this 
ethnographic case, this coordination is enhanced. The import on intentionality and the 
responsibility individual owners take for cultivating themselves in accordance to their 
personally known horses, all leads to a particular proclivity to narrate the horse’s mind 
and in so doing, articulate the owner’s sense of self. 
 
Narratives about the horse’s defiance implicitly refer to the rider’s bravery, the two 
phenomena are intrinsically linked through the form of the narrative genre. When she tells 
us about her horse’s defiance, Lesley communicates, and re-instils, her own bravery. This 
isn’t to say equine defiance inevitably makes people brave (though sometimes this too, on 
which more shortly), rather that one cannot even think about being, or describing in 
oneself, this particular strain of bravery, without a defiant horse with which to be this type 
of brave with/against. And one cannot think about describing a defiant horse without 
opening oneself up to evaluations of bravery. A perfectly well-behaved horse would 
thwart one’s capacity to ‘dig deep’ and triumph over the opponent. As would a horse who 
was misbehaving as a confused but willing servant. One’s capacity to demonstrate this 
strain of bravery with the former would be false and staged, and with the latter would be 
bullying or cruel. Both are criticisms that were made during gossip regarding other riders' 
attempts at heroics. 
 
This means that it is not only narrative form which gives affordance to particular sorts of 
ethical projects to become relevant, the horse itself has a part to play. I use the term 
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'affordance' here in line with Webb Keane (2014, 2015:27-32) who builds on James 
Gibson’s notion. For example, a chair affords the observer the chance to sit, and can 
therefore be perceived as a sitting-thing (or, equally, as fire wood). Affordances are reliant 
upon the material properties of a thing, as well as the expectations of those who perceive 
it. Keane develops the idea into 'ethical affordances', wherein things (objects, others, 
environments, cognitive capacities) create particular possibilities for the sorts of ethical 
evaluations and practices which can emerge. Hence, a defiant horse affords a brave rider. 
A willing but confused horse cannot create, or expose, bravery-triumph in its rider, it 
simply does not afford that project. 
 
The identification of defiance in the horse is also used to instil riders' bravery within 
riding lessons. Instructors actively and explicitly promote this form of narrative to riders 
who, they say, need to become braver or develop more grit. We met this pattern in 
Chapter Two, where instructor Bertie described a horse as 'dominant,' only to explain to 
me upon reading his words back that the phrase was used rhetorically, to rouse the rider. 
In Lesley’s earlier lessons during the crises phase of her and Tots’s relationship, I often 
heard her instructor telling her that her horse was “laughing at you!” that he was “taking 
the piss!” and that he knew she was afraid so was able to “get away with whatever he 
wants!” Determined not to be humiliated, and stirred by the instructors taunting, Lesley 
would clench her jaw, kick Tetley hard in the ribs and growl “gerrruupppp” at him. Sheer 
defiance could sometimes out-volume nervous anxiety. 
 
This emphasises the way narratives do things within relationships, rather than simply 
report on them (e.g. Mattingly and Garro 2000:18). This is the aspect of language that 
Austin called the “perlocutionary effect” (1962:101). Hearing, speaking and embodying 
the defiance/triumph narrative, is part of the work which riders do in order to cultivate 
their own bravery, it makes them better at being brave. Therefore, the defiant horse 
narrative, as tool, might be considered part of the 'ascetics,' or self-forming work, of the 
Foucauldian ethical project to work on the virtue of bravery (Faubion 2011:4, 45-47, 
Foucault 1997: 263-266, Laidlaw 2013:103). 
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 Nurture and the horse as noble victim 
 
'He is NOT in pain' 
One interesting thing about bravery narratives, is that they often involve at some point the 
caveats; 
'There is nothing wrong with the horse physically,' (the term 'physical problem' is used to 
refer to 
medical issues, physiological problems, pain or discomfort) and/or 'I know he isn't really 
afraid.' Here, I asked Lesley, who told me about Tots's bunny hopping escapades, to 
expand on the story she had told me: 
 
Rosie: Why would he be so stroppy? 
Lesley: Well for a while, well he can -  there's nothing wrong with him at all, I 
know he isn't sore, this is just him - well the last lesson I had with Betty he gets 
really like grumpy and sour when he's, he thinks he knows what he's doing and 
then he, he just tends to give the wrong canter lead, that's his little strop, he's like 
“I'll do it but its begrudging and you might have asked for this one but I am going 
to give you this [other]one” and the second test he was much better behaved and 
we got a much better score but he still gave me the wrong canter leg but even 
when I pulled him back to trot and corrected him he still gave me the wrong leg 
again so....we're getting there. I just have to be firm and tell him he can't 
intimidate me. 
 
Lesley had to work harder to reassert the same plot line, that this horse has an unfounded 
and amusing defiance and resistance to reasonable requests, and that she must be, and is, 
brave enough and competent enough to overcome it. It is a common 'given' within 
bravery narratives that horses just are stroppy, this is the character they hold within the 
plot, against which bravery is relevant and virtuous. In asking why he might be, I was 
unsettling that particular 'shared script' (Mattingly 2008) from functioning – it doesn't 
serve so well to highlight the virtue of bravery in the face of defiance, when the defiance 
itself might have a substantial or valid motive. If this were the case, the genre of the story 
would have changed, and a different type of lead character is required.  It is to that plot 
line that I now turn. 
 
The virtue of responsible, resourceful, care-giving 
While the human might find virtue in enduring pain and discomfort, the equine partner's 
body is 
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cared for quite differently. Pain, injury, disease and physical ill health, weakness and 
imbalance are constructed as legitimate reasons for undesirable equine behaviour.27 If the 
horse is uncomfortable, then the responsibility for the horse’s comfort, and for the 
consequences of any unwanted behaviour, fall onto the rider/owner. This responsibility is 
developing in recent times, the horse is increasingly recognised as a somatically complex 
creature, a growing number of potential pathologies have been identified and met within a 
growing market of treatments and services. For example, while ten years ago, a good 
owner would make sure the horse saw the farrier frequently, now it is a minimum 
requirement of responsible ownership to have the horse’s teeth rasped by an equine dental 
technician every six months, back seen regularly by at least one sort of practitioner 
(chiropractor, physiotherapist, acupuncture, masseuse), saddle fit checked by professional 
saddler, and it is common to speak with a nutritionist help line, and so on. 
 
Narratives that riders tell about their horse as injured or ill and in need of care often 
describe the equine as noble, vulnerable, honest and willing, and the corresponding 
human as diligent, sympathetic, resourceful and responsible. They often feature the 
owner’s ability to find and disseminate the right information in order to provide 
appropriate care for the horse. Extensive research and evaluation of information sources 
are often part of the story of care. Furthermore, they emphasise horse and rider co-
operation and shared goals. If it wasn't for the problematic health condition, it is 
portrayed, the horse and rider would naturally co-exist in a harmonious and conflict free 
co-operation.   
 
 
Below, Maggie describes the story of her horse, Trevor's medical condition: 
 
I was riding, and he was - resistant. And he's not a resistant horse. You know, 
rather than a typical thing for him, I was in the school, and he was being -he was 
trying to tell me something was up. So, I was like “Oh he's not right”, and I 
thought maybe it’s just a bad day and he'll come back a bit tomorrow then I was 
away for a week so I said to the girls look after him have him in for a week and 
                                                 
27
If the horse was interpreted as suffering from 'genuine fear', this too, acted as a legitimate reason for 
unwanted 
behaviour and occurred within a different genre of narrating human/equine connectivity, however, there 
isn't room 
here to extrapolate the discrepancy in participant's interpretations of what did, and didn't count as 'genuine' 
fear. 
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look after him, bute him [give a pain killer], then when I came back I got on, still 
wasn't right, so I thought OK. Cos I was asking people, I was like “hey come and 
look” and they would be like, “No can't see nothing, there is nothing.” But I was 
like, convinced in my head that there is something not right. And then someone 
said: “Ooo you’re being paranoid Mads, you gotta just ride him through it.” And I 
was like, maybe I am, maybe I am. So, I hacked him for three weeks in a straight 
line and he seemed fine, he didn't seem lame or anything like that and we trotted 
him on the concrete and he seemed fine, and then after the three weeks I got him 
back in the school and then, he still wasn't right, it was like he was trying to say to 
me, “Can you please back off me I can’t do it!” So I thought: “Oohhh, I gotta do 
something” and everyone was still telling me, “no, no, he's not.” But it was just 
my gut. I know him. So I took him to the Cambridge vet school, I had him booked 
in for like an assessment as 'poor performance' and they said, “maybe he's done a 
stifle or a suspensory,” so I was like OK and then they ex rayed him and came 
back with yep he's got arthritis and bone spavin28. 
Dictaphone recording, May 2017 
Maggie went on to tell me about the various treatments she had researched and provided 
for Trevor, special remedial shoes, physiotherapy, feed supplements, saddle fit changes, 
and so on. While Maggie was talking about the stages of diagnosis and recovery from 
Trevor's disease, she was also able to communicate her ability to seek the right 
information, her shrewdness in handling suggestions of others, and her trust of Trevor, as 
well as her trustworthiness for him. Maggie's narrative involves 'jeopardy' in the form of 
Trevor's need for care testing Maggie’s ability to recognise that need and respond 
appropriately to it. She describes the tension between horse and rider very differently 
from Lesley, though the scenarios are substantively similar – both horses put up resistance 
against being told what to do. In Maggie’s narrative, though, she reminds us repeatedly 
that Trevor isn't really resistant, that he is sweet and well meaning, and she shows the 
interaction to be a matter of miscommunication, an error on her part which she has since 
identified and can confirm (through the affirmation of the veterinary diagnosis) that 
Trevor is, in fact, a sweet horse, as she had always thought. Notice the description of the 
equine resistance is vague in this account – we don't really know what he actually did in 
the school. While for Lesley, Tots's dramatic actions were emphasised three-fold as they 
served a key role in demonstrating her bravery within the plot of triumph, here, Trevor's 
communicative intentions are much more important than his actions, the jeopardy comes 
in the possibility that the medical problem will not be uncovered, in the plot whose moral 
might be surmised, “trust your horse.” In highlighting the way these narratives give form 
                                                 
28Bone spavin is actually the old equestrian term for the condition medically diagnosed as arthritis of the 
lower hock (hind leg joint), Maggie had understood the diagnoses to be of two conditions, rather than 
two names for one. 
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to experience, it is significant that I never heard one story about a horse who was both 
defiant by nature and in pain, nor of one who was healthy, comfortable, and legitimately 
resistant. Some people and their horses were more likely to inhabit one of the narratives, 
some were more likely to inhabit the other, and some oscillated between the two at 
different times, or struggled to know which story they were in. 
 
Creativity and Crises 
Living the wrong story 
Diagnosis of a physical problem can be a monumental, game changing, and emotional 
event for a horse owner. Jess features in the injury photographs above. Jess and Prince 
seemed to have a good relationship, in which she took the utmost care over Prince's well-
being, and he seemed, to the best of my knowledge and to the agreement of all around us, 
to be very fond of her. Prince was a large part of Jess's ability to handle her mental health, 
having suffered with depression in the past, she found solace in riding and spending time 
with Prince, whom she had owned for 6 years. He came to her call in the field, and 
whinnied at her from the stable. Of all of my participants, Jess had the highest and most 
careful standards in relation to the care of Prince's body, grooming him until his coat 
shone (during which he would doze with his eyes half closed), giving him a deep and 
scrupulously clean straw bed, cleaning out his water bucket thoroughly (even constructing 
a little ladder for the mice that sometimes drowned in it so they could get out again). Jess 
enjoyed mixing Prince’s feeds up, oiling his hooves, filling his hay nets up to bulging full, 
and making sure he always had on the right thickness of rug (blanket) for the exact 
weather predictions from his abundant ‘wardrobe’ of options. 
 
However, throughout the first half of my fieldwork, Jess occasionally struggled with 
Prince's tendency to “put in a dirty stop” - which means to stop at the very last second 
before taking off for a jump, often unseating the rider who has prepared themselves for 
the forward momentum. It is a particularly unlike-able behaviour in horses, and generally 
seen as dishonest. Gradually, the dirty-stop issue became more of a problem in their 
otherwise harmonious relationship, while it was always unpredictable and defied many 
attempts at spotting patterns in its occurrence, it seemed to be happening more often, and 
it seemed to bother Jess more. Where once she had suggested she might give up jumping 
if Prince didn't like it, in Spring of 2016, she seemed certain that ironing out this problem 
was an essential part of achieving a fulfilling equestrian relationship. Presuming her 
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growing nervousness to be part of the problem (the more she fell, the more nervous she 
grew, the more he stopped, so that she felt she was 'letting him down') Jess asked a braver 
and firmer rider to compete Prince on her behalf. For a while this worked, though the 
rider had to use the whip at every fence to guarantee a jumping effort from Prince– a fact 
Jess could square away as appropriate 'encouragement,' though she told me she didn't feel 
she would have been able to use the whip herself – part because she would have felt 
guilty and part because she would have worried Prince might have bucked her off if she 
did. One day, though, Prince wouldn't jump at all, even for the braver rider, and the group 
came home frustrated at his defiance. “Why is he such a fucking dick-head?!” One of the 
other riders exclaimed. “Why does he just refuse to even try?! Jess really deserves better 
from him.” 
 
Though Jess got Prince's back checked regularly by a horse masseuse, she decided to get 
a second opinion, and this second practitioner recommended a veterinary assessment and 
possibly ex-rays, on account of some 'tension' she found behind the saddle area. I arrived 
at the yard one day to find Jess tear stained and pale, hugging Prince around the neck. 
Placing a hand on Jess's shoulder, and another over Princes neck, I found out what had 
happened. The vet had ex-rayed and diagnosed kissing spines29. Everything had changed. 
The possibility that Prince may have been in pain, even when not misbehaving, filled Jess 
with guilt and forced a re-conception of the narrative of their past relationship and riding 
experiences together, while at the same time, the medical cause of his misdemeanours 
gave her a sense of relief – suddenly, it all made sense, his character was restored, but 
hers was called into question in a new way. At least it wasn’t ‘her fault’ because it wasn’t 
her nerves that were causing the problem after all, but she should have trusted him, she 
told me. He was obviously trying to tell her that he was hurting and she hadn’t listened. 
Now she had what felt like a tremendous task ahead of her, to try to build and shape his 
body, changing his posture to improve the condition. The whole summer of riding plans 
she had made had to be scrapped and a new plan made, involving physiotherapy exercises 
without any weight on his back. She needed information, from vets, from the internet, 
from others who had worked through it. The corresponding ethical rider-self to Prince's 
                                                 
29A condition where the boney protrusions of the horses' vertebrae are too close together, touching one 
another, or catching soft tissue between (Jeffcoat 1980). It is significant that kissing spines is invisible 
from the outside, other than behavioural symptoms, and that it was discovered in the 1980s and its 
diagnoses (by ex-ray) has been prolific in the last decade. 
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kissing spines self was a care-giving, information seeking one. It was an emotional day 
for Jess, who seemed to realise she had been living in the wrong story, and had to adjust 
to this new one, in which her behaviour and Prince's corresponded to each other in a 
totally different way. 
 
Decision events and co-construction 
Jess's story highlights both the relationality of this narrative form of ethical self-
evaluation, and yet also the way the narrator is held personally responsible for that 
knowing. To explain this further, I turn to Caroline Humphrey's notion of the 'decision 
event.'  Humphrey’s decision event enables the recognition of an intelligible subject that 
exists before and after significant changes in the composition of the self (2008:370). 
Humphrey shows that the term can accommodate the sorts of multiple and fragmented 
understandings of subjectivity that are utilised in Mongolia. When an event occurs, during 
which the constitution of the subject is changed, yet one considers an identifiable element 
of the subject endures before and after that shift in self-constitution, then we might 
consider that shift a decision event, Humphrey contends. Decision events need not be as 
considered and cerebral as the turn 'decision' suggests, in fact, they may involve shock, 
dreams, the impact of war, or a divination event (2008:363-364). They do not only 
happen 'to' people, they have to be, to some extent 'plumped for' or 'taken up' in a 
particular way so that they resonate with the way the subject is self-intelligible. 
 
Analysing Prince’s diagnoses as a decision event, that happens to and with Jess - that she 
'plumps for' - allows us to recognise the relationality of Jess's sense of self. Jess before the 
diagnoses features as not-brave-enough in relation to the increasingly defiant Prince, and 
Jess after the diagnoses as not-yet-caring-enough in relation to the trustworthy and needy 
Prince. However, the idea of the decision event also enables us to recognise the way in 
which Jess – Prince’s ongoing owner – is held responsible across these two narratives, in 
an enduring way, for knowing which narrative she should have been in. 
 
The ethnography provided to this point demonstrates a dynamic of co-construction of 
horse and rider, we have seen that equine bodies and behaviours have particular 
affordances for who their riders can be. This multispecies co-construction has been 
emphasised by recent anthropological interest in human-animal relationships. For 
example, Leslie Irvine who utilises ethnographic data of rescue dogs interacting with 
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potential adoptees, and demonstrates the 'contingency' of human and canine self-hood 
upon one another (2008:106-125). Feminist science studies scholar Karen Barad's notion 
of 'intra-action' has been highly influential: rather than the more usual phrase, interaction, 
Barad asserts the way entities co-construct one another, such that 'the partners do not 
precede the relating' (2003:812). Donna Haraway, whom I introduced in the previous 
chapter, highlights the co-construction of humans alongside 'companion species' in a 
'meshwork' of 'becoming-with' (2008: throughout, e.g. 3, 4, 19). In contrast with 
Foucauldian autopoeisis already introduced in this chapter, Haraway’s account 
emphasises the fallibility of any human ability to really know oneself in relation to one’s 
environment, let alone to self-construct. The figment of a bounded, knowing, human self 
appears in Haraway’s account as an odd, over-celebrated, outdated, and in many ways, 
damaging invention of the enlightenment (2008:9-11,12). However, she does less to offer 
us a means of observing the varied ways in which human ethical practices actually occur 
within this gargantuan network, than she does to tell us how they should. My interest is to 
investigate the creativity with which my participants attempted to manage these deeply 
co-constructive dynamics, and the recognised risks that this capacity for creativity 
invokes. 
 
Contested stories 
So far, we have seen that a different narrative genre constructs horses who are ridiculous 
and defiant, and those who are legitimate and in pain. Within these genres, different 
affordances for the character of the rider, and its ethical evaluation, are made. This means 
that describing one's horse as defiant enables a person to invest in their own bravery, 
while describing a horse as in pain enables them to explore their capacity to care. The 
potential for creativity here, in describing the horse in line with the type of 'corresponding 
self' one is able or willing to offer, did not escape my participant’s notice: they were often 
suspicious and critical of one another's narratives. One example is the case of Naomi and 
Blitz, who featured on the fringes of my fieldwork. While I spoke with Naomi 
occasionally about Blitz during my fieldwork year, I was able to follow their story more 
frequently through the reports of several of my regular participants who knew them well 
and discussed their predicament amongst themselves often. 
 
Naomi, they felt, was over-horsed with Blitz, mainly due to her own confidence issues, 
she couldn't ride well enough to handle his particularly wilful nature, and she had become 
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more afraid of him following a series of falls and near-falls. According to my regular 
participants, while Naomi at times admitted her confidence was an issue, she didn't 
recognise the centrality of her confidence issues in the story of Blitz's problematic 
behaviour, instead, believing there to be physical problems causing his escapades. She 
didn't recognise what others saw as self-evident; that her fear was causing the issues, 
rather than only caused by them. Every time I met with Naomi, she offered a story which 
followed a similar form. Typically, it would emphasise progress, speaking from a position 
of hindsight, Nicola would string events together to show that finally, they had been able 
to identify the root (medical) cause, and now treatment had begun and things were 
looking better; he had improved. However, other participants didn't buy it. They noted 
that she left out key events, when his behaviour was not good despite the malady 
apparently receiving treatment. When the treatment du jour eventually was acknowledged 
as failing, Naomi would move on to another possible root cause; a new back specialist, 
tack changes, feeding issues, a need for calming herbs. She would be able to synthesise a 
sensible narrative around this new explanation, as well as see an 'improvement' upon 
treatment, that others didn't recognise. This constant search for the 'real reason' for his bad 
behaviour was seen by others as her inability to accept the truth of the story between them 
and the truth about her own role in their relationship: She was afraid of him and unable to 
handle him, he would be better off with a more competent, braver rider, and she would be 
better off with a more steady, predictable, horse. 
 
When Naomi received a veterinary diagnosis of stomach ulcers for Blitz, I wondered 
whether the nay-sayers would accept that there really had been a problem and that Naomi 
had been correct to continue trying to tell the story in terms of Blitz's physiological needs, 
'plumping for' his need for care, rather than her need for bravery. However, no such 
change in attitude occurred. “You can't really tell whether or not stomach ulcers are 
actually painful, anyway,” participants told me, “So a gastroscopy proves nothing.” 
Besides, they argued, it doesn't explain why he has sometimes behaved fine. Furthermore, 
he didn't really seem to improve substantively once he received treatment, which proved 
the ulcers never really were to cause of his behaviour (a point that Naomi explained in a 
different way, sometimes as 'learned patterns of pain behaviour', and sometimes as 
evidence that his stomach was still hurting him and required further treatments and 
investigations). Therefore, Naomi and Blitz's case shows the possible space for creativity 
in narrating horses' physiological conditions. One doesn't have to 'side' with either Naomi 
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or her commentators to see that Blitz's story could be told in ways which afford totally 
different evaluations of the rider. 
 
During one lengthy discussion with Bertie (riding instructor) while out riding, we 
considered the way riders interpret their horses and recognise pain. “People who want to 
find a problem, will always be able to find it eventually.” He told me, “If you ex-ray the 
whole body of any horse you will find something to pin it all on. Otherwise then you find 
it with a psychic, or a chiropractor. There is always something there if you want to find it. 
And those who can’t be bothered to get into dealing with veterinary stuff can always 
explain pain responses away as just behavioural.” 
 
Dysnarrativia – inability to narrate 
It isn't acceptable for riders to simply invent the horse as you would have the horse be, 
but it isn't always easy for participants to know, authentically, which story they are living 
in. One's intuition, or 'gut instinct,' for reading one’s horse and knowing his/her needs, is 
often celebrated once proved right in hindsight. However, many participants clearly 
experienced difficulty in evaluating and responding to 'pangs' of gut instinct that 
'something is wrong'. The problem was that riders couldn't be sure whether their 'gut 
feeling' was coming from a genuine connection with the horse, or whether it was coming 
from their own fearfulness. This 'blurring' of felt boundaries caused problems. They didn't 
know whether to work on the 'alarm bells' that were ringing by developing their own 
bravery and grit, pushing through with stoicism and resilience, or whether they ought to 
be listening carefully and thoroughly to the possibility that something might be 
legitimately wrong. Because they couldn't tell self from other in their feeling of unease 
('is it coming from me or him?'), they couldn't tell what sort of self was valuable, they 
couldn't work out the plot. 
  
Here is Lesley talking about Tots again, in more of an unsure moment: 
Sometimes I think he is better on the [herbal] calmer. I think, that it's the changes 
in the grass that make the calmer work or not work. And I think the weather, he 
hates the wind. But then sometimes I think it is all in my head. It’s the psychology 
of it. I am just worrying, because I am worrying. Maybe I am just avoiding riding 
in the wind because then I am scared. So then I'm gonna do it because I'm not one 
to be beaten. But maybe I am scared because I know, deep down, that he isn't 
right, that something isn't right. Maybe the calmer is what he needs or maybe it’s 
masking something more important. Or maybe it is doing nothing at all and I am 
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seeing it how I want to see it. 
Dictaphone recording, October 2015 
 
This can present something like a crisis in terms of rider’s ability to know how to evaluate 
themselves in correspondence with their enigmatic horses, which was seen in participants’ 
almost desperate attempts to narrate events that seemed to refuse to string together in a 
meaningful way. This is evident in the account given by Jane, below, shortly after being 
bucked off her recently backed30 youngster, Rose. She had remounted and finished the 
lesson, visibly shaken up, and then I had asked her what she thought had happened. We 
were accompanied by Jane’s instructor, Anne, whom I had been shadowing. 
 
I don't know. Well, it wasn't like last time. Up 'til that night she hadn't really, she 
hadn't put a foot wrong at all, she was quite dozy wasn't she? well not dozy but 
she was kind of like, “Yeah yeah I'll do this and I'll do it and we do it and then it’s 
all rosy in the garden and then I go out.” I knew I'd had a problem with her that 
first night because she'd gone over there, the grass was this high [gesturing to 
waist height]and I knew she wouldn't want to come in and she literally, she didn't 
even wanna come in and then she kicked shit out the stable, which is so unlike her 
isn't it? I mean this is Rose 99% of the time you can leave her there while you ran 
to the toilet and when you came back she would still be there because she doesn't 
see the point in moving normally if there is hay it’s just, “Oh I'll just eat hay,” but 
literally, I just brought her in – and she was, she was trying to kick me, she was 
out for [pause]revenge almost, not really but - and I had her out there circling and 
in the end I got a hard hat, and I've never use a hart hat, not to handle 'em, I'm not 
generally worried, but -and in the end I put a hard hat on I thought I'm just never 
gonna get the bridle on when I'm, you know, it’s gonna take two of us to do it, and 
she wasn't that horrendous actually she bronced once, didn't she but she didn't 
dump me but a lot of time it was like “ooh what's going on? I know I'm good 
mannered so I'm trying to listen but I'm just a little bit” – you know - “but yes I'm 
listening.” Like I say I did it twice after that and the other day, that other day, she 
was just superb and I jumped on an – but then that other day we couldn't even 
mount properly without turning her that way now, and nothing was different, we 
just, well you just get on, but she's still trying, but it’s just this... I don't know 
where it comes from either it’s almost, I don't know whether it’s – “piss off I don't 
want to do it”, or what, because it’s not regular, like he [gesturing to her other 
horse] was doing it regularly and then he's got a bad back and I didn't know it at 
the time, so he was doing it out of that but he didn't bronc31, he just bucked I think 
because it’s painful for him. She just has this thing of – not always – but she can – 
but she isn't ----- ” [Jane stops speaking at this point for several seconds and then 
Anne interjects] 
                                                 
30Started ridden training 
31
Bronced – a movement where the horse lifts all four feel off the floor, the front legs raised higher, and the 
head down low between the knees- characteristic of rodeo. A buck, in comparison, is where the hind legs 
are thrown up so that the horses tail is it's highest point. Both can unseat the rider, depending on their 
severity. 
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Dictaphone recording, July 2016. 
 
It seems as though Jane is struggling to know how to describe the day’s events in terms of 
a narrative that includes meaningful links to other events in the past and plans for 
progress for the future. Particularly striking, in comparison with Lesley's bravery 
narrative at the beginning of the text, is the lack of temporal structure – there is a 
beginning, but no clear middle and end, it is hard to know what this story is even about, 
and the characters of both Rose and Jane, don't make much coherent sense. This is a 
fundamentally different sort of moral dilemma than the problem of navigating value 
pluralism (Robbins 2013), or clashing projects of self-cultivation (Laidlaw 2013:165) or 
knowing how to achieve 'best good’ within a complex 'primal scene' of messy, moral 
encounters (e.g. Mattingly 2014). This is not about the problem, “What should I do?” 
when faced with a confusing and tragic predicament; this is the problem, “What 
predicament am I in?” Jane works to establish: Who is Rose?  What did we do to one 
another? What were, and are, her intentions? With this knowledge, the dilemma would be 
made ethically manageable, in one way or another. Bravery follows on as though natural 
from discoveries of equine defiance, care corresponds effortlessly to recognitions of 
equine pain. Establishing the reality is the primal problem. Jane’s predicament may 
constitute a state Bruner calls “dysnarrativia”: “a severe impairment in the ability to tell 
or understand stories,” which correlates with, “an almost complete loss of the ability to 
read others’ minds” (2003:86). 
 
Keane overviews research amongst cognitive development scientists that demonstrates 
not only the importance of knowing the other in order to know the self, but also, the 
importance of being able to separate other from self in order to operate well in social 
dynamics (Keane 2015:80-81. However, this skill has been documented as a 
developmental stage in children, rather than ethnographically as a problem to be grappled 
with within the ethical lives of adults. Within the multispecies literature, a recognition of 
the blurring of self/other boundaries is generally portrayed in ethically positive terms, as 
though acknowledging intra-activity will likely naturally lead to better attunement (note, 
the same link between establishing the truth of the relationship and then the apparently 
naturally co-occurring virtue). 
 
 Jane didn't actually manage to describe what had happened on the day I was watching, 
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and in the session I had asked about, at all. She tries to give some history but it won’t link 
up meaningfully to the present. There is no real 'moral' to the confused ramblings she 
offers, Rose doesn't really make sense as a character in the plot, and Rose's relation to 
Jane is unclear. Particularly because narratives about horses' minds are so ethically 
important in this setting, the state of dysnarrativia that Jane exemplifies is also an 
embodied state, accompanied by guilt, anxiety, confusion and unease. Somebody trying to 
work out the plot they are in, is likely to be preoccupied with internal dialogue, holding a 
weak, small, slumped and defeated posture. As we will see in Chapter Five (and Jones 
McVey 2017) horses do not tend to respond well to this sort of 'overthinking' (as it is 
known), which is why, as in Jane’s case, such speculation often takes place away from the 
horse, once dismounted. In this case, Anne, the instructor, stepped in and offered a clearer 
story, one in which Rose is actually quite stubborn and defiant as a natural temperament, 
evidenced by her responses to particular parts of the training that day. This was a story in 
which Jane and Anne together would be capable of dealing with her wilfulness. Jane 
seemed relieved, and retold the series of events as per Anne's story several times before I 
left, though she told the story again quite differently the next time we met, several months 
down the line, when she had identified regularity of riding as the (currently) real problem, 
any hint of Rose's stubborn temperament had been forgotten. 
 
Narrative as a way of living together 
This leads me to comment on the different roles that listeners can play in story-telling 
accounts.  There seemed to be a scale of involvement: at one end, as in Maggie and 
Trevor's case, stories seem told to proclaim an already settled account, the listener is 
required only to hear it, and perhaps to sympathise with it. Some accounts, like that of 
Lesley and Tots' bravery/defiance, the speaker seems to be seeking affirmation or 
confirmation from the listener, they seem to want the listener to actively confirm that the 
story and its moral are good and true. When this doesn't happen, these speakers can show 
remarkable flexibility in 'going with' an alternate telling. Sometimes, the speaker needs 
more help from listeners, and might invite them to take a part in the story telling process, 
as with Jane and Rose, here. These accounts can seem to sweep widely and can be 
disorientating to listen to, as the speaker can move from snippets in which the horse 
would never hurt them, to moments where the horse is fundamentally dangerous, from 
moments when they are co-operative allies who had a misunderstanding, to moments 
where they are automatically and always at odds. In these sweeping, searching accounts, 
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listeners (myself included) seem drawn to help the speaker to form a more coherent 
narrative, to string events together around a meaningful moral, with characters who relate 
to one another in understandable ways, and who have particular roles to fill in the 
narrative plot. Jarret Zigon describes these co-authored narratives as, 'the intersubjective 
struggle to live through a moral breakdown together' (2012:205). This is not to suggest 
the flexibility is unbounded, riders have some enduring beliefs about their horses' 
temperaments, the nature of horse instinct, character, and cognitive abilities, and the 
proper virtues that should be shown by owners; and some of these beliefs are less flexible 
than others. 
 
It is worth re-asserting that the stakes are high, and that these narratives are ways of living 
together rather than mere abstract representations. Had Jane continued to be unable to 
narrate Rose's behaviours, unable to find a recognisable plot which linked horse to human 
in a meaningful way, Rose’s future as relatable creature would be precarious. Such horses 
were considered dangerously 'unhinged' and mad, or they may be regarded as an unsolved 
mystery. Either way, they were likely to find themselves either becoming 'field ornaments' 
(living out at grass with little or no human interaction), sold (considered the least 
responsible option) or 'put to sleep' (euthanised). I would suggest on this evidence that un-
narratable relations are not feasible relations at all. 
 
Conclusions: Co-construction or autopoiesis? 
In some ways, this chapter confirms Haraway's assertion of a dynamic of co-construction 
that is beyond the capacity of the individual human to know or construct themselves. 
After all, I have shown that horse riders struggle to know the impacts of their own 
creativity, and the sources of their own intuitions (‘Is it all in my head?’) I have also 
shown that riders are dependent – in terms of who they can be, and how they can self-
evaluate - upon the affordances of their non-human companions, as well as the 
affordances of the genres of knowledge available to them, and the audiences they co-
narrate with. However, the figure of the individual is critical here twofold: On the first 
level, the 'meshwork' of multispecies co-becomings is constantly sorted and organised, 
when narrators 'plump for' particular bounded characters, with personal intentions, 
responsibilities, and moral meanings manifested within ethically informative plots. 
Distinction and differentiation between individuals (and species), is the very stuff of these 
ethical narratives. On the second level, the horse owner-cum-narrator holds personal 
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responsibility to know others (and so, self) properly. They are responsible not just based 
upon what they know, and on what their good intentions are, but also for what they should 
have known. The sort of moral 'jeopardy' and 'trouble' (Kenneth Burke 1945, see Bruner 
1990:152) that occurs in what one could have known about others is a factor of the 
relationship between the individual and the other characters, within a plot. This is the 
genre of plot which describes the tragedy of Oedipus' relations with Jocasta, whom he 
could have known was his mother, but didn't. This sort of morality is intrinsically 
relational, it takes place between characters, and it encourages individuals to relate better, 
to look out, rather than in, to know others, in order to know the self. Nonetheless, it 
requires the figure of the bounded individual, the subject who needs to be known, and the 
subject with whom this epistemological responsibility rests. These figures of the 
somewhat-bounded individual -within plots, and narrating plots -are part of the 
mechanics through which ethical interspecies co-construction occurs in British 
equestrianism. 
 
It might be noted that when boundaries between selves and others seem most 'blurred' and 
muddled, for example, in Lesley's questioning of her own gut feeling (“maybe I am just 
avoiding the wind because I am scared?”) and in Jane's messy and fragmented narrative, 
these are also the times when Foucauldian 'problematisation' occurs most clearly. Jane 
and Lesley attempt to analyse and make sense of their self in relation to their environment 
deliberatively, they try to sort out the feeling of blurring and work out how distinct 
individuals might relate to one another in a meaningful plot of corresponding motives. I 
mention this to show that definitive instances of abstract self-consideration, and 
experiences congruent with Haraway's blurred becoming-with, need not be mutually 
exclusive, in fact, they are sometimes concurrent phenomena. While Foucault emphasises 
self-construction and Haraway co-construction and intra-action, their arguments do not 
necessarily conflict. They are engaging in 'cross talk,' Haraway is invested in the 
entangled meshworks critters live within, Foucault (and following him, Laidlaw, and 
Faubion) are interested in the way humans are free-enough to reflect on the contexts they 
exist within and evaluate how they want to live. 
  
To some extent it stretches Foucault's description of care of the self to so centralise 
narratives about others. Where Foucault refers repeatedly to self-evaluation, and self-
cultivation, the accounts I have featured which seem to operate more easily in narrative 
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form, such as Lesley's earlier story of overcoming Tots' bunny hoping escapades, do not 
explicitly feature the self – are not ostensibly about the self at all. In fact, according to 
riders, these narratives should not be self-forming events in their first instance, they 
should be constructed about the horse in isolation, and then provide information on which 
ethical responses can be based. Yet the creative freedom involved in setting the terms by 
which the self will be evaluated seems exactly the sort of freedom within discursive 
contexts that Foucault refers to.  It is unclear, then, whether, or to what extent narratives 
about others might be considered examples of Foucauldian reflexive thought. One 
resolution is to refer to Laidlaw's explication of problematisation. 'Problematisation is not 
the name of distinct episodes of events...For any period or milieu, in any text or discourse, 
one should look for what it is that is problematised, for what is the subject of concern, 
reflection, and uncertainty, and for the forms which that concern and reflection take. 
Something always will be problematised in that sense, and the key to understanding a 
form of life lies in its precise delineation' (2013:118). This is helpful because it takes us 
away from looking for problematisation in particular moments of considered self-
reflection as a special type of mental action, and locates it, rather, as the evaluative 
problem which concerns individuals within historical contexts, whatever form that 
concern takes. We can certainly see narratives problematised; we can see that a key 
concern among British horse riders, is how to narrate their horse well. This is the problem 
at the heart of dilemmas like Jane’s as she scrabbles to make her encounter with Rose 
sensible, reasonable, ethically relatable. However, the contingency to evaluations of 
selves and others is also visible in that human bravery is problematised, and human care-
giving is problematised – raised as a matter of ethical concern - through the narratives I 
have demonstrated that are ostensibly about horses. This suggests narratives about others 
can function as a means of reflexively, creatively, considering and constructing the self, 
such that knowing others might be considered a form of care of the self. 
 
The particular aspect of epistemological responsibility that this chapter has developed in 
contribution to the wider thesis is the importance of knowing self from other in order to 
create ethically informative narrative plots. Riders work to know who their horse is, as 
though he was a separate and integral entity, in order to know how they ethically relate to 
him, precisely because human and equine are so tightly co-constructed. The figure of the 
intentional individual holds particular sway within these co-constructive dynamics, both 
in the construction of characters with moral meaning within stories that are told, and in 
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the ethical responsibility held by individuals to tell those stories well. 
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Chapter Four: Infantilization, reflexivity and language ideology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates infantilization; instances where horses are described like human 
children. While the previous chapters demonstrated an environment of critique and the 
search for true knowledge about the horse, this chapter deals with the puzzling issue of 
how, why, and when, people might choose to describe the horse in non-real terms, that is, 
terms which deal in some sort of fiction.  I will investigate three different forms of 
infantilization which employ non-real registers of knowledge in different ways.  I will 
show a trend towards meta-linguistic reflexivity, and the conflict between this and other 
ways of speaking not-real. First, I shall introduce anthropomorphism, and infantilization 
as ethnographic objects within my field site, and situate my approach in line with others 
who have used language ideology as a means to investigate metacognition (thinking about 
thinking) and ethics. 
 
Anthropomorphism 
The term anthropomorphism refers to instances where non-human entities (gods, animals, 
objects) are described in human-like terms or related to in human-like ways. However, the 
definition of what counts as 'anthropomorphic' in different times and places is a 
contingent phenomenon (Knoll 2011). 'Anthropomorphism' becomes employed in 
different ways as the distinction between human and animal is performed and produced 
for various means and under various logics and values. This is evidenced, for example, in 
Lorraine Daston's examination of the different sorts of 'anthropomorphic' risks that were 
managed by medieval angelologists, compared to those that faced eighteenth and 
nineteenth century comparative psychologists (2005). We can see the term 
'anthropomorphism' as policing two sorts of boundary, on the one hand, that between 
human and non-human, and on the other, that between symbol and reality. The work done 
by the concept of 'anthropomorphism' is an ideal example of what Latour calls the 
modern work of 'purification' (1991).  Any identification of anthropomorphism usually 
also devalues such a knowledge item as inferior to literal, accurate forms of knowledge. 
Since anthropomorphism describes knowledge about the non-human as parasitic upon 
understandings of human attributes, the concept holds traction through revealing 
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descriptions which are, after all, 'only metaphor'. 
 
Most of my participants were familiar with the term 'anthropomorphism,' and all of them 
regularly employed the concept (if not the term) when policing other’s treatment of 
horses considered too human-like. There was absolutely no internal contestation to the 
idea that horses were persons in as much as they had individual characters, impressive 
intraspecies and interspecies communicative capacities, complicated social lives and 
social motivations for their behaviours, deep and complex emotional experiences, and the 
ability to learn, remember, improvise and estimate. However, there were disagreements 
over precisely where the difference between human personhood and equine personhood 
lay, for example, were horses capable of jealousy? Did they really enjoy being clothed in 
warm blankets, or would they prefer to be in touch with the elements (Hurn 2011)?  
Infantilization was one of the most prolific forms of anthropomorphism I witnessed, and 
the most internally critiqued. Almost all of my participants referred to themselves as their 
horse’s 'mum' or 'dad' at some point, gave them child-like voices when speaking on their 
behalf at times, and seemed to actively 'baby' them in the way they offered care. 
However, they also censored these activities carefully, carried them out with a degree of 
irony, with caveats, or with defensiveness, and were critical of those they considered to be 
treating their horses too much as children when they ought to be treated as horses. The 
particular concerns surrounding infantilization in my field site were related either to 
animal welfare (that horses would not be properly looked after if they were treated like 
children), or to proper control (that animals would become spoiled and unruly if treated 
like children), and always also emphasised the risk to personal virtue, that one might be 
foolish, disconnected from the 'real' horse, ignorant, over-emotional, and/or self-serving. 
 
The demotion of metaphor 
The boundaries of human/non-human and thought/reality, on which the concept of 
anthropomorphism rests, have been destabilised in recent moves within anthropology to 
'bring the animal in' and to acknowledge radically different ways of relating to the world. 
For example, Eduardo Vivieros de Castro (1998) argues that we should not presume 
claims of non-human personhood are necessarily metaphorical (see also Nadasdy 2007). 
Such a presumption of metaphor, he argues, rests on an anthropocentrism that holds 
personhood as a human-only quality, and furthermore, it relies upon a multicultural, 
uninatural model in which thought is considered ontologically distinct (and varied) from 
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world (which is singular). Different approaches to overcoming the anthropocentrism, 
eurocentrism and modernism associated with concerns about anthropomorphism include 
Tim Ingold's argument that 'lively' agency can be perceived in the environment, rather 
than applied to it from a symbolic realm (2000, 2006, 2008), and Kay Milton’s argument 
that observations of person-like qualities in animals are 'egomorphic' – that is, 
demonstrate a recognition of something like the self in the other, rather than 
'anthropomorphic' – centred around the speciesist concern of attributing human likeness 
(2005). A consensus among these authors, and more, seems to suggest that too much has 
been made of the way humans construct non-humans symbolically, rather than the 
manner in which they live with them. Hence, Karen Barad argues against the way that, 
'everything – even “materiality” -  is turned into a matter of language or some other form 
of cultural representation' (2003:801), and Eduardo Kohn sets out to investigate the other-
than-symbolic forms of communication and relatedness that humans are situated within 
(2013). I describe this literature, not to follow its lead exactly, but to demonstrate that 
these authors are recognising, responding to, but also recreating, a demotion of 'metaphor' 
itself as a less-real, less-valid form of knowledge. This evaluation of metaphor as 
problematic, is important. To illustrate, Vivieros de Castro campaigns against the, 
'Metaphysical demotion of the indigenous distribution of the world to the condition of 
metaphor” (1998:14 my italics). In striking similarity, attempts to bolster the legitimacy 
of human-like observations in the natural sciences take the form of insisting, 
'Anthropomorphism is not metaphor' (i.e., it is sometimes real) (Asquith 1997). 
 
This evidences a Euro-American context in which metaphor is persistently (but not 
consistently) devalued (even where non-human personhood is declared real, metaphor is 
still found wanting), and my participants somewhat share the epistemological space in 
which both natural and social scientists try to move away from metaphor and toward 
(various sorts of) better – more real- knowing. In the British equestrian environment, 
horses are recognised as really-real persons in ways that might appear anthropomorphic to 
scientifically minded non-horsey observers, but my participants were also on the watch 
for what they consider to be anthropomorphic mistakes among their peers. Therefore, 
they maintain something of a commitment to policing the distinction between 
real/metaphorical and human/horse (though, for horse people, the latter boundary doesn't 
rest on the possession of personhood). However, they also describe horses in human-like 
terms that were deployed as non-real descriptions akin to metaphors. Given the 
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epistemological responsibility to know the horse well introduced in the thesis thus far, 
why would horse people use non-real registers of knowledge to describe their horses, and 
how would they manage the ethical implications of that non-real knowledge state? A 
multitude of theories have been suggested by multidisciplinary authors in terms of the 
motives and causes of anthropomorphism. For example, Guthrie’s (1997) game theory 
that suggests anthropomorphism is a good evolutionary 'bet', Epley et al (2007) consider 
the drive for social comfort, and also the application of human-centred knowledge where 
species specific knowledge is lacking. Yet none of these theories, nor the contemporary 
anthropological attempts to acknowledge the reality of non-human personhood, engage 
with the practices of employing and managing such explicitly non-real registers of 
knowledge in an environment that values accurate knowledge and maintains a 
commitment to policing 'anthropomorphism'. 
 
Anthropomorphism provides fertile ground for investigations of the deployment of the 
not-real, and yet this aspect has been overlooked. For example, Jessica Greenebaum 
investigates the infantilization of dogs at a Connecticut dog bakery (2004). Her 
ethnography communicates the lives of dog bakery users with warmth and fondness, yet 
we learn little about the epistemological frictions that might be underway. For example, 
she describes pet owners as 'similar to the image of soccer moms who drive their kids to 
games and social events' (2004:119 my italics). This language keeps the parent-like 
relationship that owners have described in a state of make-believe or unreal, despite the 
fact Greenebaum's interlocutors are telling her directly they are their dogs' parents. They 
really do drive their dogs to social events, yet this activity, and others, are described as 
merely in the image of another, and it isn't quite clear whether this imaginary component 
is Greenebaum's assessment of reality, or her informants' own evaluations of the mitigated 
veracity of their propositional statements.  The question remains open, as to the sense in 
which dog owners consider and mark their own descriptions some sort of real. Similarly, 
Adrian Peace investigates anthropomorphism as a rhetorical device in whale-watching 
trips, yet it is his definition of anthropomorphism, rather than his interlocutors, that 
structures that account (2005). 
 
The structure and argument of the chapter 
In this chapter I investigate these knowing practices through asking about the language 
ideologies in play. I use this term to refer to my participants expectations of language, in 
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terms of what can be said, what language is for, and what language does (Silverstein 
1979, Woolard and Shieffelin 1994). Such an interest in language ideology has been 
useful for other anthropologists investigating a variety in concepts of personhood. Joel 
Robbins and Webb Keane have explored links between their participants' theories of 
language – who can speak, what speech is – and theories of personhood - what thought is, 
who or what can have which sorts of intention. Both have demonstrated that modern 
language ideology has proved challenging for Christian converts and linked this to 
alternate beliefs about personhood and mind (among the Urapmin, Robbins, 2001 and the 
Sumbanese, Keane 1997). I follow this example, in investigating riders’ changing beliefs 
about what can or should be said (to, or about the horse) as a means to better understand 
how the difference between horse and human, thought and world, is conceptualised and 
managed. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is taken up with describing and analysing three ways in 
which infantilization is treated by horse riders. These each demonstrate a different 
language ideology – in terms of expectations for and about speech – and different tones or 
'registers' of speaking. I use the term 'registers of speech', which are different (though 
linked to) the genres of narratives I described in the previous chapter. While genre refers 
to a type of plot line, a romance, horror and so on, a register of speech refers to the 
manner with which the speaker means what she says; how real this account is, what she 
thinks of this story as she tells it, and how she expects others to analyse and evaluate the 
words. Thus, a romantic plot could feature within a comedy pastiche, a school English 
oral exam, or a fireside story – all might be considered registers of speech.  In the first of 
my examples, I aim to describe a meta-linguistic reflexivity that is emerging as the 
'cutting edge' of horsemanship. I call this register of speech 'care with words', and hope to 
capture something of the tone and taste of consideration, responsibility, enlightenment, 
and elegance that accompanies a drive toward regulating, reforming, and reframing horse-
talk, where riders consciously opt for 'helpful' descriptions that enable positive 
relatedness to flourish. In the second section, I consider a register of speaking through 
'tough love,' where there is an explicit value to 'saying it like it is.' Strangely, this often 
involves crass humour, metaphor, irony and tropes, and also often the exaggeration and 
'owning' of potential welfare issues (“yes, I'm a horse beater and my horse hates me but 
there you go!”). Tough-love horse-talk, in these instances, garners audience approval and 
obliquely resources opinions from others, while maintaining an embodied confidence and 
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pragmatism. In the third section, I describe a register of speaking with, 'words from the 
heart', in which riders attempt to express the deep affection they feel towards their horses, 
but censor that speaking carefully. This includes the whispering of sweet nothings and use 
of 'motherese' in private spaces when addressing the horse, and the posting of anonymous 
love-type poetry in online spaces. Each of these sections describes a way of working with 
words that is not unique and internal to a particular group of people, but that can be 
thought of as different moments in the equestrian milieu, that individual owners will 
move between in different environments (to different degrees). Furthermore, each section 
describes contestations and friction in the way in which people talk, such that I do not 
present any of these language ideologies as complete or consistent ways of speaking, 
rather, as different problems of regulating speech.   
 
My argument is that the child-like metaphor is useful because the concept of 'child' in the 
British imaginary enables an emphatic interest in the choices and opinions of the horse-
child, but an ambiguity over the sort of active role they are able or expected to play in 
maintaining their relationships. The metaphorical state of non-real is useful in 
establishing (varied) tones of relatedness, while also enabling space for play for the 
existence of the real horse (and the real human) beyond what is communicable. The 
capacity to reflexively and responsibly manage the distinction between the real and the 
not-real emerges as an important ethical technique, and as central to the distinction 
between adult and child, humans and non-humans. This distinction is being re-energised 
anew as conventional equestrian ways of managing the not-real are being challenged 
(and, to some extent, infantilised themselves) by the new demand for meta-reflexivity. 
 
Care with words 
 
Teaching reflexive speech 
In the Cotswolds, attached to a beautiful stone farmhouse, is a purpose-built classroom 
that can easily accommodate forty students. There is a large television and flip chart at the 
front, and tea making facilities at the back, and paddocks full of horses and ponies visible 
through the many windows and the French patio doors. This is the site of some of the 
alternative training courses introduced in Chapter Two, and on the bright March morning 
in question, it housed a group of fourteen students who had arrived to take the two-day 
'Perfect Manners' course. The course title evokes an elocution and etiquette guide, rather 
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than a horse training system. This was exactly the comparison course director Kelly 
wished to make when she authored the book of the same name, subtitled, “How to behave 
so your horse does too.” Horses are often described as 'well mannered' or 'bad mannered' 
across the breadth of the equestrian scene (generally related to the management of 
personal space, not crowding the human, not making too much noise). Kelly's move, 
however, was to suggest that the human's manners might also need adjusting in order to 
reach a companionable relationship. Kelly holds a deep interest in human behaviour and 
is eager for me to share my anthropological research with both her, and her students, as 
often as possible. 
 
At the beginning of the course, students introduce themselves to the group (sitting at 
desks), and explain why they have come, and what they would like to achieve. Some are 
shy and reserved and speak little, but more often, their narratives are colourful renditions 
of their equestrian lives, testaments to their ethical commitment to achieve good equine 
connection, and detailed, heartfelt descriptions of particular horses that matter. Debbie's 
story followed that pattern. Dressed in baggy jeans, a fleece top, and rubber wellies (no 
particular equestrian apparel), with brown-greying hair pulled back in a low pony tail, 
Debbie chain smoked at every chance she got. “Partly that’s to avoid having to talk to 
anyone,” she told me, with a wink. Debbie wasn't shy, so much as awkward – her voice 
was loud and gruff, she often spoke over others and then recognised her mistake and over 
apologised, once she stood too close and then asked whether I felt crowded, and she 
swore coarsely enough to make other students wince. Kelly corrected her on this point 
two or three times on the first day (“Debbie! You're not the swearing type, are you?”) 
until on the second day, she caught herself mid-swear by smacking a hand to her mouth 
and looking sheepish. Debbie's life had been tough – a car accident followed by mental 
health issues had left her out of work and, in her own words, suffering from low self-
esteem. She'd ridden all her life, because her father had kept a couple of ponies on a scrap 
of land, but never achieved anything much in terms of competitions, they hadn't had any 
way to transport the horses. “Hell, at one point, we didn't even have a saddle!” She 
guffawed. Debbie wasn't entirely unusual as a participant on these courses, though in 
comparison to the middle-class, more monied alternative horsemanship consumer 
suggested in Chapter Two, she provides an example of the breadth of variety of 
equestrians who might find themselves on the margins of the competent, classy, horsey 
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set and inspired to find 'another way'32. One tutor told me, “We get all the broken people. 
Broken for different reasons, but all misfiring somehow. They are drawn to us.” 
 
Debbie introduced herself by overviewing her life history, and then talking about a horse 
she had brought on the course with her. I jotted down some fragments of her rushed 
narrative as she spoke. 
 
 A little gypsy cob, who looks like butter wouldn't melt [in his mouth]. She loved 
him, but he was a stubborn bugger and a fucking nightmare sometimes. He threw 
his toys out the pram, spat his dummy out, and had his little tants [tantrums]. This 
had resulted in a broken finger, some rope burns, and a smashed-up horse trailer 
so far. These 'tants' came about because he knew he had her 'wrapped around his 
little finger' she explained, but also because he trusted her enough to test her out 
(thus explaining better behaviour with people he trusted less). You'll love him, she 
said. He's a cracker, but he's a cheeky little sod and too bright for his own good. 
Either that or he's too stupid! He'll probably prove me wrong and be a little angel 
just to make mummy look a prat! 
Field notes, June 2015. 
Kelly took a thoughtful breath, smiled at Debbie, and thanked her, and then turned to me. 
Despite myself, we exchanged the briefest of looks that said, 'Aren't Debbie’s' narratives 
interesting?!’ and then Kelly addressed the group, explaining that I was studying 
narratives just like these, at Cambridge University. “Does everybody know the word 
'anthropomorphism'?” She asked, (three quarters of the room nodded). “Rosie can tell you 
more about how to be aware of the sorts of narratives you are using,” she asserted, “And 
don't be embarrassed about it, Debbie, I think you will find it actually really empowering 
to look at your horse in a different way.” 
 
The last intention of an anthropologist is to be teaching participants how to speak (and 
know) better. I found myself wearing too many hats at once, ‘expert horse trainer' and 
'Cambridge academic' on the one hand, being asked to teach, and reflexive ethnographer 
on the other, who wanted to respect and legitimise alternate ways of sense-making, 
seeking to learn. I defined the term anthropomorphism simply – as using 'human-like 
descriptions,' but I also explained a counter-term, 'mechanomorphism' – as using 
apparently 'neutral' phraseology that was in fact, machine-like (Spada 1997, DeWaal 
1999). My aim was to suggest that whatever terms we use have interesting associations 
                                                 
32This weekend course costs £325 
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and histories. I hoped to move away from any potential for my comments to be felt as an 
assault on Debbie's self-introduction as invalid, toward a broader interest point that 
emphasises language as a 'non-neutral medium' (In Duranti's terms, 2011:28), which 
simply means, I explained, that language does things. The students looked engaged and 
positively interested, to my relief, including Debbie. Kelly thanked me for my input, 
writing down the word 'mechanomorphism', which she hadn't heard before, and added 
that the important point was to look at the impact of the words we use. “Does it help, or 
not help, to see the horse as throwing his toys out the pram? She asked,” leaving the 
answer implicit (it probably does not help), and we moved on to other things. Throughout 
the rest of the course, while we were working with horses, people were liable to check 
their wording either by asking me directly, “Is it better to say the horse is 'stressed' rather 
than 'stubborn?'” Or glancing over in my direction, presumably hoping to read my 
expression in response to a potentially questionable word or phrase. At one point, when 
we came in for a tea break, Kelly asked me loudly – for the whole rooms benefit – 
whether the students had been using ‘clean language.’ Presuming she was referring to the 
swearing and flustered about my apparent role as language-monitor, I responded with 
attempted humour, that yes, of course, “They had been very civil!” “Oh no!” she 
responded, “Not the swearing. I mean, how are they doing with their narratives?!” The 
room full of students laughed at the miscommunication, but I found the analogy between 
two sorts of 'clean' language deeply informative. Both felt (to me) like potentially 
patronising adjustments, that had the aim of making students not only more enlightened, 
sophisticated, responsible and reflexive in the way they used language (suggesting they 
lacked, and needed those qualities), but also more delicate, tasteful and inoffensive. 
 
The scholastic point of view 
As awkward a field-encounter as this might have been, I was driven to ruminate on 
equestrians' willingness to accept and seek out opportunities for reflecting on their use of 
language. I recognised the interest in anthropological (ish) knowledge as one example 
among many that demonstrates an increasing interest in human society, psychology and 
semiotics as part of what is constructed as 'the cutting edge' of equestrian thinking. A 
rising star on the celebrity equestrian scene during my fieldwork year was sports 
psychologist, Charlie Unwin. One top selling book (and subsequent series of teacher 
training programs) was named, “Ride With Your Mind” (2008). The author, riding 
instructor Mary Wanless, set out to revolutionise the way riding was taught, by paying 
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close attention not only to the way bodies moved in relation to one another 
biomechanically, but also, to the way bodies moved in relations to words. Good riding, 
she insisted, can be achieved if we can learn how to harness language in order to teach the 
ineffable 'feel' of good connection. In the transcript below from one of her books, Wanless 
explains the work of educational psychologist Guy Claxton for her equestrian readers, 
and we can see both a high degree of reflexivity about the way language works, and a 
responsibilization for riders and instructors to get to grips with linguistic ideology: 
 
Alongside the practical development of our skills we are all the recipient of both 
the formal and the informal education that teaches us in language about a 
particular field of knowledge, this develops the wordscape [understanding of 
words] and at this level you can think of ideas being linked together by flags that 
form linguistic bunting. But many of these words do not have accompanying 
understanding in the brainscape [practical knowhow], just as many of the 
indentations in the brainscape are not flagged in the wordscape [i.e. knowing how 
to do something you can't describe]. While language can liberate us hugely, it 
brings with it a set of snares that may become apparent to you as you read the 
above. Claxton quotes writer Aldus Huxley who states that every individual is at 
once both the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he 
has been born. 
(1991:20) 
 
It is interesting how some equestrians have taken up what Bourdieu calls, 'The scholastic 
point of view' (1990) and initiated a philosophical discourse of metacognition (or thinking 
about thinking, Proust and Fortier 2018). While reflexivity has been identified as a central 
practice for those living in late modernity (e.g. Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), some have 
argued for the variety in forms and qualities of reflexivity among different parts of the 
population (e.g. Archer 2003). Will Atkinson argues that an enhanced state of explicit and 
abstract reflexivity is most visible among the 'dominant' classes, who, having been set up 
for success in school and subsequently university, have developed the skills and valuation 
of explicitly reflexive thought (2010). Paul Sweetman considers reflexivity itself as an 
increasingly populous form of Bourdieusian habitus (rather than the counterpoint to 
habitus), however, he also suggests it carries particular tasteful appeal within middle class 
circles (2003). A link between class and this new meta-linguistic (speaking about 
speaking) reflexive trend is not straightforward in the equestrian example. On the one 
hand, it is notable that such reflexivity is accompanied by a context of increasing 'middle-
classification' (Edwards, Evans and Smith 2012) of the equestrian sphere, as described in 
Chapter One. But on the other, there did not appear to be any correlation between those 
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particular individuals engaged in such 'Enlightened Equitation' (another book and brand 
name, Moffett 1999) and class, described as income, family background, or university 
attendance. Still, the 'care with words' approach did feel like a 'classy' and 'classist' 
endeavour, a distinction between the considered and elegant and the brash and rough. I 
will revisit this point at the end of this section. 
 
In considering Wanless as exemplar, we also complicate the distinction between 
traditional and alternative training made in the previous chapter. Wanless is much like a 
traditional instructor, she does not focus centrally on the horse’s herd behaviours, or on 
the relationship between horse and rider on the ground, nor does she present herself as 
starkly at odds with traditional ethics. With a bossy voice, shrill with received 
pronunciation, dressed in shirt and gilet, and invested in the traditional sport of dressage, 
her aim is to enhance and enlighten traditional teaching practices, rather than reject their 
principles completely. Furthermore, alternative trainers (such as Monty Roberts and Pat 
Parelli) show no such interest in developing an openly reflexive relationship with their 
own language use. They are invested in outing traditional narratives that they see as 
wrong, but not in considering the way language functions in others, or their own 
rhetorical tactics per se.  Such metadiscursive (Duranti 2015) reflexivity seems to be the 
newest wave of 'revolution', and those who are drawn towards it hold a variety of 
positions in relation to the 'first wave' revolutionaries. 
 
As an example of this range of relationships with alternative movement, an elderly 
equestrian, Ros, attended many Parelli demonstrations and told me she had struggled, at 
first, to get along with the language. It was too emotional and had all these special sayings 
and alliterations she wasn't sure if they were just clichés or marketing or what. But then 
she started to notice the effect of the words Parelli chose. They made people upbeat, 
relaxed, and confident, she said. “There is a real difference between telling someone to 
show the horse who’s boss [traditional language] and telling them to become the horse’s 
leader. If they show the horse who’s boss, they clench their fists. If they become the 
horse’s leader, they puff up their chests,” she explained. What is particularly interesting is 
the way Ros portrays herself as having 'risen above' the marketing spiel, neither being 
'duped' nor rejecting it whole heartedly, but observing the impact of language on minds, 
bodies and relationships. 
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Helpful words 
There were certain types of language most likely to be rejected by those who adopted an 
explicitly reflexive approach with words. These included statements where the horse’s 
behaviour was interpreted as deliberately negative toward the human. For example, at the 
start of a riding lesson, Sarah, a dapple-grey mare, shuffled repeatedly backwards away 
from the mounting block, preventing the lesson proper from getting underway. 
Embarrassed, her owner, Dawn, told the instructor, Linda, “She's just showing me up in 
front of you now, because she's mad at me after that bad session yesterday. She's got such 
a temper on her, this mare,. She's determined to test me.” “'That's an interesting way to 
think about it,” Linda responded, “But whose script are you running, yours or hers? 
[pause] Is there another way to tell it? [pause] Is there a less challenging story that could 
apply?” After the session, Linda spoke with me about her care with words. 'The best thing 
to say, if you're stuck for good words, is 'interesting,’'' she said, 'For people or horses. It 
gives you time to think about what is good to say, what is going to have the right effect, 
and it doesn't commit you to anything negative or positive while you consider how to do 
it. Sometimes, ‘that's interesting’ is all I can say, and I just leave it at that. 'Interesting' 
does no harm.” 
 
Even where the horse wasn't portrayed as calculating defiance, narratives likely to be 
actively re-framed were those considered too negative, portraying the horse, or the 
relationship, in a bad light and contributing to the problem. Hence, I saw 'angry' reworked 
into 'tense', 'rude' into 'struggling to listen' and 'stubborn' into 'stuck'. Each reconsideration 
of appropriate framing changed the emotional and ethical tone in the rider’s body, and, as 
Linda told me, 'made them more likely to see solutions rather than invest in their own 
problems.' In this way, some un-truths could be considered 'helpful beliefs.' For example, 
when Sandra explained to her student that horses simply cannot be naughty and 
encouraged her to seek another narrative for the problem (though later she admitted to 
me, that they were probably as capable of naughtiness as they were of being deliberately 
good). She explained that she simply never thought of horses as naughty, because it only 
got people 'braced up and into trouble' to do so. 
 
This way of working with words is at odds with the dominant language ideology reported 
within the modern West. Such an ideology has been described as presuming the primary 
use and quality of language is its referential capacity, utilised by an intentional speaker, in 
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order to relay information.  (Duranti 1993, 2015, Rosaldo 1982). In contrast, riders and 
instructors employing an ethic of 'care with words' recognise the performativity of 
language keenly, particularly in terms of the impact of words on the affective and 
embodied state of the speaker and listeners. They do not reject metaphors categorically, so 
in some senses seem to move away from the typical modern ethic of privileging true 
speech. However, they retain and reconfigure an investment in the intentionality of the 
speaker and their responsibility for producing speech. A 'care with words' approach makes 
the speaker reflexively responsible for the way in which they frame the horse, and it urges 
them to consider both the sources, and the impacts, of the words they choose. 
 
Infantilization appears within these dynamics as likely problematic, as it suggests the 
speaker is not in considered control of what they say and where it comes from, and not 
evaluating the impacts of their words. Furthermore, according to its critics, infantilization 
demonstrates – and instigates – the wrong sort of tone in the relationship, as it is often 
associated with tantruming, spoiltness, and naughtiness (more to come in section two). 
Within this way with words, the distinction between human and animal is reconfigured. 
On one level, this appears an equalising move. Animals are framed in dignified terms, as 
reasonable, positive, well intentioned, subjective beings. The emphasis on performativity 
of language highlights the accompanying non-verbal communication that constitutes the 
horse-human relatedness, situating the human within a shared world of embodied 
affectivity. In some ways, then, the ethic of care with words is in sympathy with the 
posthuman movement that unsettles the distinctions 'anthropomorphism' presumes, 
between thinking human and raw world. However, the 'care with words' approach also 
accentuates the reflexive responsibility of the human to frame the animal well. This 
responsibilization emphasises the distinction between human, who does the framing; and 
animal, who responds to the embodied impacts of those words. 
 
A similar distinction is maintained within some British parenting practices, where parents 
hold responsibility for care in describing their children in positive, solutions-based terms, 
relating to a growing awareness of the damaging effects of 'labelling' a child badly. 
Unsurprisingly, this parenting practice is situated particularly within the middle classes 
(Holloway 1998). Enhanced reflexivity provides a hierarchical means of distinction 
between human and animal, adult and child, and this helps to explain the classist feel of 
'care with words' adjustments of language. Those found in need of adjustment by this 
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approach appear lower on the hierarchy of reflexivity too, as is evident in the care taken, 
by the reflexively-minded instructors, to positively, tactfully frame the human 
misdemeanours (as interesting) and their corrections (as empowering). In moments of 
correction, those brashly speaking humans, like children and animals, appear somewhat 
passive and oblivious to the impact of words, rather than able to harness them through 
reflection towards gentle ends. Just as horses appear bad mannered when they don't 
manage the impact of their noisy, large, bodies; humans appear ungainly and potentially 
harmful where they don't manage the impact of their words. However, in the next section 
I would like to show the sophisticated nuances of ethical reflexivity that are at play during 
these apparently brash instances of infantilization. 
 
The language of tough love 
 
'Tough love' on the yard 
Walking into the livery yard, at the peak activity time of 6pm on a Sunday evening, the 
atmosphere of wordiness that one encounters is at stark odds with the considered 'care 
with words' register of speech. The yard is a lively, bustling, storied place – full of chatter 
about the day's competition results, declarations about the horse’s awful mood today, 
check-ins with an owner whose horse needed the vet last week, critical evaluations of the 
bad judging, riding, or conduct of some acquaintance or other, and lots of rough teasing 
among friends. I, too, was the subject of this banter, “Alright Scott of the Antarctic?” (I 
do feel the cold, and overdress for the weather), or “Dear GOD let’s hope nobody sees us” 
as we headed out for a hack - my time had been short, my horse was unbrushed. Much of 
the banter revolved around sexual innuendos, there were shrieks of laughter one day 
when, considering a new purchase, Jo compared riding 'hats', and accidentally muttered 
that 'Bertie has quite a large helmet'. The riding world is not short of such opportunities.  
Another category for rough-housing involved jibes about one’s ethics, particularly those 
seen as too soft, emotive, or fanciful. “Have you been hugging your horse again? That 
poor bugger.” Bertie said with a smile when I returned from grooming George in the 
field. 
 
While yard talk is full or irony, humour, metaphor and trope (as we shall see more 
shortly), it somehow also carries a sense of 'straight talking', telling it like it is, speaking 
plainly, warmly, confidently and authentically. This is not to say all yard-talk is the same, 
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one of the most noticeable differences as I moved from one yard to another during 
fieldwork was the genre of banter, the tone of horse stories, and the 'loudness' of 
comaraderie. For example, when Leeanne first moved her horse to Paddock Farm, it was 
her language that marked her out as different from the other liveries. While their talk was 
sometimes full of innuendoes, hers was plain lewd, while theirs often joshed and teased 
their daft horses (as much as they teased each other), she insulted her horse in the coarsest 
of terms. On one occasion where she declared her horse a 'fucking cunt' with genuine 
anger after an upsetting ride, Jess gasped and jumped to his defence, stroking his nose and 
speaking to him in staged tones– for Leeanne’s benefit “Oh no! That's not a very nice 
thing for mummy to say about you, is it gorgeous?!”  Aside from this episode, as far as I 
know, nobody spoke to Leeanne about her language, and any social sanctions or negative 
reactions to her speech were so subtle I did not record them – yet within six weeks 
Leeanne's banter had adjusted in line with the rest of the crew. 
 
The ‘language of tough love' approach bore resemblances to a typical British working-
class humour which sociologist Sam Friedman's interviewees (at Edinburgh Fringe) 
describe as being “unafraid to express oneself” and “hanging out dirty washing in public” 
(2011). However, there was also something quintessentially equestrian about the tough 
love approach that in some environments carried hallmarks of an upper class, rural, elite 
sort of speech. Christine, a well-respected equestrian in her sixties, spoke with a posh, 
plummy voice as she told me about all of her favourite people and horses, 'He's as queeny 
as they come and such a bitchy little thing but I just adore him,' 'she was an absolute toe-
rag, a real toad, but she could jump the moon.' Christine was known, and loved, for 
'telling it like it is' in riding lessons, which (as in Chapter Two) sometimes resulted in 
students’ tears. Her cutting insults and demands for decent riding accompanied regular 
use of the word 'dear' and 'darling', and she was genuinely bemused and appalled when 
they started 'the waterworks' as she called it. “Now, come on, dear, I really don't see the 
point in any of that, you're either going to ride better, or you aren't. And if you aren't, you 
might as well get off and go home. I can't do a thing with you while your whimpering,” 
she would retort. “It's alright,” riders would say to me afterwards, “I needed a kick up the 
arse.” 
 
Often, riders would travel together to competitions, sharing horse transport vehicles for 
financial efficiency and comaraderie. At Paddock Farm, these outings took place in Bertie 
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and Jill's big horse lorry, known as 'the party bus'. Four horses could fit on the lorry, and 
usually two to four other people, not competing that day, would come along to support, 
groom, watch.  The lorry 'living' (an area behind the cab with sofa, fridge and hob) was 
the communal base at a show, where ties were fastened, dressage tests remembered, 
judges' comments disseminated, and coffee shared. During the early morning journeys, 
and the hub of activity upon arrival, the lorry living became a particular site of tough-love 
language, bravado, and banter. This led me to recognise the affordances of this sort of 
language in terms of bolstering a positive attitude. I use the term 'positive' here, which my 
interlocutors would recognise as apposite. However, this is clearly quite a different form 
of positivity from the helpful beliefs described in Section One. There, positivity was akin 
to harmony, the counterpoint of negative, unfavourable, unconsidered, or adversarial 
descriptions. Here, positivity is full of gumption, initiative, resilience, 'character' and 
wilfulness, and is opposed to reservedness, meekness, drabness, dryness, or softness. 
 
Working it out through play 
The use of irony enabled riders to garner the support of their peers in asserting their 
competence and authority over the horse, and also to resource others' opinions without 
fully exposing their own. We can explore this point in some detail with reference to an 
example of infantilization presented below. 
 
Roxy was a short, shy, smiley, heavy-set woman in her thirties, who often seemed over-
worked (at a DIY store) and hurried, short of time. She kept rescued ponies and ex-battery 
chickens as well as her main riding horse, a 6-year-old coloured cob, who was known for 
'taking the mickey,' “He's the yard clown!” I was told on introduction. On this particular 
sunny afternoon, Roxy had just returned to the yard and unloaded her horse, Dillon, from 
her trailer.  Roxy's competition clothing was in a state of disarray, top shirt buttons 
undone, tie missing, shirt sweaty and hair flattened to her head from the heat of the riding 
hat. She looked dishevelled, tired and disheartened. As a few of us were finishing up our 
evening chores, we asked, “How had the day gone, were there any ribbons?”  We join the 
conversation just after Roxy had explained that Dillon had been very hard work at the 
competition, attained low scores, and the judge had commented that they were not 
forward going enough. Present are Tony (Roxy’s husband) and Liz, another horse owner. 
 
Tony: You've been banging on about batteries for weeks, and I keep thinking, it 
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doesn't work because it isn't his energy levels 
Roxy: Batteries? Oh, his Duracell has run out. Yes, I do say that! 
Tony: Because when Lauren rides him he'll canter for half an hour but you're like 
“oh, oh, he can't do it”. 
Roxy: It's hard work, isn't it? [in mock-sympathetic tone, speaking to Dillon] 
Tony: It's cos he can’t be bothered and you don't make him! 
Liz: It’s because mummy's too kind to him! 
Roxy: Well there's only so many times one can slap them in the dressage arena 
with your whip, isn't there, before one is classed as a “mummy's beating her pony 
up!” 
Laughter 
Liz: Just jab them with a pair of spurs instead! 
Roxy: He just has to test the boundaries, doesn't he? I'm sure he thinks it's funny 
to see mummy huffing and puffing away working harder than he is! But I'm not 
letting it get to me, I just keep asking him. We'll get there, eventually, he just has 
to grow up a bit first. He hasn't really grasped the fact he has a job yet. 
Liz: Bless him, he's such a character. Aren't you? [turns to Dillon and gives him a 
scratch]. 
 
 Infantilization seems to play at least two roles here, at first it references over-softness in 
Liz's critique, but then Roxy re-establishes her own resolve and emotional comportment 
through referring to Dillon's infantilistic boundary-testing behaviour and her un-phased 
response to it. In that second form, a different side to the maternal relationship is called to 
mind, in which it is inevitable that children (and horses) will defy and resist control at 
times, sometimes in ways that humiliate their guardians. This is normal, healthy, and to be 
expected, (though also irksome) and the mother's role is to rise above any goading, stay 
calm, and consistent, develop a thick skin, and work hard at parenting in the hope that this 
is a passing phase.  In this framing, the (Western) child's liminal accountability is 
paramount (Lancy 2014:47). David Lancy describes a British history of knowing children 
as animal-like, with particular expectations of unsociability and unyielding natures 
(Lancy 2014:157-8), therefore their choices need not be taken as legitimate and 
accountable in the way adults/humans would be. 
 
The un-seriousness of Dillon's apparent defiance is underscored further by the fact he is 
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'laughing' in the account. It is, after all, only play, only a joke at defiance, he doesn't take 
a serious stand against the requested activity, he just tests the boundaries in good humour, 
and as is to be expected (in this account) of children and horses.  In fact, he appears a 
junior member, but nonetheless a harmonious part, of a community which plays at/with 
confrontation all the time. His behaviour resembles the wilful, jovial boisterousness that 
typifies conventional equestrian speech. Most aggravation or contestation in this 
environment isn't really meant, but is a part of strengthening bonds, developing character, 
and practising a form of relatedness that is loaded with pertinacious intentionality. 
 
Like the humans described here, Dillon (as described by Roxy) demonstrates the ability to 
act 'as-if,' to behave as though he is resisting work, without really meaning it. According 
to Gregory Bateson's play theory, laughter can act as a play marker, that is, a meta-
communication which marks a communicative context in which things don't mean quite 
what they normally would (1955). This means neither Dillon's resistance, nor Roxy’s 
account of it, are to be taken 'at their word.' She plays with the idea that he plays at 
ignoring her. We can't be sure to what extent Roxy really thinks Dillon is capable of 
mockery, nor can we be sure what Dillon thinks of his 'job' and Roxy. 
 
Naked speech and accountability 
We can learn more about local language ideology from this use of humour, particular 
when we compare it to Webb Keane's work on modernity, Christianity and sincerity 
(1997, 2002).  Keane describes how referentiality and intentionality are prioritised 
concepts within the language ideology of both Western modern scientific and religious 
projects of self-transformation, particularly seen through the ethic of sincere speech 
(2002:66) in which the speaker ought to convey the whole truth with minimum use of 
rhetorical language. Keane shows that Protestant prayer follows this modern language 
ideology, demanding the sincerity (and, though he comments on it less, veracity) of a 
first-person voice, who, referring to the self accurately and with true intentions, is able to 
communicate with God and thus work on, transform, and maintain one’s own soul. 
Keane's description of sincerity is in keeping with the sort of accountability for speech 
which Judith Butler describes (and resists), “Which demands that we manifest and 
maintain self-identity at all times and require that others do the same” (2005:42). She is 
speaking of the ways in which people are expected to be able to account for themselves, 
to explain, in words, who they are and how this relates to their actions. Butler’s point is 
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that this sort of accountability places a high expectation on speaker’s capacity to produce 
a coherent self-authored account, which, given the intersubjectivity involved in language 
use and identity formation, is an unfathomably difficult task. 
 
I would suggest that my participants share the ideology Keane describes and Butler 
retaliates against: that there is an expected moral relationship between words, truth and 
self, but they find ways to mitigate the demands that Butler sees as so untenable. We 
could see riders’ use of humour – lack of 'naked speech' (without rhetoric)- as deflecting 
such heavy accountability, defending against the possibility that what one says may be 
taken in singularity to expose one’s true intentions, beliefs, character, and the quality of 
one’s referential knowledge about the horse. ‘This isn't a really-real account, don't judge it 
(and me) too literally,' Roxy conveys through metacommunicative irony and laughter. 
 
Humour plays the biggest role in the statement Roxy makes wherein too much smacking 
will mean 'mummy's a pony beater'. This sentence was met with laughter all around, and 
in fact, exemplifies a pattern of overstating and 'owning' potential welfare breaches. These 
instances often involved a dual perspective, as though speaking to the horse, but also 
mocking the horse’s imaginary over-reaction to (pseudo-forceful) measures of training. 
“Poor Barney! Mummy has beat him and beat him today and now he's sulking!” or “I 
know, I know, you're terrified of me now because I'm an awful mother and I shouted at 
you!” These comments were ostensibly 'to' the horse, but staged to be heard by the human 
audience, as in conversation analyst Felicia Robert’s description of the way vets and 
owners speak 'to' the animal to communicate tactfully with one another (2004). These 
ironic horse-beating remarks seemed to enable the speaker to take on a complexity of 
perspectives; horse, audience, and rider/owner – with the latter quite possibly 'in two 
minds'.  In referring to herself paradoxically as both 'mummy' and 'pony beater', Roxy 
seems able to communicate that she is acutely aware that there is difference in acceptable 
treatment of horses compared to children, and that she knows there is an intersecting 
negotiation at hand between being too soft and too hard. The account of herself given 
between the lines of this joke is in fact of neither a 'mummy' nor a 'pony beater'. The 
laughter comes as a response to the candid, casual and exaggerated description of 
physical coercion, the multiple viewpoints, and the heavy dose of irony. This all allows 
Roxy to negotiate a way to occupy the reasonable middle ground, in the face of a difficult 
evaluation surrounding appropriate levels of force that depends, partly, on what Dillon 
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was doing and why. 
Multivocality enables a complexity of possible perspectives within Roxy's account (as in 
Hill 1995, Keane 2015:143-150). The irony evident enables her to not-quite sign up to 
ideas she is trying out, which means she can at once hold opposing perspectives and 
confuse the assignment of agency and authorship (see Lambek 2003 for a discussion of 
agency, irony and multivocality relating to spirit possession).We could also see Roxy's 
use of tropes (isn't his behaviour just typical?! she suggests) as moving authorship away 
from her own voice and towards that of a broader societal position that anyone/everyone 
might share33. Roxy uses tropes which have been spoken many times before, that are 
acceptable fodder for representing such moral entanglements pragmatically and 
positively. Tropes were commonplace in equestrian circles, and infantilization was a 
favourite trope, both as denoting over-softness of the mother/owner, and indexing 
expectable and discountable equine recalcitrance. Writing of tropes, Michael Carrithers et 
al quote Kenneth Burke, 'A trope ... must also be a selection of reality; and to this extent it 
must function also as a deflection of reality,' (1969:45). Carrithers goes on to explain how 
through the use of a trope, 'The situation itself is changed, deflected.' (Carrithers, Bracken 
and Emery 2011:662). One of the things which the trope does here, is give Roxy a 'stance' 
(DuBois 2007) which brings her into a broad alignment with her audience in relation to 
the problem of Dillon's poor performance. As the conversation goes on, through humour, 
she is nudged toward a frame that emphasises her ability to handle the situation 
competently and fairly, and she nudges others towards recognising that, too. The 
consensus position reached is that the crux of the problem is Dillon's character and age, 
his lack of maturity, though a fondness for these same features is also reinstated. Humour 
might seem counter to the Western value for naked speech and speaker-accountability that 
Keane identifies and Butler retaliates against, yet it also seems able to convey a sincerity 
in Roxy's intent, and is a wholly useful tactic in establishing credibility in this instance. It 
enables Roxy to garner the support of others, who, through playful responses, can 
tactfully reprise the speaker’s gambits. It also enables Roxy to communicate something of 
the complexity of these moral entanglements that might always be considered otherwise. 
It therefore enables speakers to develop (rather than report) a credible account for, and 
                                                 
33This is not unlike the language ideology among Sumbanese Marapu, who Keane describes as at odds 
with the modern, Protestant ethic of sincerity they encountered upon converting. In contrast to sincere 
self-authored Protestant prayer speech, Marapu used formalised, repeated, rhyming couplets in rituals, 
refracting the origins of their own speech towards the agency of the ancestors who invented it (Keane 
1997) 
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with, the agreement of the listeners. This supports Michael Lempert's assertion that we 
should, 'Imagine the evaluative reflection of ethics as a communicative event that occurs 
prototypically in interaction with others.' (2014:467) These interactive ethical events, he 
explains, 'May sometimes look like miniaturised versions of the full-blown ethical 
debates and belaboured decision making that academics and courts and religious 
institutions engage in, but they may also be as spare and fleeting as, say, a furled brow' 
(2014:468). 
 
 All this rhetorical talk that avoids committing to a singular, 'true' position makes for 
interesting comparison with ethnography reporting an Opacity Doctrine in the south 
pacific (Robbins and Rumsey 2008). There, people say that they cannot report what 
others are thinking (e.g. Stasch 2008). Some argue that this is a matter of concealment,  of 
'unknowing knowing' when people, for example, as in Rupert Stasch's ethnography of the 
Korowai, report they do not know why they were given a particular gift, even when they 
might have some idea (Stasch 2008:446, Keane, 2008:479-481). While this suggests 
Melanesian peoples do not speak what they do know about others, here, I would suggest 
riders do speak what they do not yet know, or not quite know, or not know in a particular, 
singular, accurate and literal way. Just as Stasch's informants aimed to retain autonomous 
control over concealment and revelation of the self (rather than have it revealed by 
others), my participants' multiperspectival, ironic and tropic speaking also enabled the 
speaker to keep something concealed and hidden regarding their true feelings about the 
relationship with the horse, whether, for example, Roxy really felt like she had not 
performed well or that Dillon's evasions were unreasonable. 
  
'Get real! Grow up!' 
The section on 'tough love' would be incomplete if I suggested such a register of speech 
was always jovial and satirical. Tactful 'nudges' were the most common methods of 
managing 'rough' language, but occasionally, 'straight-talking' took a more direct, 
exposing, and sometimes brutal form, when fantasy was felt to have gone too far, people 
(and horses) were implored to reconnect with the real world, to 'get a grip'. This could 
involve the policing of anthropomorphism, particularly in riding lessons, where 
instructors like Christine might attest, “No! Stop babying him, he is a bloody horse, and 
you are going to ruin him.” Sometimes this involved telling horses in no uncertain terms 
that it was not acceptable for them to act like children too, as in the case below. 
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I was out riding with Lorraine, around tracks that both of us knew well. Lorraine, who 
was in her late-twenties and had described herself to me as an 'alpha mare,' could 
normally be heard from far across the yard, loud with frustration or excitement. Her deep 
love of Buddy, a big, bay warmblood, whom she had owned for many years, was often 
narrated by Lorraine in the tack room, like a turbulent romance, whereby love endured, 
despite fall outs, and through many emotional ups and downs. Sometimes, in her words, 
Buddy was an arse. I was on Gorgeous George, who was behaving beautifully, swinging 
along at a relaxed walk, on a loose rein, ears gently flickering back and forth. I was able 
to take my feet out of the stirrups and stretch my legs down lazily, enjoying the summer 
breeze.  Lorraine was not getting such a smooth ride, Buddy seemed to have his eyes on 
stalks, and kept spooking at the hedgerows as though there were monsters hidden within 
them. This wasn't unusual for Buddy, sometimes he had days like this, but there were 
enough days in between where he would walk the same route calmly, that Lorraine was 
convinced his apparent fear wasn't real. 
 
“For fucks sake Buddy!” She exclaimed as he shot to the side yet again, this time causing 
her to momentarily lose balance, she had been twisted round in the saddle chatting to me 
and his violent motion caught her off guard and cut her chatter off mid-sentence. Buddy 
stared intently towards the offending hedge, in - what looked to me like – terror, and 
rushed sideways to get away. Instantly, Lorraine regained balance, shortened her reins, 
and slapped him with the whip on the shoulder. “Will you bloody grow up and stop 
pissing about!” she growled at him. “No! It's not bloody funny anymore. Now walk on 
and walk on properly.” 
 
She rode him forward firmly, giving him the occasional jab with her heels, and holding 
him in a tighter rein contact, in a rounder outline (a head and neck posture, see Chapter 
5), for a few strides before turning back to me, and saying, 
 
He's not afraid. It's all just a game to him, he does it just because he can. But he's 
not a baby any more. I've had enough of it, he's been round these routes a hundred 
times and he knows full well there is nothing scary in the hedges, there are no 
bloody dragons in Cambridgeshire, but he just has to muck about. But it's getting 
bloody dangerous and he should know better. It won’t be bloody funny if he gets 
me off, I can tell you that. There will be big trouble. (Then directed to the horse) 
BIG TROUBLE. 
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Dictaphone recording August 2016 
 
In Lorraine's view, Buddy acted as though he was afraid, when she knew he wasn't. Being 
afraid of irrational things might be acceptable or even expected behaviour for an infant 
(human or equine), but adults should have learned the distinction between reality and 
fantasy, she seems to suggest. Furthermore, he seems to disregard an adult-like awareness 
of consequences, of responsibility for Lorraine's safety, of the impacts of his playful 
behaviour. He is behaving irresponsibly, but he has the capacity for responsibility. 
Perhaps in Butler's terms, he is providing an unacceptable account of self, perhaps in 
Keane's terms, he is being insincere. The child-likeness of Buddy's behaviour is certainly 
not seen as any sort of 'elevation' here (as in Greenebaum' dog-children), he is degrading 
(himself) from proper, real, adult status to that of child. Lorraine’s critique of Buddy is 
not unlike one I heard her give, on another occasion, of her husband's weekend party-
going behaviour. 
 
In comparison to the 'care with words' register of speech, horses in the 'tough love' 
register of speaking are much more readily described as (possibly) capable of lying, 
playing and reflexively (mis)representing themselves. As in the first section, the 
performative role of language is foregrounded in these speech events, and the referential 
capacity of words to denote accurate truths is diminished. As in the first section, the 
distinction between metaphorical and real descriptions is not always easily made, 
sometimes deliberately obscured. However, the distinction between fantasy and reality, 
child and adult, non-human and human is still important; adults are expected to manage 
the real/non-real distinction carefully in dialogue with others, and sometimes, horses are 
considered capable of holding this adult-like accountability too. In the 'tough love' 
register of speech, there is a taste for pro-activity, resilience, and wilfulness in the way 
language is used to cultivate and bolster a credible, workable, and authoritative 
articulation of and with the horse. Non-real language performs a role here in the 
formation of both a strong character and a strong community. While tropes, ironies, and 
rough-housing language appeared ill considered and unreflexive to the instructors who 
aimed to cultivate a more meta-reflexive and autonomously reflexive care with words,  
here I have described something more akin to communicative reflexivity (Archer 
2003:167-210) whereby a multiperspectival approach is maintained and others' opinions 
tactfully resourced through dialogue, involving a sophisticated and sensitive 
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understanding of moral ambiguities. 
 
Words from the heart 
 
Whispered sweet nothings 
If you enter the yard when it seems deserted, perhaps in the middle of a working day, the 
peaceful soundscape is predominantly birdsong, distant traffic, and the hay-munching of 
horses. They are quiet creatures usually, who only make verbal noises (whinnies, snorts, 
wickers) when stressed or excited. In these moments of quiet conviviality with horses, 
one might well speak with, or to, them in a markedly different tone than the staged 
performances of prosthetised conversation for a human audience described above. On a 
few occasions, I stumbled across owners muttering away to their horses. Usually, they 
would stop speaking with embarrassment, having thought they were the only humans on 
site. I too, was drawn to chatter with George on some, but not all, of our private time 
together. Because of the private nature of this talk, it is hard to know what owners say, 
and how they say it. When I asked them about it, most owners admitted to talking to their 
horses. Most believed the horse did not understand what they said but appreciated the 
tone with which they said it. Some owners were happy talking to their horses in front of 
certain people but not others. Rochelle, for example, spoke to her honey-coloured cob, 
Millie, in baby-ish terms. “Are you a good girl, Millie, yes you are! You are, aren't you? 
You're mummy's lovely little darling, aren't you? Do you know I love you? I think you do. 
Did you win a rosette, my clever girl? You did, didn't you, a big red rosette!” Rochelle 
cooed one evening to Millie, as I completed stable chores in the next door stable. When 
Bertie walked around the corner, Rochelle fell quiet, and when he left she came into my 
stable mortified with embarrassment, “I can't believe Bertie heard me talking to Millie! 
I'll never live that down!” she remorsed. 
 
As in Rochelle's case, this private, affectionate, stream-of-consciousness type of speech is 
often akin to 'motherese,' which has been studied by linguists as 'child directed 
communication' (CDC) or 'caretaker speech'. The form of CDC speech common to Euro-
American communities is recognised by a greater number of questions than adult 
orientated speech (even where the child isn't expected to answer), a higher and fluctuating 
pitch of intonation, and a predominant use of present tense. While it could be argued that 
these are tactics for deliberately developing the child’s linguistic capabilities, Elinor Ochs 
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and Bambi Schieffelin emphasise the extent to which such talk is often not consciously 
planned, but an example of habitus (Ochs 1984, Ochs, Solomon and Sterponi 2005, Ochs 
and Sheiffelin 2011 ). Linguistic researcher Meredeth Rowe found that parents with 
higher education level and family income showed more of a prevalence towards child 
directed communication than those from less advantaged backgrounds (2008). Some have 
recognised the way a similar form of speech is used with pets, particularly dogs (e.g. 
Mitchell 2001). For my part, I found myself speaking with George much as I speak with 
my baby daughter, Hester. I would explain, in what I think was a reasonable, adult tone, 
where we were going and what the planned activity was, point out things of interest, and 
sometimes ask after my conversation 'partner's' opinion about an event or object. With 
Hester, I was assured by online resources, health visitor advice, and other parents, that 
this would maximise our bond and best enable her language development. With George, I 
can only say that it felt companionable, kind, and relaxing to verbalise in the way that I 
did. Sometimes, I caught owners whispering sweet nothing to their horses, stroking their 
long ears gently, with the horses dozing, eyes half closed. “You are such a lovely, good 
boy,” they might murmur. It seemed to me that this form of speech was about expressing, 
and therefore, somehow more fully inhabiting, a range of affectionate sentiments. But it 
was censored and embarrassing, this sort of language didn't fit with the image of 
credibility described above, but revealed owners as soft-hearted and soft-headed, and 
perhaps guilty of 'projection' or even 'madness' – in fact, many self-described as 'bonkers', 
'crazy' or as having 'lost my marbles' when I enquired about their tendency to speak with 
the horse. 
 
I liken this somewhat deviant use of whispered motherese to another way in which 
owners censor their linguistic expressions of affectivity, involving the writing, and 
careful, often anonymous, distributing, of poetry. While the former is embodied and 
interactive, and the latter is written and computer mediated, still, I categorise them 
together here for the commonality of censorship, and for the way that some feelings seem 
to want wording. The inventive and creative textuality of poem writing and motherese 
speaking index another sort of ethics of the non-real, in the way that words are stretched, 
reconfigured and reinvented (in secret) in order to challenge the norms of recognisability. 
In relation to the poetic use of a child-mother metaphor, we will return to the example of 
tough-speaking instructor, Christine, introduced above, and explore her surprising 
relationship with one horse, Jolly in more detail. 
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A poem 'From his human mother' 
 For the most part of Christine's life, horses were ultimately there to do a job, to answer to 
their human rider, to jump fences well, keep the rider safe, and win some ribbons. A close, 
communicative relationship was paramount in forging a competent partnership, and 
horses should be treated 'decently' she said, but it wasn't at all unusual to hear her refer to 
some horses as 'it' and to deplore others' oversentimentality. Jolly was not like any of the 
other horses Christine had owned. I never met Jolly, but as Christine and I got to know 
and like one another better, he was mentioned more and more frequently. He was the last 
horse that Christine had owned, perhaps the last horse she would ever own, and he had 
died a few months before my fieldwork began. Christine was still grieving. One day, 
when I had arrived at Christine's yard accompanying another fieldwork participant for 
their jumping lesson, Christine beckoned me away from the group. She wanted to give me 
something to look at, a poem she had written when Jolly died. She seemed embarrassed 
and flustered, thrusting a folded piece of A4 into my hands. “You'll think I'm bonkers,” 
she said: “Absolutely crazy I am. But there you go. That's what I wrote him. But you 
mustn't tell the others about that. It's just for your research. Horse and human bond and all 
that.”34 She spoke as she was already walking away from me, disappearing around the 
corner. I could hear Christine back to her usual workmanlike, brisk cheeriness in the yard, 
checking as to whether her pupil was tacked up or not, as I stood in an odd and strangely 
exposed spot in the car park, reading an incredibly heart-felt poem entitled “To my 
Beautiful Boy from his human mother” (capitalisation as in the original). The poem tells 
of how the horse, now deceased, does not spend time with other equine angels cantering 
across the fields of paradise, but waits at the gate, as his mother waits on earth, until 
finally they are reunited and can enter heaven together. She later told me that it was an 
adaption of a poem she had been taught by her own mother when they lost a terrier that 
was particularly close to her as a child.35 
 
                                                 
34Christine gradually got braver about sharing the poem with others, and later published the poem online 
and gave me permission to use it in my research.  Whole poem in appendix. 
35This is relevant because animal persons were woven into Christine's life history such that her model for 
coping with grief through poetry, taught to her by her (human) mother, was in reference to the loss of an 
animal kin-like relation. This evidences Boyers argument (1996) against the 'familiarity thesis' (which 
states that people anthropomorphise because human-centred knowledge is more available and easier to 
grasp, so they apply it to the more alien non-human phenomena). To the contrary, Boyer asserts that 
humans are learning about the non-human world throughout their lives, not in a secondary way, or at a 
later stage. 
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As I finished reading, Christine darted back towards me to throw me some more of the 
story before hurrying away again proclaiming her own insanity. Jolly had been her baby, 
she said. She was his mother. She really was. That was how she loved him. That was how 
they were. She had kept him in the stable nearest to her house, and a security camera 
captured his stable doorway. Early in the morning, or late at night, he would look up at 
the camera and make faces, and she would see him on the monitor, and know that he was 
calling her out, and then she would come out and give him treats and spend time with 
him. His ashes now lived in a box in her bedroom room. All of this, and more, Christine 
told me in short, flustered sentences, bustling away again before I could really respond, 
asserting often, 'You'll say I'm mad!' 
 
Motherhood is (sometimes) like horse owning 
Christine's poem elucidates an authentically felt love for the horse, sometimes described 
as something like maternal love, that a few close and trusting participants discussed with 
me, with utmost sincerity. In some ways, such sincere maternalism is entirely 
understandable, in that British horse care and British child care have many 
commonalities. David Lancy emphasises the peculiar Euro-American tradition of valuing 
and doting on children compared to the variant ways in which childhood is handled 
around the world (2014). He demonstrates that Western parents obsess over their 
children's upbringing, endeavouring to create an idealised childhood environment of 
comfort, warmth, and fond memories. This, he calls a neontocracy, a society led by the 
needs of children, compared to a gerontocracy, wherein society answers predominantly to 
the needs of ancestors (2014:12). He links the tendency towards neontocracy to the moral 
import placed on individuality, each child represents a unique individual, with potential 
talents that must be nurtured and developed, a future of autonomous choice ahead of them 
(2014:161). Strathern offers some similar arguments, British children, she shows, are in 
some ways the ultimate individual, encompassing a future of choices, while their parents 
occupy a more tied and responsible position (1992:14-22). This is evident, for example, in 
the way children are known by personal name, while parents answer to a role-description 
'mum' or 'dad', supporting roles, effectively, to the individual-coming-into-being that is 
the main event of the family. The most relevant aspect of both these analyses is the 
downward flow of responsibility and emotion from parent to child, it is expected that 
parents are more caring towards their children than the reverse, which is a fitting simile 
for equestrian relationships. Christine and her peers do report feeling loved by the horses 
159 
they feel maternal towards, but the love is not equal and certainly not symmetrical, the 
care and responsibility flows downward. Owners make sure their horses have enough to 
drink, balance their diet carefully, and arrange for vaccinations. They watch their horse's 
expressions and behaviours in order to learn about their likes and dislikes, some of which 
they shape towards civility, others of which they indulge as signs of the individual's true 
personality.  I felt that Christine evidenced some, or all, of these aspects of the maternal 
position -nurturing a particularly special dependent individual - when she called herself 
Jolly's mother. 
 
Jolly's role in his infantilisation 
Yet these aspects suggest reasons that a maternal feeling might have resided in Christine, 
there is more to be said about Jolly's role here. The first time I met with Christine after the 
awkward poem-exchange-day, I asked her, “Why Jolly? Of all the horses you have bought 
and sold, why did this one become so special?” I was wondering – though I didn't 
explicitly ask - whether the correlating timing of the death of Christine's husband and the 
purchase of Jolly was relevant. Note, I was looking for an explanation that came from her 
end of the relationship, presuming it to be something of Christine which made it what it 
was. Her answer was surprising, and profound in adjusting my mindset. “Because he 
treated me like a mother” she said, with a tone that suggests this had surprised her, too. 
 
I asked what she meant, she replied: 
When there was horseflies in the paddock, he would always run straight over to 
me to get them off him. If I was not there he would call for me and I knew what it 
would be, then he'd come to me and line himself up for me to get them off. When 
there was rain, he would play in the puddles, really, play, but only if I was 
watching, like he wanted me to see him doing it, to play with him, he could make 
me laugh and he loved it. He would paw in the puddle to splash it and then just 
look at me and then do it again. He liked his stable to be clean, when there was a 
dropping in there, he would bang on the door for me to clear it. But he had 
different bangs, he would do a different bang if he had run out of food. I have 
never known anything like it - he was communicating with me all the time - we 
understood one another. I wish you could have met him, Rosie, you would have 
loved him. He was something else! 
Field Notes, September 2016 
 
In this statement, and our subsequent conversations, Christine emphasised Jolly's active 
role in establishing the terms of the relationship, he treated her like a mother. In doing so, 
she deflects an assumption among equestrians (and the British more broadly) that 
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infantilization, or anthropomorphism, is projected on animals from (somewhat 
dysfunctional) humans. Christine wanted to assert that she wasn't the sole author of this 
account, she didn't make it up, she was responsive, impinged upon, her motherhood 
answered an other's call, it was not projected from the inside, out. While this provides 
some evidence to suggest that Jolly offered something like a reflexive appeal, deliberately 
moving Christine to relate to him in a particular way, my focus is more centrally on the 
fact that this version of events is an important part of the way Christine accounted for 
herself when explaining the relationship. While Jolly's role is important, recounting it 
only partially manages to render the relationship believable, she seems barely able to 
believe how wonderful that relationship was, herself. 
 
 
Stretching the word 
Exploring the sensibility of Christine's account doesn't do justice to the rhetorical work 
she completes to manage the risky register of not-real that she is dealing in. She professed 
her craziness to me, she hid her poem from others; and within its text, we can see 
suggestions that giving an account of the relationship as a maternal one is not so easy. The 
title of the poem betrays the work that Christine puts into maintaining the cross-species 
maternal link. There would be no need, in a poem written by parents to a deceased human 
child, for the second half of the title sentence, “from his human mother”. The maternal 
link must be made explicitly and sits awkwardly on the reader's eye. This is a special sort 
of mother, not a garden-variety mother, but a cross species motherhood. Christine's 
humanness is marked out. In theory, we might suppose that Christine could have called 
the poem, “to my equine son”, marking out his equineness rather than her humanity in 
order to emphasise the species-crossing effort involved. Yet it is somehow unsurprising 
that the onus is on the human party to be marked out as capable of cross-species 
motherhood, rather than the equine party to be capable of being cross-species progeny. In 
all of the examples I gathered of horses’ owners referring to themselves as 'mums' and 
'dads', never once did I hear a horse referred to as somebody’s 'son' or 'daughter'36. In 
resonance with Strathern's observations, the horse-child is individualised here, known by 
                                                 
36Though they could be referred to as 'baby', but this seems to already carry less literality than the terms son 
and daughter, one can be a romantic 'baby', for example, and we have the verb 'to baby', while son or 
daughter or even 'child' all seem to carry more of a kinship type link and were never used to describe a 
horse. To call a horse your child would be absurd, even as much as you might well call yourself his 
mum. 
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name rather than kin-term, while the responsible human takes on the role of kin-linked 
adult. Strathern points out that the adult has their own version of particular individualism, 
precisely in the flexibility of being known (by the child) as mum, but by other family 
memberships and in other constellations of relationships by other terms – there is a self 
that is not only 'mum' (1992:14-22). In the equestrian example, there is a similar 
expectation in the human-adult to have the capacity to be flexible in their subjectivities, 
relating to horses somewhat maternally across the species divide, in a way that horses are 
not expected to totally mirror. Regardless of the reasoning for the inconsistency (human 
mothers to horses who are not quite equine sons), the salient point is that the maternal 
link is not easy, there is something tentative and inconsistent, and the species distinction 
is subtly upheld. 
 
 In arguing that mentalistic terms referring to animals are not meant metaphorically in 
behavioural reports, Pamela Asquith elucidates the difference between metaphorical and 
literal description (1997). Literal descriptions, she contends, can be recognised as right or 
wrong according to whether the term has been used in line with the understanding of 
other common language speakers. In comparison, metaphorical terms can only be 
identified as appropriate or inappropriate, parasitic upon the literal meaning of the term. 
Here, it is unclear whether Christine's use of 'mother' is best understood as literal or 
metaphorical. The phrasing she used when she asserted to me, “I was his mother. That is 
how we were,” seemed to deliberately emphasise a literality to the term, particularly if we 
consider that this is Christine's experience of motherhood, there is nothing more suited to 
that term, and there is no term more suited to it (she neither had, nor wanted, human 
children). Christine is more Jolly's mother than 'cotton wool clouds' are made of cotton 
wool. She was his mother. She told me so. But, we conclude (from the rhetorical markers 
Christine provides, as well as from the normative species-bound categorisation she knows 
I share), this is not 'mother' in a normal sense.  Asquith identifies, but doesn't elaborate 
on, a third type of word use: catachresis (1997:27-31). This term usually refers to words 
being used wrongly, but can also refer to instances where words are used deliberately 
outside of their usual usage in order to stretch, modify, or re-appropriate the literal term. 
I'd suggest Christine uses the term mother in a catachrestic way. Knowing she uses 
'mother' outside of its normally appropriate meanings, she insists on a new authenticity, 
stretches its remits, and applies it literally. This is a new or different sort of motherhood, 
one which might render her crazy, but which is some sort of real none the less. 
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The word-stretching, creative, norm defying, self-risking work that Christine carries out 
(along with other sincere horse 'mothers'), on the borderlines of sensibility, can be seen as 
an ethical move. Judith Butler draws on Emanuel Levinas to demonstrate how encounters 
with others can reconfigure normative thematizations of recognisability, effectively 
causing subjects to reconsider their way of ordering the world (2005: 87-89, 128-129, 
134-135). Language should yield to the incoherence of encounters, rather than 
relationships yielding to the constraining limits of legitimate description, Butler implores. 
Others have charted the ethical work completed by acts of word-making, for example, 
Webb Keane explains how feminists gave a new language to women’s experiences of 
subordination, and with it, enabled them to recognise, legitimise, mobilise and inhabit an 
anger which changed the imaginable contours of ethical gender relations (2015:183-195). 
Carrithers argues that agents have at their hands the ability to not only present themselves 
to a public, but also to adapt and change their culture through creatively weaving 
rhetorical accounts, utilising and modifying pre-existing schemas, in response to the 
'incessant' eventful nature of their lives (2005:580-582). Carrithers’ rendition of rhetoric, 
looks in some ways like Butler's rendition of accounts of the self, one significant 
difference being that Carrithers appears optimistic about the capacity of his interlocutors 
to wield cultural schemas as tools at their bidding, while Butler depicts hers as free in as 
much as they are creative and reflexive, but always constrained, restricted, and at odds 
with the only forms of intelligibility available. 
 
Creatively managing scenes of address 
In terms of Christine's freedom to wield radical language, there is a clear disjuncture in 
the sincerity with which the relationship is communicated in the text of the poem, and the 
embarrassment and mitigations of madness with which it was presented in our face to 
face encounter. These are matters, in Butler's terms, of differing 'scenes of address' (2005: 
50, 67): the social situations 'accounts of self' are made within. Christine understood well 
the risky legitimacy of infantilistic reports within the equestrian, and broader British 
context, in which she is speaking. She herself was a likely policer of the difference 
between fantasy and proper, responsible realism.  She was able to counter the possible 
accusation of naivety through demonstrating her reflexive self-awareness in proclaiming 
her own absurdity, she knows this is abnormal, we are in agreement that the species 
usually/really are different, we do share that reality, she seems to assert. Yet at the same 
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time she appeals to me to bear witness to this special relationship, this real anomaly, that 
puts her sanity at risk.  A few weeks later, Christine told me she had decided to publish 
the poem online, anonymously. The internet provided a more distanced, less face to face, 
and less familiar readership – Christine had been able to get her expressions 'out there' 
without any awkward exchanges with her close clients and equestrian friends. This is not 
to say they did not know how deeply Christine cared for Jolly, in fact, many steered me 
towards speaking with Christine about Jolly, knowing their 'bond was so close'. But the 
poetic, emotive, sincere textualization of maternal love expressed within the poem was 
deployed towards an online scene of address, as a management of the particularly risky 
and exposing form of 'not real' that it displayed. Christine's poem joined a number of 
other poems, often shared anonymously, about love for horses. Scores of poems can be 
found online as testaments to maternal love but also sometimes other sorts of love; quasi-
romantic, deep friendship, or mystical and spiritual. Some were poems of thanks to the 
horse, expressions of trust, of hidden love, of the sharing of souls, or of wrenching grief 
after a horse had died. Sometimes poetic quotes or phrases were shared by my research 
participants on Facebook, with a few heartfelt words expressing trust, bond, or love, 
scrawled in a handwritten font next to close up images of the horse's eye, or of horse and 
rider on the beach. These images and words would collect hundreds of 'likes', were shared 
by many of my participants, but were never discussed face to face. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 7: Image of love for horses 
shared on Facebook 
 
Illustration 6: Poem and image of 
love for the horse shared on Facebook 
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In all of these cases, the important point is that Christine and these other poetic love-
writers are not passive to the scenes of address which hold them accountable for their 
words. On the one hand, with Butler, we can see that Christine is limited in expressing her 
experience of relationship with Jolly in legitimate terms. On the other hand, she is able to 
construct and seize opportune scenes of address that enable her to search for a way to 
make this relationship part of a shared, worded, reality. She goes looking for ways to 
express the relationship, to make it speakable, hearable, and shared, even with the risks of 
madness or softness that accompany these attempts at earnestly speaking the not-
legitimately-real. The speakers and writers in this section have worked to censor their 
words and to manage the scenes of address that will receive their heartfelt renditions. 
They have felt moved to speak in ways that challenge sensibility, speaking to those who 
cannot understand, or to audiences that will not directly respond, deviating terms from 
their recognised meanings, giving new forms of literality and legitimacy to fantastical 
experiences of meaningful encounters. Using language outside of its normative 
sensibilities enables novel relationships to emerge, that are somehow at odds with the 
logic of their time. In these examples language has not been deployed to communicate a 
referent meaning accurately and intentionally, rather, it has flowed 'from the heart', 
sometimes unconsciously, or defying conscious reason, expressing authentically felt 
affection in illegitimate terms, and enabling people to dwell on an experience of 
relatedness that does not quite make sense, perhaps even to them. 
 
Illustration 8: "Horse breathes new life 
into my soul," image shared on 
Facebook. 
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Conclusions 
 
In contrast to studies which reject anthropomorphism as metaphor, I have investigated 
participants' practices of managing and evaluating not-real registers of knowledge as they 
relate to the horse/human distinction. In all of the cases above, the distinction between 
child and adult has been a useful way to construct ethical relatedness. Not least, this is 
because adults are understood to be better able to manage the complexity of not-real 
registers of knowledge (as in the distinction between human and animal, too). The 
distinction between human and horse is under constant reconsideration, as is the boundary 
between metaphor and reality. Still, consistently, in the examples above, horses are 
thought capable of some degree of reflexive communication. The idea of childlikeness 
enables riders to trace the choices and intentions of their horses with care and interest, and 
to experience loving relationships even when the sentiment is not symmetrically returned. 
It also enables riders to discount or demote their horses' resistances, considering them not 
quite accountable for their actions. However, the idea of childlikeness is managed as not-
real in different ways, both within, and between, the three registers of speech described. 
 
 In each of the three sections above, I have demonstrated the management of not-real 
knowledge as ethical work. In the first section, an emerging taste for, and ethic of, 
metalinguistic reflection was seen in the way instructors instigate riders to 'watch their 
language', managing the tone, impact, and (sometimes) accuracy of what they said. The 
distinction between metaphor and literal description was less important than the 
distinction between harmful and helpful speech, the latter depicted the horse in a positive 
light and was solutions-focussed. In the second section, the language of tough love 
contributed to the cultivation of resilient, authoritative riders and bolstered a community 
of serious play. Irony, metaphor and trope enabled riders to develop complex 
multiperspectival accounts, garnering others' support and opinions, while deflecting the 
'naked' accountability of sole-authored speech. Horses were described as teasing too, and 
the distinction between reality and fantasy was managed through tactful 'nudges' or 
straight-talking, brutal demands for the recognition of reality and the assignment of 
proper accountability. In section three, riders were drawn to speak in ways which they 
recognised as challenging reasonable and legitimate understandings of language, but 
which expressed sincerely felt emotions and authentically experienced relationships. This 
norm-bending practice was managed and censored in order to mitigate the risks of being 
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found wanting in handling the distinction between the real and the not-real. Debbie, 
Christine and I moved between different ways with words during our equestrian 
endeavours, and sometimes the distinctions between requirements of different audiences, 
or different moments, were jarring. This chapter has contributed to the broader aims of 
the thesis by describing the changing and challenging epistemological responsibilities that 
answer to the riskiness of verbal language. I have shown that equestrian relationships are 
figured out in words and performed through the evaluation and management of the not-
real, such that we could describe metaphor (and its management) as part of the very 
substance of subjective relationships with really real equine persons, rather than a 
problematic appendage attached after the event in the imagination. 
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Chapter Five: Qualifying the centaur: Authority, engagement, and 'real connection'. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters I have focussed on the ethics of understanding and representing 
horses, and the horse has largely featured as an enigmatic person-like thing to be 
understood and thought about.  In contrast, this chapter brings aspects of the materiality 
of the horse/human relationship to the fore, investigating the way thinking about the 
horse is also a way of being with the horse. In this chapter, I will investigate the 
pedagogical processes that enable horse and rider to 'tune in' to one another, and I will 
attend to the capacity for riders to feel profound moments of 'togetherness' with their 
horses. Turning to the phenomena of embodied 'togetherness' at this stage in the thesis 
highlights the particularly interesting question of how experiences of embodied 
attunement emerge amid and despite the representationalist concerns that I have 
described to this point. This is an interesting question because the embodied ridden 
partnership between horse and human has featured in some posthuman performative 
scholarship as an exemplary case of non-propositional, responsive and relational 
knowing with (rather than about) an animal other. However, in my ethnography, 
participants quest to qualify ridden relatedness as a 'true connection' requires a sensitivity 
towards semiotic discourse as well as embodied practice. My aim is to situate riders’ 
experiences of embodied, 'true connection' with their horses within a gendered, 
technological and late modern context in which ideas about authenticity, engagement, 
and empowerment frame ridden partnership as a particularly seductive project for my 
participants. My first task is to introduce the sort of horse/human ridden 'togetherness' 
that this chapter is concerned with, and to orientate my approach in relation to 
posthumanist performative literature, before overviewing the structure and aims of the 
rest of the chapter. 
  
While there are many shades of company and co-operation that riders experience and 
enjoy with their horses, in this chapter I am particularly interested in an enhanced, 
elaborated strain of heightened ridden co-operation and 'real connection' (also called 'true 
connection', 'really working', 'totally engaged' and more), that riders strive towards with 
their horses, yet infrequently obtain. Some of my participants invested more time and 
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money into the project of obtaining a highly 'schooled' close ridden connection than 
others, but all admired the ideal. Below are two particularly eloquent short excerpts of 
dialogue which function as an introduction to this ideal. In the first, I had asked Lorraine 
what she meant by the phrase 'engaged' (more to follow on this term later): 
  
It's the connection between you and the horse, it goes [pause] you feel [pause] at 
one with the horse, and your movement becomes [pause- she seems to lift her 
body, as though her heart literally lifts in her ribcage and takes the rest of her 
body a few inches upward with it] like cadence, you know that cadence, it's so 
rare to get cadence... then he can be, light, but at the same time, strong. There is 
not a downward pulling, no heaviness, there is an, it is upward, does that make 
sense? He's in tune, he's engaged, when they are like this they are 100% with you, 
there is a lightness and they are very attentive – so maybe the lightness is the way 
of – responding – of the movement ...I'm not even thinking about maintaining 
[his posture], he's there, he's just there, and I don't need to play with it, because 
he's just there... It's togetherness. It's connection. A real, engaged moment, that 
feels so – complete. 
Dictaphone recording, April 2016. 
  
In another example, Jodi, lamenting her troubled relationship with her current horse, told 
me about the best horse she ever owned, Henry: 
  
We were so in tune, it was like you could just feel everything he was going to do 
before he did it, it was like you would be cantering to a fence and you would just 
know when you would take off, like you were adjusting the rhythm to meet the 
fence right but it wasn't like you were adjusting him or like he was doing it, it was 
really like you were doing it together, like you couldn't even be sure whether he 
said to shorten or lengthen the stride or something, or if I did, it was like people 
would watch and say “did he learn the course?!” because I didn't have to even 
steer him from one fence to another we were that in tune. He was a dream. 
[pause] Honestly. It was like flying. [long pause] I will never have another horse 
like it. 
Dictaphone recording, August 2016 
  
Notice in Lorraine's example, that Buddy's collaborative attitude is referenced at the 
same time as sensory and embodied details, so that responsiveness and attentiveness 
feature in congruence with lightness and strength. Notice also the vivid detail involved in 
the materiality of Buddy's being; he's there, he's just there, Lorraine asserts, evoking a 
spontaneity and immediacy to the experience. It is not thought about, approximated, 
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analysed (practices the previous chapters have described)- somehow his sheer material 
presence is particularly, notably apparent when he is 'engaged'. In Jodi's example, notice 
the blurring of self/other boundaries – such that ideas and movements are experienced as 
co-owned, co-produced, truly shared. Finally notice the sense of power, company, 
freedom, rightness, accomplishment, and almost euphoria that both women experience in 
this '100% withness.'  These points will be revisited through this chapter as I aim to 
investigate the contextual elements which establish this sort of  'hyperreal' (Luhrmann 
2012a, 2012b) relationality as a desirable possibility. 
  
Equestrian endeavours and experiences such as those described above have proved 
themselves particularly apt for posthuman and especially performative analysis. 
Performative approaches stress that meanings, facts and values (for example, those 
pertaining to gender) are not found as essences in the world, nor as abstract ideas floating 
in human minds, rather they emerge and are 'congealed' through material-semiotic 
practices (e.g. Butler 1990). Posthuman performative scholars resist what they see as the 
monopoly of 'representationalist' approaches within the social sciences, that is, those that 
prioritise human-held meanings and conceive of them as ontologically distinct from the 
material world they refer to (Barad 2003, Birke 2007, Despret, 2004, 2013, Haraway 
2008). Counter to this, performative approaches tend to emphasise the way boundaries 
between idea and thing, mind and body, self and other, human and non-human, or subject 
and object are blurred, inchoate, or continually configured anew through entangled 
relationships. 
  
The equestrian example of togetherness evident in the above transcripts clearly lends 
itself towards such analysis. It exemplifies something akin to what Vincianne Despret 
calls 'the miracle of attunement' (2004:125) of responsive bodies, rather than the 
interpretation required in abstract arbitrary symbolisation, and it demonstrates a felt 
dissolution of the sort of self/other boundaries that Western dogma might be thought to 
presume (e.g. individualised minds that move and decipher personal bodies). Both Anne 
Game (2001, writing auto-ethnographically about horsemanship) and Kirilly Thomspon 
(2010, 2011, writing of Spanish mounted bullfighters) utilise the figure of the centaur in 
their performative accounts of the way horse/human relatedness defies normative 
self/other and mind/body distinction. Thompson describes an innate 'centaurability' 
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(2011:222) in both horse and human bodies that makes them already related and 
receptive to a particular sort of relation. This dismantles the idea of bounded, pre-existing 
species or subjects as the raw 'relata' (in Barad's terms 2003:812). In another example, 
Maurstad, Davies and Cowles describe riding as a 'co-becoming of horse and rider', 
emphasising the way horses and riders are re-made through their embodied relatedness in 
British and Swedish equestrianism (2013).  Similarly,  Despret (2004:113-115) uses the 
mutual attunement of horse and rider's bodies as an example of the potential for humans 
and non-humans to 'articulate' well (2004:122), since riders learn to responsively move 
with, rather than accurately think about, their intra-active partners. 
  
However, there is a risk (or promise) that this sort of approach can end up naturalising 
and semiotically flattening the sorts of ridden connections that riders work towards and 
report. In fact, Donna Lee Davies and Anita Maurstad triumphantly report: 'Together 
rider and horse flatten or bridge not only the divides of animal/human but also those of 
nature/culture.' (2016:2) (my italics), and elsewhere suggest, 'concerning ...a 
naturalcultural language where body and mind are intra-acting with effects, the elements 
that riders speak of seem to cut cross sports and geography; they seem intrinsic to being 
with horses' (Maurstad, Davies and Cowles 2013:334). 
  
In contrast, Nikki Savvides (2011) argues that approaches which emphasise the embodied 
connectivity of horse and rider repeat a gendered narrative, which romanticises an 
apparently natural affinity between women and horses. Savvides argues that while 
embodiment focussed accounts can describe well the idealised interpretations of riders, 
this ought to be balanced with a recognition of the experience, knowledge and hard work 
that is required in working towards (and perhaps never achieving) such experiences of 
connectedness. In relation to my project here, the important point is that a similarity 
between riders' symbolic apparatus and posthumanist performative analysis creates the 
possibility for what Gregory Bateson refers to as 'confusing the map with the territory' 
(1972:454). The fact that performativity-inspired scholars might argue that both maps 
and territories are material-semiotic assemblages is beside the point that they work on 
different registers of referentiality for those who use them. The map is judged right or 
wrong in its reference to the territory. In this thesis, as has been shown in previous 
chapters, representational concerns are very much a part of responsible relations with 
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horses, and so semiotically 'flat' accounts are unsatisfying, particularly if they deem what 
might count as 'active participation' somehow more of a material, natural matter than a 
discursive, semiotic one. 
  
As will become clear throughout this chapter, horses are always intra-action37 partners 
(to use Karen Barad's language, 2003) in relationships where 'true partnership' (to use a 
participant's term) is contested as a propositional fact. This distinction is similar to the 
difference that Joanna Latimer identifies between 'becoming-with' and 'becoming 
alongside' (2013); the former indexing a totalising hybrid (akin to the image of the 
centaur), the latter a looser and broader category of intra-action38. This means 
performative theories must be applied with particular care, because of the uncanny 
similarity, but important distinctions, in the vocabulary use of horse riders and material-
semiotic performative analysis. This is particularly important with reference to terms 
such as 'collaboration', 'participants', 'partners', and the use of verbs which may/may not 
index intentionality, such as referring to a horse as 'teaching' the human how to move. 
This slipperiness between performative accounts and equestrian ones is the flip side of 
the felicitous point Maurstad, Davies and Cowles seem to celebrate, that, 'Riders seem to 
think and act in naturalcultural terms' (2013:325). However, this slipperiness provides 
not only a methodological risk to be managed but also a theoretical angle to be exploited. 
It invites me to ask about who/what qualifies certain material phenomena as certain sorts 
of meaningful (Navaro-Yashin 2009), such that the idea of true partnership with horses 
can be performed in various and particular ways by different parties (and simultaneously 
denied by others).  I ask, how are representational concerns part of the entanglement that 
qualifies the idea/experience of true connection in British equestrianism? Looking at the 
active role of horses in the meaning-making process here, involves recognising the way 
they might play a part in performing a historically particular riskiness of truth and 
falsity.39    
                                                 
37Intra-action refers to partners who do not precede their relationship, who emerge within relatedness with 
one another. 
38Though becoming-alongside is also an exclusive and ethically idealised category of intra-action. Latimer 
argues that becoming-alongside is more of a partial relatedness than the holistic hybridisation associ-
ated, at times, with Donna Haraway’s becoming-with . 
39This is not just about the horse playing a part which is misrepresented by the meaning-making practices of 
humans. To take the potential of performative theory to its full extent would be to recognise that the horse 
plays a part in the establishment of the risk of misrepresentation too. The horse can therefore be considered 
'active' in the construction of itself as a (mis)represent-able subject. 
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The contribution that I would like to make towards this literature is to investigate 
horse/human ridden togetherness as a local exclusive category of relatedness, rather than 
as an exemplary case of intra-action. It is a very specific sort of togetherness that is 
highly demanding on both partners, that can be judged in terms of accuracy, and that is 
permeated with representational concerns. In sum, this chapter approaches some 
contemporary British ideas of 'truth' as they emerge through the experience of improving 
ridden partnership, in the form of true leadership, true engagement, and real connection. I 
set out to investigate what qualifies particular intra-active dynamics as 'true connections' 
by attending to pedagogical processes through which humans and horses learn (in 
unsymmetrical ways) how they ought to engage with one another. In the first section, 
'developing authoritative affect,' I begin by demonstrating the high value given to  the 
affective responsiveness that can occur between horse and rider, and then investigate the 
gendered dimensions involved in the cultivation of embodied authority as riders try to 
control the affect they transmit to their horses.  In the next section, named 'evaluating 
true engagement,' I describe requirements placed on horses' bodies, which are intricately 
trained and moulded to optimise and maximise the capacity for complete, empowering 
'engagement' (a local term). I relate the ongoing scrutiny of horses' bodies to a gendered 
discourse about (mis)representation and body aestheticization. In the third section, 
cultivating a feel for real', I demonstrate how riders work on being 'present in the skin', 
and explain that the idealised, vivid, 'hyperreal' aspect of true engagement emerges from, 
rather than defies, modern representational concerns. My argument is that the quest for 
true ridden connection is situated within a context where real connectivity features as a 
likely problematic with gendered dimensions, plagued by risks of misrepresentation, 
misunderstanding, disengagement and disempowerment. In contrast, the idea of a real 
embodied connectivity that could enhance all partners and authenticate a woman’s 
natural authority is idolised. Moments felt as clear, ethical, authentic, complete 
engagement, which feel vividly real, and empower both partners, are sacralised and 
sublime, but also treated with scepticism. 
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Developing authoritative affect 
The value of affective connection 
'Horses are practically telepathic,' riding instructor, Anne, told me in the car as we drove 
between her appointments. 'I don't say that to all of my clients, because I don't want them 
thinking I'm woo-woo, but if they are not actually telepathic, then you may as well think 
that they are, because they are that good at reading your thoughts.' She went on to tell me 
that she believes horses think in pictures, not words, and that they somehow have access 
to whatever their riders and handlers are picturing. If a rider pictures falling off, or 
pictures the horse spooking, or the horse jumping the fence just nicely, then the horse 
may well follow the picture, she told me. Anne's tentative theory of telepathic picture-
reading was her personal version of a widespread recognition that the rider’s thoughts 
and, especially, feelings infiltrate the riding relationship, often without the rider’s 
awareness or consent. It was not entirely unusual that Anne had put this down to 
something 'woo-woo', as she put it, I heard others speculate on the uncanniness of horses' 
ability to access and respond to riders' hopes, fears, and expectations – which are more 
usually presumed private, internal matters. 
  
 Some rationalised this responsiveness as evidence of horses' exceptional sensory 
perception; their ability to 'read' and 'feel' very subtle changes in humans' bodily postures 
and tones of movement. Some grounded the somewhat spooky speculation that horses 
can know human souls with the ethological explanation that this was due to their nature 
as sociable herd animals, with heightened sensitivity toward the emotional states of those 
around them. Others, like Anne, were willing to leave it ultimately unresolved just how 
horses know so much of their riders' innermost thoughts and feelings. But most seemed 
to see horses as uniquely sensitive to human hearts, minds and souls, more so than other 
animals (even more than dogs, who were 'too forgiving' and 'too tame' one participant 
told me), and certainly more 'in tune' with emotional states than humans were. While this 
knowledge was widespread, it was nevertheless regularly remarked upon and 
remembered anew as particular circumstances led to revelations or warnings, via the 
barometer of the horse, about the mental state of the rider. 
  
Riders' recognition that feelings can transmit across inter-species individuals is not 
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novel40. Similar phenomena have been studied in developmental psychology and 
neurology under the name of 'emotional contagion' (Panskepp and Panskepp 2013). 
Some ethologists and welfare scientists have argued for a sensitivity in the opposite 
direction; that humans have more access to animals' emotional registers than scientific 
methodology tends to allow (Bekoff and Pierce 2009, Whemelsfelder, Hunter, Mendl and 
Lawrence 2000). In congruence with this, Vincianne Despret refers to 'embodied 
empathy' (2013), sociologist Leslie Irvine uses the term 'vitality effects' (2008:138), and 
Ken Shapiro describes 'kinaesthetic empathy' (2008:33) to refer to the tone of movement 
in animal and human bodies that is available to others via mutual feeling, rather than 
cold, objective, interpretative analysis. 
  
Experiences of equestrian shared feelings resonate particularly well with the 'affective 
turn'. Inspired by readings of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guatarri, researchers of affect are 
interested in the interpersonal, environmental and relational aspects of feelings that are 
more permeable, influential, emergent and atmospheric than personally felt, identifiable 
'emotions' (Thrift 2004, 2008, Stewart 2011, Massumi 2002). Ethnomusicologist Ana 
Hofman claims, ‘[Affect] is embodied in the automatic reaction manifested in the skin, 
on the surface of the body and in the heartbeat, but it is still something that goes beyond 
the body, a passage from one experiential state of the body to another.... that body is not 
exclusively human, but can also be animal or plant, crowd or social body.’ (2015:36). 
  
Affect theory seems able to describe well the way humans and horses are 'moved' by 
encountering one another, particularly where this is experienced as unintentional. For 
example, Sarah told me: 
  
 [After that lesson] I suddenly realised I am communicating with her the whole 
time. Whether or not I mean it, or whatever I think I am doing, I am actually 
communicating, because my body is communicating, and that is going to be 
influencing her...so, even how I breathe, it is linked to her breathing, so, like,  we 
were both breathing quickly and sort of holding our breath, and she was speeding 
up, and I hadn't even noticed that it had happened until [the instructor] said, look 
at your breathing, and then we both started to breath and then she took this big 
sigh and I felt like a weight lifting and we both slowed down. It was amazing. 
Dictaphone recording, November 2015. 
                                                 
40though the ideas of specific thoughts/pictures transmitting as Anne describes is more radical. 
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 The way Sarah uses the term 'communication' here is distinct from the models that focus 
on speaker intention and referentiality discussed in Chapter Four (see Duranti 2015). She 
explains becoming aware of, and amazed by, a sort of ongoing embodied influence that 
cannot be explained by the idea of deliberate, discrete, representational gestures. A 
similar recognition leads Thomas Csordas to reject the term 'body language,' which 
presumes some sort of code or grammar, instead he talks about 'intercorporeality' as 
'languages Other' in order to emphasise that this sort of communication is not a non-
speaking speaking, but something structured quite differently, quite at odds with a 
representational model (2008:114). 
  
Affect theory seems to also capture well the experiences described in Chapter Three, 
where riders struggled to narrate the root cause of feelings of anxious unease; where did 
they come from? The horses' physical problems, or the riders' uncontrolled fear? The 
guilt-fear-anxiety that infiltrated the relationship was hard to name, hard to place, and 
hard to own. Similarly, a surge of excited-nervous energy could inhabit horse and rider 
problematically during the buzz of a horse show, or in the thrill-terror of a fast-paced 
gallop that got out of hand. On hot summer afternoons, horses and riders lazily plodded 
around shady hacks, sharing the hazy and atmospheric attunement (Stewart 2011) of 
calmness and warmth, while on brisk, windy, autumn days, both horse and rider were 
sharply alert and reactive, seemingly feeding off one another’s brittle tension and the 
liveliness of the windy weather (inhabiting a responsive relatedness to the weather world, 
as described by Ingold 2010). And, in line with the excerpts which opened this chapter, 
the feelings of 'true togetherness', power, softness, and energy that riders report in 
sublime moments of real connection seem to exist with, rather than refer to, the horse’s 
mindful movements during moments of centaur-like partnership. Game describes, 
'Connectedness in living the image of the centaur comes of... letting go of self in order to 
be open to a connecting spirit.' 
(2011:10.) 
  
Game’s language may be a little too poetic to gain favour with many of my participants, 
most of the time, (see Chapter Four), but it testifies to the way that this affective 
connection is emphasised and valued as almost divine. I am reminded here of John 
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Durham Peters' exploration of the history of American/British ideas of communication 
since the 19th Century (2012). He demonstrates historical moments where 
'communication' (in various forms) has featured as a particularly seductive, and/or 
dangerous idea. He describes titillating excitement and genuine fear at the idea of some-
or-other communicative mechanism or technology causing breakthroughs in the way 
personal thoughts might become more accessible and available to others. Hence an 
excitement about mind-reading is shadowed by fear of mind control. On the other hand, 
the limits of communicative mechanisms to live up to these ideals/horrors provides 
privacy and authority over one’s own soul/mind, but also the impossibility of ever truly 
connecting - the melancholy of isolated solipsism. Peters demonstrates echoes of these 
'good and evil twins of communication' reconfigured in different historical contexts 
(2012:12-16, 27). Using these ideas, we could suggest that affect theory and equestrian 
centaur-like togetherness both have a footing in this longstanding obsession with our 
capacities to communicate, particularly when articulated in comparison to the 
contemporary disembodied form of digital connectivity. Affect theory emphasises the 
fact that we are already communicatively connected – not only to one another but also to 
the world, through our bodies, thereby banishing the evil twin of solipsism, while the 
idea of centaur-like togetherness ritualises how complete and fulfilling that embodied-
connecting can be if we recognise it and develop it in the right way. 
  
The horse as a mirror to the soul 
Riders spoke about the affective responsiveness of horses as though it was special; 
sometimes with awe, sometimes as though one is in on the secret. The non-
representational, unintended, embodied and spontaneous nature of this sort of influence 
gave it an air of utmost authenticity, which could be productively contrasted against a 
cynicism regarding the sorts of 'facework' (Goffman 1955) expected from Facebook and 
other digital media and marketing platforms (Dalsgaard 2008). However, this heightened 
value and even sacredness of equestrian affective responsiveness does not provide 
equestrians with an alternative to theories of pre-existing, internalised subjectivity, as it 
does for affect theorists. Rather, equine mind-reading responsiveness compliments the 
idea of a true, hidden self or soul, with the idea that the horse has a special sort of access 
to it. Riders spoke to me about being their 'true self'' around horses, compared to in their 
human relationships. They applauded the way that horses’ responses to/with people could 
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flatten, rather than flatter, egos through rejecting riders whose wealth, looks, or other 
status symbols were meaningless to their mounts. They celebrated the way horses 
interrogated personal substance, rather than superficial representation. In Chapter One, I 
noted how this was welcomed particularly by women, who felt judged by horses on equal 
grounds to men – and not in line with their clothing or appearance. As Jill told me, “You 
either make a horse feel safe, or you don't.” 
  
The 'horse responds to the real me' discourse emphasises three points; that there is a true 
self to be known, that this self is at risk of being unrecognised and impoverished, and 
that there is a (continually surprising) underlying connectivity of influence between horse 
and rider that can/should be honed and enhanced, rather than constructed from nothing. 
This creates an interesting mixture between the non-representationalism of something 
akin to affect theory on the one hand, and a heightened sense of personalised interiority 
on the other; evident most clearly in the popular phrase, “The horse is a mirror for the 
soul”. The idea of the soul as a mirror image, visible and accessible yet intangible and 
other-worldly, captures the uncanny exposure of interiority that riders experience in their 
horses’ responsiveness, while also celebrating, rather than negating, the existence of such 
a soul. Horse/rider affectivity enhances, rather than demolishes, the capacity for detailed 
self-reflection. 
  
The idea of authentic, spontaneous, perhaps parrhesiastic (Foucault 1986) responses from 
the horse can provide the resource for certain projects of self-improvement. Riders and 
instructors try to shape dysfunctional affective responsiveness (guilt-fear-anger-anxiety-
tension) towards centaur-like ends (confidence-harmony-balance-power-pride). In this 
process, affective, emergent responses are 'tamed' into name-able emotions (Massumi, 
2002:219 from Wetherall 2013:354), cause and effect are distilled and a distinction 
between responsible human subject and responsive equine subject is often made. For 
example, in one riding lesson, a muscular, short legged, 'stressy' little horse, named 
'Blackie'  for his colour, jig-jogged in a sweaty frenzy, refusing his rider’s requests to 
calm down and walk. His rider/owner, Emma, looked equally tense, gripping onto the 
reins with white knuckles, her upper body buckled forward, and speaking in a high 
pitched, pinched voice, 'steady, steady, walk, walk now, come on, walk now,' she 
pleaded. Emma had only recently bought Blackie and things were not going well, both 
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horse and rider were becoming increasingly fraught, they just didn't click well, I was 
told, and they were bringing out the worst in each other. Her instructor tried her best to 
salvage the relationship with a stern lecture. Emma HAD to get control of her anxiety, 
she emphasised, because all of this tension was coming from her. Blackie was reacting to 
the tight reins, the gripping legs, and the fact Emma was barely breathing. She had to 
learn to breath, she had to trust the horse, and she had to let the reins go a bit. Using 
Karen Barad's language, we might say that as emotions and responsibilities are 
identified, 'agential cuts' are made that distinguish self from other, cause from effect 
(2003:815). The affective bundle of horse/rider nerves becomes partible, the fingers are a 
name-able part of the problem, as is the breathing. The rider’s intentionality is called 
upon to get control of her nerves. What is 'made available' (Despret's language 2013:122-
123) in this multispecies context is work to improve Emma's state management for the 
good of the relationship. 
  
Cultivating embodied authority 
One way in which riders work to control, organise, and enhance their affective influence 
on the horse is through the idea of 'holding intent', also known as 'meaning it'. The latter 
would be more associated with a traditionalist style of instruction, and the former with 
the alternative horsemanship system. The two terms are not entirely synonymous, but 
both refer to a particular way of moving with embodied conviction that has a largely 
positive influence on the horse. For example, both ideas were used to explain the 
phenomenon that I witnessed novice riders experience whereby their cues to the horse 
seem to fall on deaf ears, ignored by lifeless horses who then seem to suddenly spring to 
attendance as soon as the instructor mounts up to show the student what to do. In these 
cases, instructors sometimes clarified that the problem was not the accuracy of the 
novice’s signals, but the novice’s lack of 'clear intent' or ability to 'really mean it'. Bertie 
explained in one lesson, “It’s no good just flapping your legs like that feebly, and 
thinking you have asked the horse to trot, you have to inspire him. You have to mean it. 
Don't be rough, it isn't about being tougher, you’re only getting rough because you don't 
believe it will work. It’s about just trotting, just going trot with your whole body, don’t 
think about asking him, just really mean it, like it’s definitely going to happen, no big 
deal, like trot” [the instructor moved forward into a trot on his own feet as he said the 
command]. 
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Self-belief is one of many traits/skills that are recognised as having positive impacts on 
horses and are made available for development work through the equestrian encounter. 
Crucially, these traits are also valued in riders' human society, they include; authority, 
self-control, resilience, integrity, clarity, authenticity, humility, self-respect, awareness of 
others, initiative. In short, they are what broader contemporary British society might call 
'leadership skills' (e.g. Telegraph article, “Leadership: The Eight Essential Skills”, 
Peacock 2013). These emotional/personal/social 'skills' are the focus of Bonnie Urciuoli's 
ethnographic exploration of the 'neoliberalisation of the self' in North American 'soft 
skills' corporate development programs (2008). She describes the worker-self-as-skills-
bundle (2008:211) required by the contemporary labour force: flexible, resilient, and 
highly motivated. The 'neoliberal twist' she explains, is 'persuading workers that this is 
right, natural and empowering’ (2008:222). In the equestrian case, there is often little 
causal relationship between work on emotional comportment when riding and 
subsequent corporate success or value to the labour market. In fact, these equestrian 
endeavours are framed by participants as a sort of anti-work work, as an opportunity to 
develop a more meaningful, natural, authentic sort of interpersonal power than is 
afforded within the labour market. However, the neoliberal ethic described by Urciuoli is 
clearly present in the form of 'autonomation' and 'responsibilisation' (Rose 1992: eg.162) 
where riders develop 'state management' (as some riders call it) in order to maximise and 
optimise their influence and impact.  Sometimes, similarities with working values are 
identified. For example, Lorraine told me about the central role her horse has played in 
her anger management, since in order to get him to 'go well', she had to learn to 
recognise and manage her own 'internal state' as she put it. “I am a much nicer person 
around him than I am at work,” she explained, “but I try to be the horsey-me at work if I 
can, to keep clear, and calm, and to keep it all together.” 
  
The responsibilisation of riders' own 'state management' presents a daunting feat with 
many unsettling risks, reminiscent of Peters' evil twin that shadows the idea of 
transparent communication (2012). In attending to their affective impact on the horse, 
riders learn (and relearn) they are 'moved' by all sorts of environments, often in negative 
ways, and also that they are 'moving' others without their knowledge, and often with 
undesirable results. They discover that 'private' thoughts are actually accessible and 
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impactful. They may find they are 'thinking' in ways they didn't even realise. They are 
drawn to recognise that a bad day at work infiltrates their very being and infects their 
embodied presence in ways that the horse reveals. With this awareness, the horse can 
become like the panopticon (Foucault 1985:eg 202-203) of the riders' emotional 
composure and 'internal' attitude. Although this provides opportunities for self-
development that can be empowering even outside of the stable yard, when things are 
going wrong, riders find their own thinking/feeling practices scrutinised as the site/cause 
of dysfunction. Even momentary lapses in the riders' commitment became remark-able 
failures in this material-semiotic context. For example, during jumping, even a half-
formed version of the intrusive thought, “what if he stops?” would seem to find itself 
quickly, and brutally, answered: horses were seen as responding to riders' doubts by 
putting the brakes on in front of fences resulting in falls. This sort of affective 
responsiveness 'makes say-able' (to paraphrase Barad 2003:819) continuous evaluations 
and speculations about riders (lack of) belief and commitment in the felicity of their own 
commands. Horses seemed to reject hypocrisy, falsity, feeble-minded leadership, or two-
faced communication, and rewarded authenticity, integrity, and genuine self-belief. 
  
'Holding intent' as a gendered concept 
Authenticity and self-belief feature in a gendered dynamic, in that women were 
considered particularly liable to need self-development in terms of establishing these 
leadership skills. Throughout my fieldwork, the empowerment of women towards 
leadership roles continued to feature in British media and political discourse as a 
significant and important challenge. Popular media engaged with scientific research that 
revealed 'cultural bias' in terms of the expectations on women’s working styles and 
capacities (e.g. BBC programme “Boys and Girls, Can Our Kids Go Gender Free?” Sept 
2017), leading to a diffuse awareness that British women suffer from faults of self-
deprecation as much as men are liable to over-inflation. This discourse often focussed on 
developing women’s personal attributes as the means for overcoming gender 
inequalities; echoing Anita Harris' description of the idea of 'can-do' girls, full of 
(appropriate) ambition (2004: 25, 13-47). Christina Scharff demonstrates that young 
British women in particular engage with the idea that they should be ambitious and 
resilient, individualising the responsibility to make things happen in their own futures 
(2016, also McRobbie 2009). 
181 
  
Like Scharff's participants, many horse riders were defiant about any expectation that 
women may well be lacking in confidence or plagued with self-doubts. This is a related, 
but distinct, phenomenon from the physical bravery and endurance known as 'not girly' 
that I have already described in Chapter One. Here, rather, I refer to the capacity to 
assume an embodied 'aura of authority' (to repurpose Michelle Rosaldo's term 1974:39, 
see Lugo 2000) that naturally commands respect. For example, Heidi told me about how 
horsemanship has helped her stand up for herself at work when she was being patronised 
by a male colleague: “I was like, Hey! I have found a way to get half a tonne of 
belligerent horse to respect me. You, Sir, will not be a problem!” Horsemanship enabled 
riders to orientate themselves variably against the expectation that women may struggle 
to hold authority, but it certainly didn't dissolve that expectation altogether.  Occasionally 
'meaning it' was referred to as 'manning up'. Those without the sufficient authority were 
referred to as 'wet' – which captures something of the undesirable embodied slackness, 
limpness and emotional permeability (to some extent, a form of girliness) that was to be 
avoided. Traditionalist instructor Bertie told me that many women are unable to 'feel 
comfortable' being in control, so they are more likely to either be pushed around or to get 
frustrated. “I'm not saying that’s right,” he qualified, “but it is the way it is, more often 
you have to give them [women] permission to really take control of the horse.” 
  
During one residential alternative horsemanship course, instructors worked particularly 
explicitly on riders' ability to 'hold intent', which they described at various points as 
“being present”, “being grounded”, “having purpose”, “having self-confidence”, 
“inhabiting your own movements” “believing in yourself” and “being authentic”. One of 
the tutors, Sandra, told me of some cases where women had discovered 'their own power' 
which came in the form of 'a way to occupy personal space as though you have a 
complete right to be there, as though you own that space'. Sandra proudly explained that 
with these skills, women had gone home from the course to make massive changes in 
their lives – starting new careers, negotiating pay rises, renegotiating the terms of 
personal relationships, even ending them. 'YOU are worth listening to!' Sandra 
announced to one student whose horse was ignoring her. 'You ARE. But you are not 
going to be listened to unless you believe that... Imagine the most important you have 
ever felt, or better, imagine the most important person you personally know. How do they 
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move? How do they feel when they walk down the corridor? That is how you need to 
move to inspire this horse. He needs to be like, Oh Wow! Who is She?!' This sort of work 
on making the self authoritative in the right way – inspiring respect rather than pleading, 
negotiating or resorting to force- was an ongoing and central project for most 
equestrians, and an esteemed quality in talented riders. 
  
Reflecting back on the descriptions of true connection transcribed at the start of this 
chapter, we can begin to see a specificity to the value of the experience. These moments 
index an accomplishment in cultivating a particular sort of connectivity which answers to 
both a fear of solipsism and yet also indexes an accomplishment in personal 
comportment. Against the societal risk that women will not know what they want in a 
clear enough way, or at least, will not be able to communicate or act on those wants 
authoritatively, moments of true connection are empowering as instances where riders' 
intentions are profoundly, positively impactful and realised in the composed, muscular, 
'light, but strong' movements of/with the horse, so liberating it was 'like flying'. 
  
 Evaluating true engagement 
 
The horse’s body as communicative infrastructure 
From first riding lessons to professional competition standards, riders work to improve 
the efficacy of their communication with the horse. This communication comes in 
various forms. The affective dynamics discussed above are one important aspect; another 
is the use of the rider’s legs upon the horse’s sides, the rider’s 'seat' on the saddle and 
weight distribution, and the 'contact' between the horse’s mouth, the metal bit, the reins, 
and the rider’s hands. Novice riders may simply pull the right rein to go right, pull both 
reins to stop, and kick to go. All of these controls have to be taught to young horses who 
do not automatically offer the desired responses to these signals, and responses also have 
to be 'kept sharp' in older horses - who do not always turn right when the right rein is 
pulled. More advanced riders develop a subtle relationship with the aids: a centimetre of 
difference in the angle of the rein, or in the placement of the leg along the horse’s ribs, 
can communicate transitions in speed, direction, pace, or posture to the horse, if the horse 
is prepared to understand and respond (Brandt 2004, Dashper 2016). Much riding and 
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horsemanship practice involves improving the horse’s response to communicative aids, 
as well as simultaneously developing his athleticism in order that horses and riders might 
be able to better perform the challenges of show jumping, eventing, dressage, or even 
pleasant hacking; the idea is that horses should be (using riders’ terms) supple, malleable, 
and soft. 
  
Over the last two decades, riders have taken an increasingly keen interest in the 
biomechanics of the horse’s body, which is seen as the infrastructure through which their 
riding ambitions are met (e.g. Wanless 2008, Higgins and Martin, Moffet 2012, Swift 
2014). The horse’s body is described as both a site of communication, and as a site of 
energy and power. An 'unbalanced' horse would be recognised as one who is not in full 
control of his/her body, but 'falling' round corners, 'dragging' himself along, or 'leaning' 
on the rider’s support through the reins. In contrast, a balanced horse is poised such that 
he or she is ready to change speed or direction, or adjust bodily posture (for example, 
bending in the opposite direction) quickly, without tension, and without losing 
composure. This takes strength as well as skill, on both horse and rider’s parts. Riding 
instructors, internet information pages, and riding manuals alike, explain that the horse's 
body must be organised in order to retain balance and to be able to respond quickly and 
softly to the movements the rider requests. The horse must have a well-developed 'top 
line' – which refers to the muscles that stretch from his ears, along his neck and back, to 
his tail. This enables him to arch his neck and shift his centre of gravity back towards the 
hind legs. From this position, the hind legs step further under the horse’s body, and act 
like springs that lift the horse and rider off the ground, giving more 'elevation' and 
'power' to the movements. It is said that the horse has 'engaged' his hind end, or, more 
broadly, that 'he is nicely engaged''. The term 'engagement' is often used to describe this 
physical posture and mental attentiveness that are one and the same thing; the horse is 
ready to respond, attentive, and 'on the aids'. His body is in the right place, 
because/therefore his mind is ready to respond positively to any task he is given. 
  
Tinkering and repair work 
Walking past the arena with a wheelbarrow full of muck, as I did at least once every day, 
I might well witness a horse and rider in what looked like a private bubble of focussed 
responsiveness to one another, 'schooling' in the arena. The chances are I would go 
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unnoticed, feeling somehow awkward as an unacknowledged observer. Sometimes, being 
an accidental watcher here is no more problematic than, say, walking past an exercise 
class in a public space. But at other times, it is as though I have walked in on something 
like a musician's private practice of a difficult tune, or even a couple’s talking therapy 
session.   
 
When schooling, riders take up an expression of utmost concentration. Often, they are 
looking down at the horse’s neck and shoulders and frowning with focus. Mostly, the 
adjustments that they make are subtle. Perhaps they complete a trot-canter transition 
(change of pace) that goes awry, the horse’s head lifts, the rider’s hands pull back, both 
look braced, all sense of harmony is lost for a few seconds. They may, in this instance, 
return to trot, to try again, more preparation, better timing, perhaps the rider tries to sit 
more squarely in the saddle, or to encourage the horse to bend his neck ever so slightly 
more to the left, perhaps subsequently the transition is improved. But not infrequently the 
repair work is more pronounced; a smack, or a few forced steps backwards might get the 
horse to 'listen better'. Returning to a slower pace and breaking the exercise down into 
smaller steps might help to clarify what was going wrong. Or the rider might lose their 
balance to varying degrees and actively have to regain it. The horse might buck, evade, 
or otherwise reprimand the rider (or at least, it could be interpreted thus). 
  
 Schooling is akin to the 'adaptive tinkering' (2010:15) Anne-Marie Mol describes in an 
ethics of care: ‘Try again’, she says, ‘try something a bit different, be attentive’ 
(2010:14). This is physically and mentally demanding work, things don't always get 
better as the session progresses, and any sort of progress is measured in micromoments; 
significant goals (getting a 65% score in a novice dressage test, perhaps) are set in 
months and years, not in days or weeks. 
  
I describe this schooling as 'repair work', borrowing the phrase from linguistic 
anthropologist Emanuel Schegloff (1992). He uses the term to describe the way human-
human conversation partners will alter the usual turn-taking exchange as they detect and 
repair any misunderstanding. Each turn communicates an understanding of the things 
that have previously been said, and of the other speaker’s communicative intentions. Any 
rupture in shared understanding requires intervention of varying degrees of subtlety, and 
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maintaining a working conversation requires ongoing reflexivity and responsiveness. 
Schegloff argues that even everyday conversations can be seen as the site of ongoing, 
intersubjective work to establish a sense of shared reality. While the verbality of the 
exchange is central to Schegloff’s theory, and, in contrast, equestrian communication is 
an ongoing embodied affair where 'turns' at speech are not particularly apparent, the 
phrase captures riders' continual readiness to the detection of problematic intersubjective 
dynamics, and ongoing attempts to repair them to reach a shared ease of communication. 
  
Connecting, collecting, engaging. 
Below is an extract from a riding lesson, demonstrating the ongoing task of working on 
the horse’s posture and therefore also, improving communicative harmony. 
  
Come on your three-quarter line, and then over we go, that's it, yeah, you got your 
weight just right and he said “oh, that's what that means!” That's good. And again. 
Did you feel he was there, when he came against your hand? Yep. That again is 
when the steering is not happening enough from the seat and leg area, and he just 
gets a bit against your hand, and that, to be fair to you and him, he got a bit 
stretched in the tracking on the fence line, so it was a lack of balance issue rather 
than an obstinance. 
 [pause] 
Yeah, good good good, we are getting there now. When he does give in – when he 
softens about everything, he is easy. Yep. That's it, now he's got a bit of a happier 
face about him and more of a swing in his stride. So, I think he is feeling a bit 
more comfortable now. When you were doing this before he was holding his tail 
quite a lot to the right, and now it is becoming softer, so I do think he was having 
a bit of an issue. Let's see him walk and let him have a stretch through. He is 
softer in this direction, do you feel that? 
 [pause] 
Good, now try taking the circle a little bit smaller. And as he comes into the 
circle, be careful that he doesn't start to sag, he has to keep a little bit active in his 
hind leg to keep his back up. Head up, head up – you are both falling forward. 
Now don't pull back on him to correct or he'll block, yup, that's better, yeah, you 
feel the difference when he did a little - 'give'? Then he comes through from 
behind for a stride or two? 
Dictaphone recording of a lesson with Anne and Cathy, November 2015 
  
This exemplifies well the typical riding lesson work of dealing with a multitude of 
ruptures and dysfunctions; balance problems, comfort issues, communication break 
downs, attitude problems (on either horse or rider’s part). Instructors sort ruptures into 
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one or other of these categories; it seems important, for example, for Anne to help Cathy 
acknowledge when the problem is the tracking in the arena compared to obstinance (to 
be fair to him, she says). We might call the tracking a 'mechanical' explanation and the 
obstinance a 'relational' one. In other instances, some of Anne's language manages to 
capture something like the 'vitality affects' Irvine describes (2008:138), elucidating the 
affective tone of the horse’s movement and/or the texture of the sensory contact between 
horse and rider, while still leaving the exact intentionality of the horse vague. For 
example, when describing the horse as 'blocking' – it is unclear whether the block is a 
physical issue in the muscle fibres, a reflex, or misunderstanding, or a recalcitrant 
decision. All three sorts of description (relational, mechanical and 'tonal' – we might say) 
are common in riding lessons, often plaited into complex relationships with one another 
as in this example here. The point I would like to take from this is not only that riders and 
instructors maintain and utilise multiple ideas about the relationship between the horse’s 
mind and movement, or body and ideas. Rather, I'd like to acknowledge how distinctive a 
goal it is, given this epistemological and technical apparatus, to reach a state where the 
whole of the horse’s mind and body is pliable and receptive for favourable 
communicative responses, which is the ultimate aim. 
  
What is striking about watching lessons with Anne is that the sort of togetherness riders 
seek is intricately detailed, with the horse and rider’s mindful bodies appearing 
frequently fragmented into misfiring parts as the ruptures are identified and amended.  
Through intense scrutiny of the horse’s body, riders/instructors are also invested in their 
horse’s motivation, concentration, willingness, trust, intelligence, and understanding. 
Minute 'resistances' can be felt/found and worked out, sometimes this seems like 
massaging away a knot of tension in a muscle, or like talking an unwilling teenager into 
doing the washing up. True engagement is not just about achieving potential, but also 
about mitigating damage. A horse who is not 'working properly' is thought likely to be 
weakened or physically damaged by the riding process. The phrase 'not working 
properly' is meant in an intentional sense, akin to the way it might apply to undergrads 
(for example), rather than, say, car head lights. However, it benefits from the mechanical 
association and refers to the correctness of the body – a synonymous phrase is that the 
horse is/isn't 'using himself well'. What is made available to riders, in this material-
semiotic apparatus, is a monumental and magnificent task of collecting, improving, 
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assembling, composing and connecting parts such that the rider can have an unreservedly 
communicative relationship with the whole horse, and reach a state of complete co-
operation and mutual engagement. Riders often speak of 'gathering him up,’ or 'getting 
him together', as though, uninfluenced, the horse’s body and self is scattered, disarrayed, 
and misaligned, and unavailable for optimum connection and communication in that 
state. 
  
Improving the horse’s way of going is about increasing the horse's conscious connection 
with his own body, and at one and the same time, increasing his conscious connection 
with the rider’s aids. It is therefore an awareness-raising exercise in which the horse 
learns to know his body, as well as an ongoing task of convincing him as to what he 
ought to do with it in order to achieve mutual benefit and flourishing. A common 
exercise involved raising wooden poles a few inches off the ground for horses to trot 
over in order to, “learn where his feet are”. The most likely problem area with the horse’s 
awareness of his body was thought to be the back legs, it was not uncommon for people 
to suggest the horse had “forgotten he had hind legs” or “he isn't connected to his hind 
legs”, or to say they were trying to “get his brain to talk to his back end.” The hind legs 
were considered the power-house of the horse, responsible for generating power and 
energy. Another likely area for attention was the horse’s mouth, which was considered 
the area through which riders could communicate most subtly with the horse’s mind, 
feeling through their fingers the way the horse was thinking. This work is known as 
'improving the contact', and horses could 'take up the contact', 'resist' it or 'evade' it. “If 
you can get his mouth on side, his body will follow,” was a common phrase. Another 
way of describing a good, engaged way of going was to refer to the 'connection between 
the hind legs and the mouth'. The aim being that the rider was able to create energy and 
power from the horse’s hind legs as the 'engine', and then contain, control and direct that 
power through the 'softness' and acceptance of the horse’s mouth.  'True connection' is 
when the horse actively, deliberately, willingly engages the whole body attentively and 
completely with the exercise at hand, bringing all of its sensitive complexity into 
alignment – thus enabling mutually enjoyable and meaningful feats that would never be 
possible without such training. 
  
The word 'engagement' holds a cluster of related meanings in the British imaginary that 
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to some extent permeate the equestrian ideal: a romantic engagement, a mechanical 
engagement (engage the engine), a state of active participation, commitment, to be 
employed, coupled, and attentive. In contemporary usage, the term often features in 
negative form, in referring to the disengagement of youth with their future, the public 
disengagement with politics, or the disengagement of iPhone users who squander real 
face-to-face interactions.  Engagement is a term which suggests profitability and progress 
too, both in cultivating consumers and workers. Online marketing vies not only for 
consumers to see their adverts, but to actively engage with them also. Ideas that surround 
equestrian engagement clearly resonate with Foucault’s concept of biopower (1978: 
eg.140) , demonstrated in the phrase 'using himself well', as well the neoliberal ethic of 
optimising potential through self-awareness and concerted application to tasks (Harvey 
2007, Rose 1998). One particularly interesting aspect of equestrian engagement is that 
the horse features not only as the focus of subjection (as might be more commonly 
expected for nonhuman biopower), but as the model for subjectification also; the horse 
emerges much like a human worker whose own self-perspective can be harnessed and 
empowered – the horse has to learn to apply his 'engine', his mind, and his feet to the task 
at hand. A second point of interest is that since the horse’s true power is unleashed 
through his communicative accomplishments with people, equestrian engagement 
resonates with studies which recognise the way contemporary neoliberal markets value 
and even fetishize connectivity and communication as commodity (Cameron 2000, 
Urciouli 2008). As in those cases, the heightened value of connectivity is shadowed by 
the risk of being disconnected, or misconnected, and this plays out in scrutiny of the 
horse’s body. 
  
 
Scrutiny of the body, is it enhanced or dominated? 
The equestrian world is on the look-out for ways in which the horse’s body is not being 
used (or, more precisely, 'collected') in an optimal way, sometimes identifying a state of 
domination that can look alarmingly similar to real connection. This concern created a 
different sort of moralisation than debates over, say, whip-use or feeding regime. The 
particularly contentious aspect of working the horse in the wrong way was the possibility 
that what might look like a well-functioning, or even aesthetically pleasing shape (to 
some), could be hiding ugly truths and causing damage. In 2009, one top-level horse was 
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photographed with his mouth open – revealing his tongue turned blue from the pressure 
on the bit while in rollkür (extreme neck flexion) position. Given the sensitive moral 
relationship between riders and their horses’ mouths/minds, it is unsurprising that the 
image of a strangulated tongue, hidden in the mouth of a top performing horse, was 
deeply shocking, revolting, and upsetting to my participants. Internet campaigns were 
still actively circulated during my fieldwork (see images 3 and 4 below). In 2010, due to 
public demand new guidelines were made by the governing body of equestrian sports 
(the FEI41) to give stewards new grounds on which to warn, or eliminate, riders who used 
force to achieve rollkür or hyperflexion in the warm up ring. 
  
 
Images 9 and 10, shared on Facebook as part of antirollkur campaign. 
 
After the 'blue tongue scandal', head positions of horses became an even more sensitised 
issue, and a cause for regular critique and anxiety about one’s own and others’ riding. 
The hot defensiveness and sharp critique around this subject spilled over into even fairly 
mild examples of the horse's body not being 'properly engaged.' Confrontations were 
                                                 
41Fédération Equestre Internationale 
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mostly limited to internet forums, with some online discussions becoming so heated they 
were reported in the paper printed equestrian magazines too. One commentator to a 
lively and vicious thread responding to a photo of a horse 'over bent' captures the general 
tone of critique, “It's sick. Dominating such a beautiful animal into an Unnatural (sic) 
position just for the sake of your ego and your trophy. Shame on you. Get an education 
and learn about your horse’s body before you break him for good.”  In face to face 
encounters, critiques of 'over bending' and 'working the horse in a false shape' were less 
candid. The collecting ring at competitions was a key site for spotting acquaintances or 
strangers whose horse’s postures demonstrated signs of 'disengagement' (and therefore, 
potentially, abuse, and as a minimum, poor relationality). Problematic 'shapes' (neck too 
bent, hind legs not 'engaged') were criticised for being too 'artificial,' 'false,' and 
'manufactured', and linked to the use of 'gadgets' – particular pieces of training tack that 
encouraged the horse into certain 'outlines'– rather than achieved through 'good feel'. A 
few participants, notably the most competitively successful, resented the aura of intense 
moralised critique, and felt the over bending issue gave an opportunity for 'keyboard 
warriors' to cause a drama and critique those who ride at a higher standard than them, 
with little awareness of what really makes a horse happy, comfortable or successful 
themselves. They argued that the extreme moralisation of head positions was 
unnecessary, that, when performed correctly, even 'deep stretches' of the horse’s neck 
could enhance horses’ capabilities, rather than dominating them. 
 
In these efforts to scrutinise the engagement and shape of horses' bodies, there are 
resonances with broader British concerns about womens' consent, compliance, and 
coercive control, and with the challenges of differentiating between enhancing and 
dominating the body. Of course, one major difference is that in the equestrian example, it 
is the (often female) rider who takes the position of the potentially over-dominant party 
and the (often, castrated male) horse who is at risk.  Others have linked the moulding of 
horses' bodies to the aestheticizing and controlling of women's bodies. For example, 
Linda Kohanov describes an emotional connection between women and horses on 
account of the fact both have a long history of having been 'broken in' by men (2001). 
She directly links sexual violence to training violences and suggests that women can 
intrinsically recognise horses as comrades, having both been subjected to physical 
domination despite their deep emotional capacities to bond and collaborate in a more 
harmonious way. Both Amanda Miejer (2008) and Gina Marlene Dorre  (2002) describe 
191 
an affinity between Victorian women and horses, particularly the sympathy felt towards 
the fashionable restraint of horses' heads in bearing reins, given women's restraint 
through corsetry. Both were attempts to bind and control wilfulness as well as to 
aestheticize and tame natural flesh. I believe my participants would find this link 
uncomfortable, their concerns for the horse’s body are rooted in the reality of the horse’s 
needs, not in any symbolic reference to women-flesh. What is more, the unspoken echo 
of the power and ethics relating to riding, and those relating to sex would make my 
participants uneasy. While equestrian relationships involved a form of embodied 
intimacy and even love, they were absolutely not about interaction between sexualised 
bodies.42  However, the head-position controversies seemed to me to tap into an 
emotional and moral register that resonated strongly with discourse about women's 
choices with their bodies, in terms of enhancement, engagement, aestheticization, 
passivity or even complicity.  The salient risk was that either because of ignorance, or 
something more sinister in the desire for (the wrong sort of) control, seemingly 
harmonious – or even beautiful - relationships might in fact be damaging one of the 
partners, distorting their body, and inhibiting their true potential. 
  
Recognising a false outline is not easy. It takes a discerning, experienced and talented eye 
to see the relational and mechanical problems in what might, to the less skilled, or the 
differently opinionated, look or feel like a good engagement. While crude faults are 
easily recognised – though hard to fix - there is kudos in being able to see the enigmatic 
fault in a generally well-functioning pair. Is the horse really working 'through' enough? Is 
he truly, completely, engaged? Has his stride been able to 'open up' to its full capacity? Is 
he really moving straight and even? Is there enough bounce and 'cadence'? Is the rider’s 
seat or hands blocking the horse’s potential for even better paces? Does his eye show true 
acceptance? Is he holding a positive tension in his body or a negative one? Is there 
sufficient 'elevation'?  Communication between horse and rider is rarely good enough to 
be uncontentiously praised – winning scores in dressage competitions were often around 
68%. 
  
Maurstad, Davies and Cowles suggest that boundaries between horse and human are re-
                                                 
42In fact, while I do not explore it here, perhaps this emphatically non-sexual embodied intimacy was part 
of the liberating appeal of horsemanship for women. 
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affirmed in moments of communication breakdown (2013:330-333). My ethnography 
differs in that the recognition of communication breakdown, resistance, falsity, or 
domination, is a matter of (expert) perspective, a highly educated, nuanced and contested 
affair (Schuurman and Franklin 201543). The moralised scrutiny of horses' 'way of going' 
performs the need for a particular sort of moral/technical expertise when it comes to 
engaging the body.  The ideal of true, empowering, engagement of the mindful body is 
performed as an epistemological risk with hidden depths of complexity, a worthy subject 
of ongoing contestation, problematisation and revelation. This provides women with 
grounds for continually working at (rather than working out) ideas about passivity, 
aestheticization, embodied power and choice. True engagement features as a virtuous 
goal with numerous barriers, not least of which is the semiotic passivity of horses with 
regards to what is said and known about them. Horses are not considered reliably capable 
of adjudicating riders' representation of them, but as potentially inadvertently 
participating in dysfunctional relationships which dominate and damage, or at least, do 
not enhance their true potential to flourish. 
  
Reflecting back on the descriptions of true connection at the start of the chapter we can 
now see further specificities to the value of true connection. I have shown that horse and 
human bodies are understood and performed as made up of parts that do not usually 
connect in optimum ways, to themselves, to the world, or to the bodies of others. Riders' 
training practices demonstrate the belief that this state of affairs would be improved by 
greater awareness of those connectivities. True connection is a state in which the body is 
no longer problematically partible, and in which the whole horse/rider is actively co-
operating in the task such that nothing is 'blocked' and everything is engaged well. It is 
also a state in which, despite such deliberate and active cultivation of the body and mind, 
both horse and riders' true selves flourish in the relationship, neither is dominated, over-
aestheticised, or manufactured into falsity. 
 Developing a feel for real 
                                                 
43Nora Schuurman and Alen Franklin demonstrate how the horses resistant behaviour can act as a 'counter-
performance' that either challenges the trainers performance of expertise, or contributes to it – as trainers 
are able to perform their own skill in handling such a difficult horse. I do not draw on them further here, 
because their own interpretation of equine behaviour is problematically straightforward. They perform 
their own expertise in determining what really counts as resistance/partnership and are cynical in rela-
tion to the trainers in their account. 
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'Feel' and attunement 
To this point this chapter has drawn attention to embodied authority (on the part of the 
rider) and engagement (on the part of the horse) that riders cultivate in the quest for true 
connection. Managing and monitoring these projects involved a great deal of perceptive 
and proprioceptive skill: a 'tuning in' towards attending to both horse and riders' 
responsive bodies and the relatedness between them. 'Feel' is considered an elusive and 
valuable trait among horse riders. It refers to the perceptive capacity of the rider to be 
able to 'read' the horse’s emotionality and intentionality through tactile perception, but 
also to the ability of the rider to generate the right tone and timing with their own bodies 
such that the horse is most likely to respond to cues in a harmonious way. Changes in 
either horse or human body create responses in the other, and a rider with good feel can 
work with, rather than against, this mutual dependency to forge a good 'way of going'. 
Amateur horse riders spoke about those with particularly good feel (mostly professionals, 
some aspiring young riders) with admiration, and sometimes envy.  Much of their own 
riding practice, particularly in lessons, was about deliberately attempting to cultivate a 
good feel for the horse, at the same time as working on the horse’s embodied engagement 
with the rider. 
  
This sensitive attunement resonates with an ethic of responsive attentiveness that some 
scholars have advocated  (e.g. as research practice, Taylor 2013). For example, Donna 
Haraway argues that the important concept is not (human, one-way) responsibility, but 
response-ability (2008:71). In this line of argument, ethics is not located in personal, 
cognised deduction nor in societal rules and norms, but in the mutual bodily 
responsiveness of people in 'contact zones' with one another, animals, or environments.  
This is about tuning into embodied presence, rather than representation, such that 
geographers Beth Greenhough and Emma Roe (2010) describe Haraway's ethics in line 
with the nonrepresentational ethics of dance theorist Derek McCormack (2003). His, like 
Haraway's is a tactile ethics, of bodily attentiveness and cultivated sensitivity. 
  
Some anthropologists have reported this sort of attuned ethics ethnographically. Deborah 
Bird Rose conducted research in the Northern territories of Australia, and found an ethic 
of embodied attentiveness to the living environment among her research participants. She 
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emphasises that 'living responsibly requires one to take notice and to take care’ (2007:91) 
In a similar vein, Naisargi Dave describes animal rights activists in India as 'witnessing' 
animal suffering (2014). This is more than simply seeing, it refers to moments where 
people recognise the animal through being 'present,'  'to root themselves when they might 
rather run or turn away' (2104:440).  She describes how upon meeting a suffering horse, 
one of her participants was 'transformed, recognising in herself an ethical responsibility 
at the moment of seeing the animal other” (2014:441).    
  
These ethics of attention tend to be situated in opposition with representational 
epistemology, and are often described as though immiscible with the oft-cited Cartesian 
distinction between thought and world, mind and body, self and other (e.g. Dave 
2014:451, Greenhough and Roe 2010:43, Rose 2007). However, in this section I am 
going to show how the equestrian ethics of attuned 'feel' is situated within a modern 
context, and is cultivated through a complex relationship with representational thought. 
  
The unfeeling body, the absent mind; disconnection from reality. 
Schegloff describes the imperative to establish shared reality as a universal feature of 
human conversation (1992). However I am interested in the particular meaning and 
value of the establishing 'reality' in this context, and especially how it relates to the idea 
of intersubjective connection. In order to demonstrate this, I am going to turn to some 
ethnography of riders working on their 'feel' during horse-less workshops, where riders 
worked on the feeling capacity of their own bodies, while well away from the horses. 
  
In a village hall, thirteen women, and one man, sat in three rows staring intently at the 
fifteenth student, Gemma, who was mounted upon a saddle, which was fastened on an 
artificial simulation of a horse. Teaching on mechanical horses is becoming increasingly 
popular, and some of the top of the range machines can move in a way that simulates 
different paces, and can detect pressure changes under the saddle, so as to give the rider a 
read out of what is really happening with their weight distribution during efforts to 
absorb the bouncy rhythm of the horse’s back. This one, however, did not move, it was 
more of a rudimentary model, named 'Woody' after its principal component. Riding 
instructor, Julia, was saving up for a better model. Julia was small, slight, quick, and 
195 
gentle with a beady eye for detail. She was sparrow-like in the way she hopped around 
Gemma and Woody inspecting from every angle, head cocked to the side. Gemma's left 
leg was two inches shorter than her right, the result of a bad fall three years ago, which 
had left her with limited mobility in that leg. Gemma had attended the course with hopes 
of regaining something of her previous riding ability, which had been shattered by the 
fall. While her physical recovery had gone well, her riding skill had plateaued at a 
fraction of her previous competence, she didn't seem able to connect with her horse as 
she used to. She became tense, afraid and frustrated, she lost balance easily and felt 
herself gripping, she could barely turn to the right at all as her leg simply wouldn't give 
the aids she wanted it to, and her horse had become increasingly unruly. While the other 
students were able bodied, they were similar to Gemma in that each was frustrated that 
their body was not able enough to allow the form of connectivity they desired. 
  
Julia began by asking Gemma to imagine Woody was to disappear into thin air, leaving 
her to fall to the ground. “Would she fall on her feet, her bottom, or her face?” She asked. 
Gemma took a moment to consider, and responded confidently that she would fall onto 
her face. The other students murmured in wonder. It was clear from their perspective that 
Gemma was tipping backwards, that she would fall onto her bottom. Julia confirmed this 
fact, bringing the audience into play in order to convince Gemma of the observation. 
“You are worlds apart from what is actually happening with your own body” she 
lamented. Later, Julia told me she often started with an exercise such as this, a very clear 
demonstration of how disconnected people are from their bodies. “You have to show 
them what they don't know, and then once they believe you on that, they are able to really 
work on establishing more of a feel.” She explained. I see Julia’s role, therefore,  as 
cultivating a sense of ignorance (knowing what is not-known, Mair, Kelly and High 
2012) as well as a sense of feel. 
  
During the lesson, Julia often referred to a crises of connectivity between riders and their 
own bodies, which, I felt, mirrored the problem of connection between riders' bodies and 
their horses.  “As riders, we need to be in our own body to feel it. You need to be present 
in your own skin. This is what most of us are missing. We don't connect with our bodies, 
so we cannot feel the horse,” she emphasised, and then the plan; “I am going to give you 
a map, we are going to look for landmarks so that you know what is actually happening, 
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so that you know where you really are and what you are feeling.” Outside of the lesson, 
Julia spoke with me about the problems of disconnection that riders experienced. While 
particular traumas like Gemma’s made people more likely to 'absent' themselves from 
their own bodies, she felt most people were not really 'present'. Too stressed about work, 
or lost in their own ambitions, or running through their own fears, or stuck in negative 
patterns of bracing and ignoring and forcing their bodies in various ways. Too many were 
'all in their own heads' or 'somewhere else entirely' she explained. 
  
This dual work of recognising a form of embodied ignorance and replacing it with feel 
continued at increasingly subtle levels throughout the session. “Can you notice, if you 
close your eyes, how far down your body does your breath go?” Julia asked. Gemma was 
not sure. Julia placed her hands on Gemma's shoulders and shifted her a centimetre or so 
forward. “Well what about now, does the breath go further down your body, or less far 
than before?” she asked. Gemma tentatively tried, “Further”. “Good!” Julia confirmed. 
For several minutes Julia moved Gemma back to the old position, and forward again, 
until Gemma could reliably find the new position herself through recognising a change in 
the feeling of her breath when she was there.  Then Julia moved onto new foci, with 
increasingly imaginative registers of sensory perception, “And are your hands lighter, or 
heavier, in this position?” then, “Does your thigh feel stuffed with feathers, or with 
clay?” and, “If your whole body was stuffed with peas, where is the point where the 
stuffing is leaking?” 
  
Connecting (up/with/through) the partible, partial body 
During this process, Gemma’s body was often rendered as-if a mindful person in its own 
right. “Bodies have muscle memory,” Julia said, “which means they think they know what 
they are doing. This can be a pain in the backside, because bodies can't talk so we can't tell 
them otherwise. But we have to negotiate with them. We have to ask them to try something 
different.” The conversational and interactional metaphor ran throughout, the body was 
treated as a sentient being (or collection of beings), waiting to be better known. “Ask your 
toes if they can speak with your knees'' she said, at one point, and. “Gosh!” towards the end 
of the session, “You have such a clever body Gemma. You must be kind to it and thank it 
very much.”  At one point, Julia explicitly made the metaphor between communicating 
with the rider’s body and with the horse. “We have to treat your body like a horse” she said. 
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“We have to show it what this good position affords it. We have to help it feel secure in the 
right place, when it is doing the right thing.” 
  
In this work, the rider’s body was rendered partible and hard to know just as the horse’s 
body could also be, such that the job of composing these bodies was what Julia referred 
to as 'the ultimate multitask'. For example, when focusing on the feeling and position of 
her hands, Gemma 'detached' from her own breathing again, unable to organise both 
body parts at once. This mindful multitasking may be somewhat akin to learning any new 
embodied skill, until it becomes an unconsciously competent technique. However, the 
relational component of the equestrian project was particularly pronounced, the 
responsive horse and human bodies made 'feel' a moving target, susceptible to ongoing 
re-partibility and re-collection, quite different from learning to drive a car. Horse/rider 
embodied connectivity was performed and managed as a multifactorial, fragile, powerful 
interdependence not unlike a complex ecosystem, where 'balance' is a moving concept, 
and where tinkering creates unexpected consequences, and seems to inevitably reveal the 
fallibility of any attempt at holistic knowledge. Nonetheless, riders tried to cultivate an 
awareness and feel for the whole horse, via becoming better connected with the whole of 
the rider’s body. At the end of the session Gemma welled up with tears. She had never 
felt so in tune with her own body, she said, she felt she had discovered a 'powerful place 
to be' and she couldn't wait to see what it afforded her in terms of connecting with the 
horse. 
  
The horse-less workshop emphasises that the desire to connect with the horse is akin to 
the desire to better connect with, and through, the body, and I have begun to show that 
work to improve feel performs the crises of connectivity that it aims to overcome. In the 
more usual (ridden) riding lessons, I found the same themes of cultivating increasingly 
sensitive levels of ignorance (known not-knowing), and of recognising bodies as often 
misfiring and misconnected interdependent parts that needed collecting into harmonious 
wholes. This involves a complex relationship with modern ways of knowing. It is neither 
an exemplary case of Cartesian dualistic thinking, nor its opposite. While body parts 
might relate, think and even 'talk', and while there is a valorised dynamic of multispecies 
intersubjectivity and responsiveness, there is also a deep commitment to the idea of a 
real-reality that is hard to grasp, and an awkward solipsism to be grappled with in the 
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relationship between thoughts and bodies, selves and others, minds and worlds. 
  
Objectification and third person stance 
This commitment to the idea of enigmatic reality is evidenced in the prolific employment 
of a third-person perspective in the cultivation of 'feel'. Riding instructors were relied on 
heavily, most of my participants had lessons at least weekly, and all of them had lessons 
as often as they could afford (or a little more). Katherine Dashper describes the centrality 
of the horse-rider-instructor relationship as the 'triad' of equestrian pedagogy in which 
feel is taught (2016). In my ethnography, instructors were particularly valued for their 
ability to see or feel 'what is really happening' (sometimes riding the student's horse, but 
mostly watching from the ground). 'People have no idea what is going on underneath 
them,' Anne said, exasperated by another bunch of challenging lessons. 'They think it 
feels great, and you are looking and thinking, where am I even going to start unpicking 
this?!' But instructors are not the only source of third-person stance (and of course, 
instructors are also open to critique, not always trusted to get at the real relationship). 
Many riding arenas' contain at least one wall of mirrors, such that riders can glance up 
and see whether their knee is really where they think it is, or whether the horse looks as 
good or bad as he feels. An outside view, 'from the ground', is endemic to the idea of the 
real relationship. In books and internet pages, pedagogic diagrams of what horse and 
rider ought to look like almost invariably utilise a side-on, observer’s view (as in 
illustration 12), and very occasionally, a birds eye, top down perspective that captures the 
real degree of straightness, for example. Diagrams never picture the horse’s neck and 
head from the rider’s perspective. Riders must reflect on the relationship from the 
outside, in order to continually calibrate and improve what they are feeling on the inside. 
Regular competition is valued by riders as another way of measuring how the 
relationship is really progressing, against other competitors, and against past 
performance, via scores and judges’ comments (which, again, are open to critique). 
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 Internet based educational resource, happy horse training.com, offer a large number of 
diagrams demonstrating different aspects of correct training/riding. All feature 'outside 
perspective', as here 
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Webb Keane describes the third person stance as a central element of human ethical 
conduct, because it is from this stance that generalisations can be made, such that 
phenomena are 'objectified', which means, for Keane, rendered recognisable in explicit 
terms (2010:69, 2015:67). For Eduardo Kohn, too, despite his interest in non-symbolic, 
more-than-human registers of communication, it is the generalising and representational 
capacity of 'thirdness’44 that enables humans alone to inhabit moral worlds (2013:5, 60). 
However, my aim is not to analyse the role of thirdness in general, so much as to 
emphasise the particularly complex employment of it for the ethical project of developing 
feel. The cultivation of feel for real connection relies upon a representational way of 
considering thought distinct from material reality, in order to calibrate the senses and 
convince the mind to better inhabit the 'skin' of the body. 
  
 While riders continually re-evaluate themselves in relation to the horse when riding, by 
glancing into the mirror, or reflexively responding to the horse’s errors, or listening to the 
instructor's advice, they also recognise 'overthinking' as impeding the potential to connect 
with the horse, and they valorise those rare moments in which they aren't having to work 
at it, evaluate, interpret, and consciously adjust. The ideal, in fact, is to turn the triad of 
horse, rider and observer-of reality (instructor, or reflective self) into a dyad of merged 
horse and rider in complete connection, that is, to lose the need for thirdness, even as that 
need has been emphasised. 
  
Hyperreal horses and cultivated ignorance as linked, modern phenomena 
In examining Californian Vineyard Christians’ desire (and sometimes ability) to 
experience God as a 'hyperreal' material presence (2012a:301), Tanya Luhrmann has 
shown that increased attention towards detailed sensory perceptions can create 
experiences of vivid reality she calls 'absorption'45 (2012a:200-201). Crucially, for 
Luhrmann, Vineyard Christians' absorption in experiences of God is related to their 
culturally held beliefs about knowledge and the mind (2012b:378). The presumed 
'boundedness' of minds, the 'interiority' of experience, and an 'epistemological stance' 
that recognises plurality of beliefs (2012b:383), all feature in the way God is engaged 
                                                 
44Here, he uses the semiotics of Charles Pierce. 
45She adapts Tellegen and Atkinson's psychological term 1974. 
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with explicitly 'as if' he was a really present friend (2012a:74-78, 2012b:375, 378). In 
Vineyard Christians’ projects of coming to know God more completely, the imagination 
is employed and tuned in order that the mind might be opened up towards allowing God 
in (2012a:196). 
  
 Scepticism is an integral part of the project. Vineyard Christians work specifically to 
overcome a societal scepticism that, they argue, renders minds unable to be open towards 
the presence of a transcendental God, even when he is personally believed in 
(2012a:e.g.314). Scepticism is also employed, and honed, during the project of trying to 
hear God’s voice, as students seek support from one another, or interrogate themselves, 
to evaluate which of their tentative experiences of presence are really God (2012a:63-
67). Though honing the imagination towards experiencing a real that is not 
straightforwardly sense-able, Lurhmann's participants pay extreme attention toward their 
perceptive senses (try to imagine, in great sensory detail, what it would have been like to 
walk with Jesus, for example) and occasionally, this enables spontaneous, vivid, material 
sensations of God's voice, hand, or presence that are experienced as immediately and 
immanently real beyond doubt, without interpretation, analyses or evaluation. The value 
of this form of really-real God, and the work done to experience Him as such, are wholly 
modern phenomena, Luhrmann argues, “This near-magical God is an expression of what 
it is to be modern” (2012a:301). 
  
Clearly, there are significant differences between horses and God as interaction partners 
(their materiality, for one). However, what I find interesting about relating Luhrmann's 
use of absorption to the ethnography in this chapter is not just that it helps to explain how 
some moments of connection can appear so vividly real despite riders' high sensitivity 
towards epistemological challenges in knowing the horse. Rather, moments of hyperreal 
absorption are enabled precisely within a context of epistemological doubt, by the 
subsequent work that is taken on to make the real horse (or God) directly knowable 
through imaginative work to tune the senses, as seen, for example, in the tinkering repair 
work and the riderless workshop described above. This supports my argument that the 
ethical project of developing feel does not evidence an alternative to representational 
knowing, but is an intimate and complex engagement with it. 
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This is evidenced most clearly when we recognise the precariousness of any such 
experiences of holistic, dyadic, complete, real togetherness. The standards of what might 
count as real connection are pushed higher and higher as (or rather, if) riders improve, 
such that competent riders do not consider themselves experiencing real, complete 
connection most of the time. Rather, they have a more detailed, deep, and complex 
understanding of the nuances of connectivity that still evade them. They perform a more 
sophisticated cultivation of ignorance, but still, schooling time is spent deeply involved 
and invested in the known not-knowns, in what is not quite grasped, in the question of 
the connectivity they cannot quite feel, or the communication that is not quite shared. 
This was clear, for example, when Bertie looked at old photographs with me, and 
stopped for several seconds, transfixed by an image of himself competing at a show. That 
moment had felt amazing, he said, like such a connection between him and the horse, and 
like really good engagement and lightness. Now he could see the horse really wasn't 
moving that well at all, and his own hands were 'too heavy'. “It just shows how much you 
keep learning” he concluded. 
  
In this phrasing, Bertie tapped into a diffuse idea among my participants of the never-
ending learning project that was the relationship with the horse. At times, this learning 
was fraught, critical and urgent, and at others, it was tinkering, playing, and nurturing. 
While there were precious moments that surpassed the need for critical interpretation, 
nevertheless, the project of knowing/feeling the horse a bit more, a bit better, was never 
done. 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that my participants’ conception of real connection with the 
horse is a highly particular, valued, exclusive category of relatedness. The concept of true 
connection gains traction through the idea that while complex connectivity advances to 
hidden and incredible depths, optimum connectivity is elusive and unlikely. True 
connection is not (only) an example of the ways in which all life is embedded in 
responsive, co-constructive/destructive entanglements, but is the enhancement of that 
state through the accomplishment of a distinctive set of relational skills. My aim has not 
been to argue against performative theory of human/animal connectivity per se, but to 
argue that British horse riders do not perform profound connectivity as an alternative to, 
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or negation of the Cartesian dualisms associated with representational thinking. Rather, I 
have shown the quest for true connection involves a deep, complex engagement with 
representational registers of knowing. In contrast to the descriptions of relatedness 
typical of performative theorists or nonrepresentational ethicists, my participants 
demonstrated both a commitment to the idea of the objectively real, and a valorisation of 
the idea of the well-functioning whole.  In section one, I demonstrated how affective 
connectedness is sacralised as a mystical phenomenon, but also identified as a risk to 
subsequent personal responsibility. Ones' affective impact should be known, curtailed, 
composed, and harnessed. I showed how riders work on the holistic integrity and 
authenticity of their communications with the horse, particularly in the development of 
embodied authority – ‘meaning’ what you say– an aim considered particularly relevant 
for women. In section two I demonstrated the aim of engaging the whole of the horse’s 
mind and body, which emphasised the detailed partibility of horses’ bodies during 
scrutiny of 'way of going'. I showed the risky relationship between the ideal of enhanced 
embodied engagement and the (gendered) danger of domination, misrepresentation, and 
damage. In section three I have shown work to cultivate 'feel' demonstrates a crises of 
connectivity with, and through, the body, such that riders aim to be more 'present'  in 
their own skin, more 'in the moment' and more aware of their internal and external 
connectivity. I have shown riders' reliance on third-person objectivity, and on calibrating 
internal 'feel' to externally recognisable reality, even as the ideal of true connection is to 
experience such connectedness that representational mediation and personal reflexivity is 
momentarily redundant. In sum, I have argued that the quest for real ridden 
connectedness responds to, and recreates, a felt need for hyperreal, empowering, 
naturally ethical engagement and I have situated that need within a particular gendered, 
late modern context. 
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Conclusion 
 
I have shown that the project of achieving 'real connection' with the horse is a highly 
specific aim, situated within a particular classed, gendered, and epistemological 
environment, where 'truth' and connectivity hold peculiar import, and where (particularly 
women’s) ambitions are drawn towards the potential affordances of empowering 
togetherness that horses provide. In this conclusion I will draw together evidence from the 
preceding chapters and clarify my argument that British amateur equestrians' ethical 
relationships with their horses involve a complex mastery of, rather than negation of, 
Cartesian dualistic thinking. I will also summerise the complex relationship that has 
emerged throughout the thesis between the concepts of choice and nature. I will offer 
some concluding remarks on the role of verbal language within ethical relationships with 
non-verbal beings, and I will argue for the contribution that multispecies ethnography can 
offer to the anthropology of ethics. 
 
'Modern' epistemology and embodied, ethical, multispecies relationships   
 
Both the recent 'animal turn' and 'ethical turn' in anthropology have contributed toward 
'provincialising' (Chakrabarti 1992) epistemological patterns associated with modernity, 
and proposing alternatives. Individualisation, rationality, objectivity, detachment, and 
representationalism are notable terms among a constellation of concepts that are treated 
with caution, or disbanded entirely, by anthropologists whose admirable goals are to 
account for non-Western people on their own terms, or, alternatively, to better attend to 
the way in which Western people really live (or even, might live better). 
 
As described in the introduction, a critique of modern epistemology has been especially 
foundational to the emergence of the animal turn (Mullin 2002). Multispecies studies 
often frame their theoretical standpoint through explicit antagonism with the oft-cited 
Cartesian dualistic distinctions, between mind and body, self and other, human and non-
human (e.g. Locke and Muster 2015:1). However, I have demonstrated a number of 
epistemological practices that carry hallmarks of 'modern' dualistic thinking integrated 
within embodied registers of knowing, and intersubjective, multispecies, co-constructive 
dynamics. I have shown that these relational dynamics are sometimes at odds with the 
anti-modernism of the animal turn. In Chapter Two, I demonstrated the specific forms of 
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'open-mindedness' that British amateur horse riders practised and promoted. While at first 
glance, this appeared harmonious with the variant use of the term 'open' by some 
multispecies authors (Ingold 2000, 2006, Haraway 2003, 2008, Locke 2017), in fact, I 
showed an incompatibility. Riders were less concerned with the distinction between 
subjectivity and objectivity; presuming horses to be capable of social relationships, they 
were invested in ascertaining precisely (accurately, objectively) what sort of ethical 
relatedness each encounter demonstrated. 
 
In Chapter Three, I argued that British amateur horse riders value and utilise the idea of 
distinct individuals, even as those individuals are  recognisable through the 
intersubjective practice of constructing plots, in which characters are formed  in relation 
to one another.  I showed that while Haraway proposes multispecies entanglement and co-
becoming as an alternative to the idea of the rational, reflexive, self-constructing 
individual, in fact, it was in moments that felt particularly inchoate that riders were most 
likely to 'stand back' and analyse in an abstract sense, unable to act until a degree of 
narrative coherence – and individual distinction – could ground their thoughts and 
movements. 
 
In Chapter Four I showed that metaphorical registers of knowing are not necessarily or 
fundamentally more 'detached' (in the broadest sense) than ontological versions. I showed 
various ways in which the management of the not-real is an ethical practice. Not-real 
ways of speaking enabled riders to hone their embodied movements and communicate 
something of the tone of a relationship. Speaking not-real knowledge about horses also 
allowed riders to work out, and work at, how to know horses, sometimes through yielding 
to (learning from) the norms of legitimate discourse and sometimes through challenging 
or playing with them. 
 
In Chapter Five, I demonstrated various ways in which riders consider human and horse 
bodies to carry enticing potential for profound connectivity, but persistent problems too. 
While performative strands of multispecies literature have utilised examples of responsive 
embodied relationships with animals as an alternative to representational ways of 
thinking, I argued that in this ethnographic instance, the embodied relationship was 
inseparable from the representational concerns that co-exist with it. In the ethnography 
presented in this chapter, embodied registers of knowing are performed as fallible and 
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vulnerable as well as sacralised and utopian if accomplished correctly. Representational 
concerns abound: that (particularly female) riders won’t be able to compose and 
communicate their intentions clearly through their bodies, that horse bodies might be mis-
read, misrepresented, and dominated and damaged as a result, and that riders' bodies 
might not be able to feel what is really going on with the connectivity they are part of. 
Ironically, the reliance on a third-person perspective to mitigate these concerns is as 
trenchant as the desire to connect completely and dyadically, unmediated by reflexive 
thought, third-person evaluation, and critical interpretative analysis. 
 
Through attending to the embodied skills and experiences of my participants, I have also 
demonstrated that 'knowing well' in this context operates on two levels: the effective and 
the accurate. By 'effective,' I am refering to the capacity to hone and compose the 
dynamic of affective responsiveness between horse and rider. Effective ways of thinking 
during interaction with horses were not dithering, doubting, or reserved – traits which left 
bodies brittle, withdrawn, static and pensive. Effective epistemology while riding or 
handling horses was positive, spontaneous, optimistic, and involved moving with 
conviction, but also ongoing interest, 'feel', flexibility, and humility. This observation 
mirrors Vinciane Despret's assertion that thinking bodies are always also interacting 
bodies, that knowing is always a knowing with (2004, 2013, 2016). This argument leads 
Despret to reject the scientific quest for accurate knowledge that involves withdrawing or 
denying scientists' affective bodies (e.g. 2004:121). However, in my ethnography, British 
horse riders cared about accurate knowledge, objective truth and embodied affectivity and 
effectivity. The very challenge of riding was managing what you don't yet know at the 
same time as managing thinking-practice as an interactional skill. 
 
In sum, I have shown that British amateur horse riders' ethical relationships with their 
horses demonstrate an engaged, complex, and sometimes ambiguous relationship with the 
constellation of epistemological traits often associated with modernity and Cartesian 
dualism. That dualism has not featured in participants' conceptual apparatus in a stable 
and coherent sense. I have shown instances where riders consider their bodies as 'talking', 
where selves are co-constructed with others, where species boundaries are under constant 
reconsideration, and where the privacy of the rider’s 'soul' seeps out and infects their 
horse’s body. However, I also haven't found Cartesian dualisms irrevocably 'blurred', 
dispanded, or surpassed. I have described a deep commitment to the idea that reality is 
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distinct from fallible thoughts about it, that others' minds are never transparent (enough), 
that individuals are natural units of distinction – and that human individuals are 
responsible for what they choose, and how they know. The ethnography presented here is 
testament to the variety of 'detached' forms of thinking at play even in 'relational' settings 
(Candea, Cook, Trundle and Yarrow 2015, see also Neumark 2017). I hope to have shown 
that there is merit in attending to ethical epistemological practices as, on the one hand, the 
varied means of conducting ethical self-evaluating projects, and on the other, the ethical 
substance to be cultivated and valued, such that certain ways of thinking are considered 
virtuous in themselves (as in the metareflexivity in Chapter Four, for example). Further 
research of this type is necessary to enable comprehensive comparative work to ascertain 
the prevalence, distribution and variety of ethical epistemological traits similar to those 
described here, including to what extent we might consider these traits uniquely 'modern' 
phenomena. This call is harmonious with that made by Didier Fassin, who advocates a 
closer attendance to consequentialist ethical practices, which, presumably, may well 
involve a simultaneous commitment to the idea of establishing 'real' (2014:432-433). 
 
Choice, nature and real connection. 
 
The epistemological responsibility that I have described among British amateur horse 
riders is bound up in the awkward relationship between the concepts of choice and nature, 
and a related desire to be better in touch with reality as well as better connected. I 
introduced this conceptual tension in Chapter One, where I demonstrated that while riders 
greatly value the idea of individual choice, they often legitimise choices through the 
idiom of nature. This was evident in the case of women who were proud of the 
independence their equestrianism involved, yet apt to reinstate essentialistic views about 
the natural emotionality of gendered bodies in bolstering their sense of belonging. I 
described 'each to their own' as an ethic that celebrated individual variety, yet, at the same 
time, choice seemed to act as a risky mechanism for building resilient relationships, too 
many options were associated with community breakdown, and real belonging to horsey 
worlds was figured as 'in the bones' and 'part of the soul', a natural phenomenon that had 
to be actively pursued. 
 
This awkward and important relationship between choice and nature can be traced 
throughout the thesis, and was regularly related to riders' desire to connect – and for that 
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connection to be real. One regular theme throughout the ethnography involves the idea 
that relationships are constituted by the choices of the partners, and that a true connection 
is one that both partners freely choose. This theme was evident in Chapter Two, where 
riders were keen to emphasise and work towards their own epistemological independence, 
but were also (sometimes, in variant ways) invested in the idea that the horse ought to be 
a free thinking, choosing partner within the relationship. For some, very compliant 
behaviour was considered evidence of programmatic training rather than a real 
relationship. The provocation was that horses ought to look like active choosers in order 
for the connection to be a good one. A similar theme was repeated in Chapter Three, 
where resistant behaviour was not considered problematic for the quality of the 
relationship at all, if it were diagnosed as pain, becoming a matter of nature, rather than 
choice. However, if bad equine behaviour was considered willful, it was incumberent on 
riders to apply their own strength of mind, possibly overcoming their embodied 
fearfulness with sheer grit, in convincing the horse to choose differently. We have seen, at 
multiple points, riders' tactics for training the horse to make better choices for the sake of 
developing the ridden relationship (Chapters Two, Three, and Five). Rebecca Cassidy 
described her Newmarket racing participants as tracing the bloodlines of horses and 
humans creatively in order to enhance a sense of exclusive belonging (2002:33). In 
contrast, this thesis demonstrates my participants' propensity to trace choices creatively in 
order to evaluate and legitimise the constitution of the connectivity they forge with the 
horse. Chapter Four, for example, evidences the way riders can obsess over continually 
defining and working out what sort of  choices the horses' behaviour indexes, the child-
like frame proved useful in affording the horse choices of great import while 
simultaneously mitigating moral legitimacy. 
 
A second theme which emerges is anxiety around the responsibility riders carry to 
recognise the real relationship they are involved in. One common problem riders evoked 
is that they may have too much freedom in the way that they can construct the horse (in 
the epistemological, and physical, notions of the term 'construct'). We saw this in Chapter 
Two where alternative and traditional training systems each harboured critiques that the 
other was too artificial, too invented, not true enough to the real needs of the horse. 
Similar fears were evident in Chapter Three, regarding the possibility of projection, and 
Chapter Four, in terms of infantilisation; each case performed a risk that the horse can 
become fantasised as an object of mere human whim. In Chapter Five, a similar danger 
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was most clearly evident in the critique of rollkur and the threat of over-aestheticising 
horses' bodies, making them into objects for human tastes, rather than forging real 
connections. In these cases, the invocation is that people ought to yield more to nature, 
ought to respect and seek out the underlying realities of the natural relatedness they are 
entangled within in order to realise real connectedness. 
 
Human choice is not only performed as threatening to nature, but also at times, as futile in 
the face of it. The whole project of obtaining a real connection with the horse is imbued 
with a sense of authenticity by virtue of the fact that horses reportedly won't yield just 
because riders want them to. They will not flatter. This idea was cherished and oft 
repeated among my participants, who were likely to tell me why their horse in particular 
was strong minded, complex, crazy, full of attitude, and would be impossible to dominate. 
British horses, at times, embody the idea of a romantically wild nature, beyond the scope 
of humankind to tame, that must be authentically respected, ecouraged, cojoled, and 
tactfully tended, rather than ever fully 'broken-in.' The idiom of the un-forceable horse 
brings us back to the valorisation of choice, with the horse featured as the ultimate 
chooser, wildly independent and recalcitrat, therefore, potentially, the ultimate 
relationship partner, honest and true and authentic (specifically not false or forced), if one 
can genuinely win him over (Schuurman and Franklin 2015, Latimer and Birke 2009). 
These fragmentary ideas about nature, choice and connectivity are sometimes 
contradictory. On the one hand, relationships with horses can be considered particularly 
authentic because nature is too fierce to be doctored by human whim and culture; while 
on the other, there is a risk that nature is misused and misrepresented such that not all 
working relationships are considered 'real connections' after all. On the one hand, choice 
is the very substance of real connection, such that humans cultivate the choosing capacity 
of themselves and their horses when developing ridden relationships, while on the other, 
humans are considered too able to impose their whim on nature, human choice can ruin or 
misrecognise the relationship, and natural relationships based on the horse's instincts, 
bodies and behaviours are considered more real than 'artificial' ones. Throughout these 
complex dynamics bettern choice and nature, I have demonstrated that riders' projects of 
grasping towards the real, and of cultivating connectivity are inseparable from one 
another. Asense of really real is searched for and sometimes found in connectivity, and 
true connections were formed through searching for the really real. 
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What can animals offer the anthropology of ethics? 
 
My argument has largely been formed by creatively employing perspectives from the 
anthropology of ethics in order to critically evaluate how well particular contributions to 
the 'animal turn' can accommodate my participants' ethical relationships with their horses. 
However, the anthropology of ethics can also benefit from, not only contribute to, this 
dialogue with mutlispecies ethnography. Two pathways for engaging the anthropology of 
ethics with ethnographies of human-animal relationships have already been proposed by 
other authors, and I believe I can offer a third. The first involves injunctions already 
discussed in the thesis, to attend to embodied dynamics of 'witnessing', caring for, or 
responding to one another (Dave 2011, Haraway 2008, Despret 2013). I have found it 
useful to recognise the ways in which my participants' relationships with their horses are 
affective, tactile, and developed in relation to the horse's sensitive responses. I have found 
it  informative, for example, to observe that riders’ reflective practices have a direct and 
immediate impact on the horse, and are developed through this responsiveness. However, 
I have found it particularly interesting and important to attend to the way these registers 
of knowing are reflected upon (through dialogue, individually, online, with friends, 
instructors etc) evaluated, and deliberately cultivated. This cultivation has been directed 
toward both horse and human equestrian partners: so that riders might know horses better, 
but also so that horses might be better to know. This emphasises the way self-knowledge 
and other-knowledge are interrelated in contextually specific ways. 
 
In line with this, the second already-proposed route for acknowledging animals within 
accounts of ethics is to observe the way they might be thought about ethically by humans, 
as part of human evaluative ethical projects. This is the suggestion offered by James 
Laidlaw (2013:106-7, 2014:503-4), who maintains his assertion that the ethical domain is 
characterised by the reflective freedom of ethical subjects – a trait he is yet to be 
convinced of in non-humans. This does not mean animals are not significant to ethics, he 
asserts, after all, “Lots of things other than other ethical subjects are of ethical 
significance to us” (2013:107). However, this treatment does not suffice for Eduardo 
Kohn, who, in a book review, pushes Laidlaw further to investigate the ethical dynamics 
'beyond the human' (2014). Laidlaw responds, “[I]t remains unclear to me whether by this 
he is suggesting merely (and surely uncontentiously) that beings other than humans ought 
to receive our ethical consideration, whether they ought to be in some further unspecified 
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way “involved” in humans' ethical practice, or whether they are themselves ethical 
subjects, and, if the last of these, whether this is to include all nonhuman life equally 
(bacteria as much as forests in the same way as dogs)” (2014:503). 
 
I believe animals are involved in a 'further unspecified way' in humans' ethical practice, 
and that this relates precisely to the question that Laidlaw raises; the inconclusive matter 
of animals' reflexive capabilities. Responsive, aware, trainable, sociable, affective 
creatures like horses afford particular ethical problems and projects by virtue of the 
degrees and types of reflexivity, morality, conscience, communication and evaluation that 
they can be thought to demonstrate (or not). Veena Das (2013) refers to Stephen Mulhall's 
(2007) reading of Heidegger, “Animals neither simply lack access to objects in their own 
right (as do stones) nor do they simply possess a humanly accessible mode of access to 
objects (as do other Dasein); their singularity in our experience lies in their having a 
mode of access to and dealing with the world from which we are excluded” (Mulhall 
2007:76 from Das 2013:17).  I am wary of this ontological take on what animals are (and 
stones and people), as it excludes many ethnographic accounts of multispecies 
relationships which challenge that categorisation. Nevertheless, I believe there is 
something – on slightly more general terms – about the responsiveness, but non-verbality 
of animals, that makes them ethically interesting and worth anthropological attention. 
 
Animals can constitute a particular sort of problem, of great interest to the anthropologist 
of ethics, precisely because their (limited? Different?) reflexive capacities and moral 
accountabilities which are not human. In observing how people make sense of the non-
human interactant, who is not-quite-ethical, or at least, not considered ethical in the same 
way as humans (since non-verbal), we can learn more about the constitution of human 
ethical conduct. We can learn about the varied ethical import and changing 
understandings of ideas central to human-human ethical relatedness, such as 
intentionality, choice, emotionality, 'theory of mind', language, truth, communication, 
trust, bond, co-operation and so on, when these concepts are stretched, morphed, 
contested, discovered, and performed differently in relationships with non-humans. For 
example, in this thesis we have learned about the ethics of representation, by observing 
the way horse owners take responsibility for managing the limited (but not wholly absent 
or irrelevant) representational capacities of horses. 
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While many multispecies authors have argued for the ethical import of non-verbal, 
embodied responsiveness (Haraway 2003, 2008, Rose 2002, 2007, Despret 2004, 2013, 
2015, Ingold 2000 2006, 2008) other anthropologists have argued for the centrality of 
verbal language to ethical aspects of life (Carrithers 2005, Lambek 2010, Kohn 2013:133-
135, Keane 2015, Zigon 2014). However, few have investigated the relationship between 
these two registers of knowing and communicating with others, that is, the ethics of 
translating non-verbal communication into speakable terms (though see McKearney 
2018). Alessandro Duranti has argued that we need to collect ethnographic data that 
attends to the  figuring of 'intentionality'  in observable ethical practices (such as giving 
excuses, teaching children) rather than through direct questioning about what can be 
known about others' minds (2008, 2015). Interactions with animals provide an ideal 
opportunity to observe all sorts of aspects of 'marked' (explicit or observable) empathy 
(Hollan and Throop 2008:394) or emapthy-like experiences, practices, and ideas. This 
includes people's ideas about what sort of access to the other's experience they expect to 
have, who might be expected to display empathy (including animals?), in what way, what 
happens when they don't, and what forms of 'complex'  (Hollan 2012:71) empathy are 
called upon when empathising is difficult? The responsiveness, yet non-verbality of 
animals, affords instances where human-human ethical conduct does not quite apply, and 
the way those instances are managed, celebrated, or problematised, are potentially 
informative about aspects of human-human ethical conduct. 
 
The role of language in ethical life 
 
This interest in the way people interact with beings that are not human, but not considered 
entirely unreflexive, has been supported by my interest in speech. In the introduction I 
explained that this focus on speech may be seen as a move away from the imperative in 
the animal turn to attend to embodied registers of knowing that we (to some extent) share 
with animals. I have found it more informative to attend to the important distinction 
between those who can, and can't speak. I have investigated speech not only as a matter 
of speaking about animals, but also as a way of interacting with them. In Chapters Three, 
Four and Five, I described instances where riders' recognised the impact words have on 
the embodied relationship with the horse. Words spoken or heard by riders had effects on 
their muscle movements, breathing rate, somatic sensitivity and emotional tone. Words 
changed minds and bodies – even when they were not considered completely 'true'. 
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However, it is not only the performative but also the referential aspect of speech that I 
have observed as important in the relationships with horses described here. Through 
honing referential descriptions about horses in dialogue, riders were able to develop a 
sense of legitimate knowledge and 'shared reality'. Through adjusting the body towards 
the feel that instructors describe, riders were able to calibrate their own senses towards 
the parts of the horse that couldn't quite be felt. Through refering to the horse as an object 
of joint attention, they were able to reflexively develop their own ethical 'stance' in 
relation to other humans. In attending to language, my ethnography has therefore asserted 
the importance of the third party in ethical human-horse relationships, which are always 
also human-(horse)-human relationships too. We have also seen varieties of self-reflection 
through the use of speech, particularly in Chapter Four, where different forms of 
reflexivity (meta-reflexivity, irony, self-censoring) were evidenced. 
 
This is not to suggest that language is the only important medium for ethical conduct, in 
fact, my intent has been to show how hard riders must work to put non-verbal regiters of 
ethical relatedness into words. However, I assert that we can learn about those non-verbal 
registers of relatedness (such as 'feel' , affect, and maternal love) by studying the verbal 
work that goes into accounting for, and cultivating those experiences and practices. 
Drawing these threads together, I have shown that language plays a central role in the 
development of embodied relationships between these riders and their horses, even 
though they aim for a connection so profoundly close that it is not mediated by any sort of 
representational communication, and is practically inexpressable in verbal terms. 
 
Resillient story tellers   
 
In drawing to a close, I would like to revist my initial assumptions and anxieties about 
equestrian rhetoric that I mentioned in the introduction. There, I noted a potential for 
language manipulation and even hypocrisy that made me uneasy. I hope to have 
demonstrated that I have, in fact, found British amatuer horse riders to be 'reasonable 
creatures' throughout the thesis, but a brief comparison secures the point. Throughout, I 
have critiqued elements of the 'animal turn' for its lack of ability to accommodate the 
ethical practices of my participants. However, we do well at this point to recognise the 
covalences too: multispecies ethnographers seem  - like horse riders - invested in the idea 
of epistemological responsibility, that is, in the importance of knowing your 
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connectedness well. After all, they often appeal to their readers to think differently in 
order to relate better. The difference is in the epistemological virtues that academics of 
human-animal relatedness display, compared with those of British amateur horse riders. 
Clearly, both groups are internally varied and conflicted (as this thesis depicts), yet an 
archetypal comparison can be sketched out. Both groups share a problem with putting 
relationships with animals into words, within a context where 'objective truth' is a potent, 
but vulnerable concept. The academics handle this problem through literary 
sophistication, complexity, and sometimes ambiguity. Vinciane Despret argues, “An 
achievement in this type of dispositive would actually be to make things less simple, and 
to stammer in one's reading, as I sometimes do in writing, in laughter or in irritation. In 
short, to cultivate – as Haraway so accurately does, not without unease or trouble, with 
anger and humor – contradictory versions that are impossible to harmonize” (2016:176). 
Despret characterises a common aim within multispecies literature of playing with, and 
unsettling, the reader's presumptions about animality, humanity, knowledge and more 
(Ogden, Hall and Tanita 2013). 
 
My participants used similar techniques, rhetorical tactics, irony, and inconsistency in 
order to put felt relationships into words. However, compared to the mutlispecies 
literature authors, my participants were also particularly brave in the way in which they 
made regular propositional claims about the true nature of their horse, or their horse’s 
thoughts, character and intentions – and equally bold in the way in which they rigorously 
evaluated one another's claims for veracity. These stories are the means through which 
equestrians make their horses more knowable, and in doing so, offer themselves up for 
evaluation by the self  and others. This boldness is also a product of the nature of 
equestrian engagement with the responsive horse; there is a demand for immediacy, 
conviction, courage and authenticity and little tolerance during equestrian interactions for 
'overthinking' or reservation. I contend that horse riders might be considered particularly 
resilient in their effort to keep narrating the horse as a way of ethically relating to it,  
especially amid such active and moralised critique. I have learned that British horse riders 
don't tell stories about the horse’s mind because they have trivialised the problem of 
knowing the horse, but as one moment in an agile project of working out the 'best good' 
description. These stories are not self-serving, but self-cultivating. The potential for other 
perspectives, other tellings, is at the heart of why the stories need telling, because the 
ethical cultivation of self depends upon ascertaining and negotiating with the perspectives 
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of others.  This includes human others who act as co-authors, authorities, apprentices and 
audiences with whom to build moments of shared reality. But I have also shown that 
human selfhood, in this context, is contingent upon the equine others, who are considered 
never quite knowable enough.   
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Appendix 
 
Christine's Poem for Jolly: 
 
To My Beautiful Boy from his human mother 
High in the clouds of heaven today 
A little horse angel waits: 
With the other angels he will not play 
But stands all alone at the gates. 
“For I know my mother will come” says he, 
“And when she comes she will call for me.” 
The other angels hurry by, 
To faraway fields and are gone, 
And he watches them with a wistful eye 
As he stands at the gate all alone. 
“But I know if I just wait patiently 
Someday my mother will call for me” 
And his mother, down on earth below, 
As she wanders across his yard, 
Remembers him and whispers low, 
How losing him was so hard. 
And the little horse angel pricks his ears 
And dreams that his mother’s voice he hears 
And when at last his mother waits 
Alone in the dark and cold 
For her dying breath to open the gates 
That lead to the clouds of gold, 
She will hear him call to guide her on, 
Her beautiful boy who had never gone 
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